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Pathways from and Crises aft er 
Communism 
Part 2. Th e Case of Former USSR and China
For the fi rst part of this paper see Belvedere Meridionale 2014. vol. 26. no. 4.
Abstract Th e transition from socialist redistributive economy to capitalist markets has 
proved to be a rockier road that anticipated. Th e degree and character of diffi  culties that the 
countries faced during the transition depended on the nature of the pathways taken.
In this paper I distinguish three major trajectories various countries followed: Central 
European neo-liberalism; post USSR neo-patrimonial regime and the East Asian (Chinese and 
Vietnamese) transformation from below. Rather than distinguishing the “right way” from the 
“wrong way” I explore what the diff erent costs and benefi ts of the various pathways were at vari-
ous stages of the transformation.
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Neo-patrimonial regimes
I call the second trajectory neo-patrimonial and – with the exception of the Baltic States 
which followed the prescriptions close to neo-liberalism – the countries of the former USSR 
can arguably be classifi ed as such. The purest type of this pathway is the Russian one. (i) The 
emergent political system is “managed democracy” (typically referred to as “presidential Re-
public”). Political power is usually held by people who were closely associated with former 
communist rule. They were elected to offi ce, but their electoral success was “managed”, the 
ancient regime was organically transformed rather than radically broken up in order to reduce 
the dangers of instability. (ii) The post-communist rulers and the rule itself are paternalistic. 
The privatization process was as fast (or even faster) as under the neo-liberal model, but it did 
not follow the “blind forces” of market, it was resistant to invasion by multinational capital and 
rewarded clients (often called “oligarchs”) who promise to be competent and loyal with property. 
(iii) The paternalistic logic applies to management-worker relationship as well: employers rather 
than laying workers off did not pay their wages, instead they offered them provisions in kind 
(barter – at least initially – was often extensive). How well or poorly neo-patrimonial regimes 
performed is contested. They might have absorbed the initial shock of transition better than neo-
liberal regimes (especially as far as relatively moderate reduction of labour force participation is 
concerned), but the subsequent disintegration of the economy and social order was even deeper 
and lasted even longer. Nevertheless, those who were ready to deliver the verdict by 2000 would 
have arrived at a conclusion prematurely. The second decade of the transition turned out to be 
rather successful for the neo-patrimonial pathway, Russia and the Central Asian Republics took 
off. While in 2008-09 neo-patrimonial regimes also took a dive, they fast recovered and they 
seem to be less vulnerable by the euro crisis. It remains to be seen whether this is a sustainable 
growth trajectory or merely a one-time return on oil and mineral wealth. Some analyst suggested 
that Russia undertook at least a partial re-industrialization following the fi nancial collapse of 
1998 as a response of the sharp drops of domestic demand to import-products. In what follows 
I offer data from to so calls FSU-5, the fi ve population-wise largest post-Soviet states (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, Turkmenistan)
The fi rst phase of neo-patrimonial transition (1989–1998): deeper and prolonged recession
The USSR broke up in December 1991, but the writing was on the wall before: some 
countries declared independence and the economies were already declining by 1989-1990. The 
following decade was an unmitigated disaster. The GDP fell by some 50 %, life expectancy 
declined substantially (mortality of middle aged men skyrocketed). I could not fi nd systematic 
data on poverty/living standards, but by all indication it went through the roof. In my 2000 
survey (KLIGMAN – SZELENYI 2002.) I asked randomly selected respondents on a large sample to 
report poverty in 2000 and recall whether they experienced the same level of poverty in 1988. 
In 2000, 17% of our Russian respondents were below $2.15 PPP expenditure level (the same 
fi gure in Hungary was 1.8%; in Poland 1.7%). While Russia was a poorer country than its CEE 
satellites by the end of socialism (what in irony of Soviet imperialism), it became much-much 
poorer after ten years of transition. Since the trend of decline in GDP and life expectancy is 
similar in the other four neo-patrimonial countries, there is good reason to believe that their 
speed (and level) of impoverishment is comparable to Russia.
Furthermore, the recession was not only deeper in neo-patrimonial regimes (and they 
without doubt qualify for the D word: “depression”) but is also lasted longer. While neo-liberal 
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countries generally recovered by the year 2000 and were at or near the 1988 levels states on 
neo-patrimonial trajectory generally were still in free fall as late as 1998. Recovery had to wait 
until the middle of the fi rst decade of the 21st century.
But in other indicators the neo-patrimonial regimes did not do that poorly. These countries 
managed sharp falls in GDP with relatively small unemployment and quite substantial labour 
force participation. Take the case of Russia. This country in 1992 was in decline for the third 
consecutive year and just in that single year the GDP fell by 15% – nevertheless unemployment 
stood only at 5% and labour force participation was still at a respectable 66%. Or Ukraine: by 
1995 the Ukrainian GDP was down by some 50%, but unemployment did not reach 6% yet!
There is some debate about what caused the disaster of the fi rst decade of the transition – 
and much research remains to be done to give a persuasive answer to this question. Some (SACHS 
2005.; ASLUND 1995, 2007.; ASLUND – GURIEV – KUCHINS 2010.) blame initial conditions and lack 
of consistency in the reforms (and these authors tend to emphasize the relative success of the 
transition), others (STIGLITZ 2003.; KING 2003.) blame the reform strategy, “shock therapy”, espe-
cially mass or voucher privatization (and tend to see the Russian way to capitalism as a disaster).
❖
The Russian (and Ukrainian) neo-patrimonial order seems to be related both to the rather 
dramatic decline in the economy and the relative moderation in unemployment and decline in 
labour force participation. Hence it had its “upside” and “downside” even during the fi rst dec-
ade. The unique feature of privatization under neo-patrimonial order was the exceptionally fast 
transfer of public property into private hands of a new small elite almost “handpicked” by the 
patrimonial rulers. “We need millions of owners, rather than a handful of millionaires… The 
privatization voucher is a ticket for each of us to a free economy” – said President Boris Yeltsin,1 
but this had opposite effect. Given the speed the political leadership intended to transform 
property rights (to make capitalism “in 500 days”) it led to the emergence of an oligarchy. How 
and why? Arguably voucher privatization was intended to achieve sort of Proudhonian social-
ist aims. Indeed: who not make everyone an owner by distributing the common wealth to all 
citizens or at least to all workers of a given fi rm? Future vice premier, Chubais was responsible 
for privatization and under his watch privatization vouchers were mailed out to every Russian 
citizen. But most of them did not know what to do with them, but since their savings disappeared 
due to hyper-infl ation , they offered their vouchers virtually at any price for sale in the emergent 
secondary market for vouchers. A small group of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurially minded 
managerial personnel bought up the vouchers and privatized state owned enterprises well below 
their value. Klebnikov for instance estimated that Gazprom which sold for $250 million in 1994 
by 1997 it was worth $40 billion2. Instantly a new class of a few dozen (or at best few hundred, 
certainly not millions) dollar billionaire oligarchs emerged.
The oligarchs of neo-patrimonial post-communism were similar in many ways to the rob-
ber barons in 19th-century America. And as Aslund among others pointed out there is nothing 
wrong about making such a class, if that solves the property problem (helps to create identifi able 
owners), what it certainly did. But there were some important differences between the oligarchs 
of neo-patrimonial order and the robber barons of the Wild-West US capitalism. For better or 
worse the robber barons were certainly not clients of the American political class, on the con-
 1  Cited by Aslund 1995. 235.
 2  Klebnikov 2000. 135.
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trary, already during the late 19th century money called the shots. Under neo-patrimonial order 
the new rich were sort of “appointed” by the political rulers (and if they proved to be disloyal or 
unpredictable, like Berezovsky or Khodorkovsky from Putin’s point of view they were “fi red” 
or jailed). Even more importantly, while almost all American robber barons made their millions 
by MAKING something (producing steel like Carnegie, drilling and refi ning oil like Rockefel-
ler, building railways – no matter how useless some of those were – like Gould, who resembles 
most the Russian “oligarchs” who built railway line, even though some of those only bought 
markets along already existing lines – they created wealth. In sharp contrast the oligarchs at 
least under the fi rst decade of market transition under neo-patrimonial regimes made billions 
from speculation (like Berezovsky purchasing cars from state owned fi rms at subsidized price 
promising hard currency revenues, but immediately re-exporting them in Russia for high profi ts 
on car markets where consumers normally had to wait for years for Russian cars, but could drive 
off from the saloons of Berezovsky immediately by paying higher than usual prices). So the US 
economy was booming with the raise of robber barons, the Russian economy was collapsing 
as the oligarchs were transferring their extra profi ts from privatization speculations to Swiss 
bank accounts (this is what Berezovsky also did, since the purchased cars from AVTOVAZ with 
promissory notes when infl ation rate was 1000% in Russia, so “saved” his profi t in stable Swiss 
Franks) and freezing them into mansions on the Riviera, Colorado Springs or you name it where.
Well, OK, the oligarchs made a big service by creating identifi able property rights, but it 
is hard not to see that at least for a while society had to pay a heavy price for it – lost half of its 
GDP (and million, probably as many as 3 million in Russia alone –as Lawrence King and co-
authors ague – lost their life years before they were due to appear before their Creator).
Nothing can be further from me than to moralize about this and blame the oligarchs. Most 
of them are shrewd, young and smart entrepreneurs who used the opportunities which were 
inevitably created in a system which intended to turn within 500 days an economy wholly pub-
licly owned into individual private ownership. And this all was managed under the gaze of the 
benevolent patrimonial ruler who was looking for the ablest young people (almost exclusively 
men) who will manage now the newly acquired property effi ciently to serve the leadership of the 
ruler. If they ever lost sight of it they were severely punished (I already mentioned Berezovsky 
and Khodorkovsky). But at least for the early years the relationship of the new barons and their 
subjects was also patrimonial. The oligarchs were rich out of the grace of the ruler so the new 
barons also “took care” of their subjects. Workers may not have been paid, but they were less 
likely to be laid off than their comrades under a neo-liberal regime. Instead of receiving a wage 
they might have gotten a plot on which they could grow their food, the fi rm which employed them 
bartered food for them for the industrial products they produced; if they worked in agribusiness 
they received bartered clothing instead of a wage.
❖
This was workable but of course unsustainable. By the second decade of the transition 
the capital accumulated from speculation is turned into drilling oil, mining copper etc. and 
the relationship between the political bosses and the new grand bourgeoisie, the employers and 
employees had to be renegotiated.
The second decade as we will see is a productive one, but it is more authoritarian rather 
than patrimonial.
But let me comment fi rst on the cross-national differences among the FUS-5 countries. 
 Studies BELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E . .8
BELARUS1
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth
8 -3 -1 -10 -8 -12 -10 3 11 8
Unemployment rate
Na 2 10 15 16 19 14 13 15 16
Labor force participation rate2
na 67 66 65 64 63 62 62 61 60
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na Na Ma Na Na 18 10 12 11
GINI3
22.84 Na Na Na 21.6 Na 28.8 Na Na 30.3
Life expectancy at birth5
71.6 70.8 70.4 70.0 69.0 68.8 68.5 68.6 68.5 68.4
KAZAKHSTAN6
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth7
Na Na -11.0 -5.3 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 .5 1.7 -1.9
Unemployment rate8
Na Na Na Na Na 7.5 11.0 13.0 13.0 13.1
Labor force participation rate9
na 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Public debt (% of GDP)
GINI10
25.711 Na Na Na 32.7 Na Na 35.3 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth12
68.913 68.3 68.0 67.7 66.3 65.7 64.9 64.1 64.5 64.6
RUSSIA14
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 1  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 2  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 3  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 4  1988
 5  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 6  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 7  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 8  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 9  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 10  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 11  1988
 12  Data from www.goofl e.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 13  1988
 14  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
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GDP annual growth
2 -3 -5 -15 -9 -13 -4 -4 1 -5
Unemployment rate
Na Na Na 5 6 8 9 9 11 12
Labor force participation rate15
na 68 67 66 63 61 61 60 58 57
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na Na 48 46 49 57 82
GINI16
23.817 Na Na Na 48.4 Na Na 46.1 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth18
69.2 68.9 68.5 66.9 64.9 64.5 65.2 66.2 67.0 66.8
UKRAINE19
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth20
3.9 -6.4 -8.4 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9
Unemployment rate21
Na Na Na Na Na Na 5.6 7.6 8.9 11.3
Labor force participation rate22
na 63 62 62 61 61 60 60 59 59
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na Na Na Na Na 22 24 30 38
GINI23
23.324 Na Na 25.7 Na Na 39.3 Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth25
70.5 70.1 68.9 68.9 67.9 67.9 67.1 67.3 67.3 68.0
TURKMENISTAN26
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP annual growth27
-4.9 .7 -4.7 -5.3 -10.0 -17.3 -7.2 -6.7 -11,3 6.7
Unemployment rate28
na Na Na Na na Na na na na Na
Labor force participation rate29
na 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Public debt (% of GDP)
na Na Na Na na Na na na na Na
GINI31
26.432 Na Na Na 35,4 Na Na na Na 40.8
Life expectancy at birth33
62.6 62.7 62.7 62.7 62.7 62.9 63.0 65.2 63.4 63.6
 15  % of total population ages 15+ years old, see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 16  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
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Th e description of neo-patrimonial order off ered before fi ts reasonable well Russia and the 
Ukraine, but it is at best a rough estimation of the actual socio-economic processes and structures 
in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Th e Belarus comes close to something one could call a neo-Stalinist state. Belarus carried out 
some privatization, but the public sector is still the dominant one. Its post-Soviet recession (hard 
to call it transformational recession, since Belarus did not experience as of yet much of a transfor-
mation) was somewhat milder than in Russia or the Ukraine, though the unemployment rate in 
Belarus was substantially higher and the decline in life expectancy almost as bad as in Russia. Slow 
or little reform did not protect Belarus from the crisis, though its economic performance aft er 
1997 was respectable. Its economy bottomed earlier (1996) while the other countries – each one 
of them, especially Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan better endowed in natural resources 
– were still in free fall. While Belarus followed a diff erent trajectory in terms of privatization 
than Russia it has a similar socio-political system as the other neo-patrimonial countries (and 
it has very close economic and political ties with Russia). Each of the neo-patrimonial regimes 
were (and still are) ruled by older men who were high or at least middle ranking offi  cials in the 
Soviet political, economic or military/intelligence establishment. Kazakhstan’s Nazerbayev was 
already the chairman of the council of ministers during soviet times; Belarus’s Lukashenko was 
an offi  cer of the Soviet Army and a mid-level manager during the 1980s; Turkmenistan’s eccentric 
fi rst post-Soviet president (“president for life”) Niyazov was the fi rst secretary of the Communist 
Party of Turkmenistan; Ukraine’s Yanukovich was promoted to managerial positions during the 
1980s despite his earlier criminal (NOT political, criminal-criminal) convictions and of course 
Russia’s Putin was an offi  cer of KGB. Th e rulers operate with a sophisticated network of clients 
and while in Russia and the Ukraine there is a somewhat competitive multi-party system, their 
democracy is highly “managed”, in Belarus and Kazakhstan and especially in Turkmenistan 
there is little semblance of any democracy. All fi ve countries are “presidential republics” with a 
strong institution of presidents who are not tested in particularly competitive elections (some of 
the elections – especially in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – are not competitive at all – giving 
80-95% of the votes to the “candidates” – resembling elections in Soviet times).
 17  1988
 18  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 19  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 20  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 21  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 22  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 23  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 24  1988
 25  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 26  Data from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 27  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 28  Statistical data are state secret in Turkmenistan. Offi  cial statistics report 0% unemployment, but it is believed 
to be 60%. Th at casts doubt on the labor force participation statistics as well. See CIA World Factbook, www.
cia.gov
 29  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 30  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 31  1988
 32  Data from www.google.com/publicdata (from World Bank)
 33  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
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 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Turkic states – used to be rather nomadic nations before 
incorporated into the USSR – with the majority of their population is Muslim and both regimes 
increasingly – though still cautiously play the Islamic card.
Despite these diff erences in economic policies and historical-cultural background, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union impacted the countries in similar ways to a similar extent, hence 
defi ning them as travelling on a similar trajectory, distinctly diff erent from Central European 
neo-liberalism and East Asian “capitalism from below” seems to be justifi ed. 
Th e second phase of neo-patrimonial transition (1999–2010): economic explosion and fast 
recovery from the Global Financial Crisis
Th e great surprise of the post-communist transformation is the aggressive recovery of neo-
patrimonial regimes. Social theory would predict that neo-patrimonial regime and economic 
modernizations are inconsistent hence the collapse of the 1990s impressed many of us as some-
thing anticipated. But starting the 1999 for ten uninterrupted years all countries I identifi ed 
as neo-patrimonial were on a growth trajectory, some achieved double digit GDP growth and 
they outperformed the neo-liberal regimes and produced growth rates comparable to China. 
Th e BIG puzzle of course is: are these countries so successful, because they are neo-patri-
monial or to the contrary they are successful, because they are resource rich? Hard to tell, since 
both the crisis of the 1990s and the explosion of the fi rst decade of the 21st century probably has 
as much to do with resource richness/dependency and the strategy of transition or the nature 
of the social-political regime.
Th ere are really two schools of thought to explain the diff erent dynamics of the 1990s and 
early 2000th. Among other commentators Aslund (2010) and Treisman (2010) claim that the 
collapse of the 1990s is overestimated and the resource curse is way exaggerated (Ruthland and 
others tend to agree). Russia (and arguably the region) is on the right track, neo-patrimonial or 
authoritarian order is transitory and eventually with economic growth and modernization Rus-
sia will also enter the democratic development (this is also consistent with Jeff rey Sachs, 2005).
Others attribute both the collapse and the recovery/and new downturn in the Russian 
economy to resource dependence. Russia fell so deeply in the 1990s, since oil prices plummeted 
– it recovered, since energy and mineral prices skyrocketed during the early years of the 21st 
century and it fell sharply in 2008 again because the shrinking demand for raw materials and 
oil/gas. Sidosenko (2011) claims than even in 2010, 98 % of Russia’s export cane from natural 
resources and primary derivatives. 
❖
So was the impressive recovery simply the result of the increase of raw material and oil/gas 
prices or was there something else beyond it? Some argue aft er the 1998 fi nancial crisis Russia 
(at least partially) re-industrialized. Given the collapse of the ruble import product became far 
too expensive hence a policy of import substitution led to some degree of re-industrialization. 
(Kadochnikov 2006.) A complementary explanation is a rebuilding of state capacities under 
President Putin, as Peter Rutland put it a transition from Yeltsin’s Oligarchic capitalism to “state 
guided capitalism” (for this distinction see also Baumol–Litan–Schra 2007.), what some may 
attribute to Putin. It is hard to tell how much of the success of the fi rst two presidencies of Putin 
have to do with the “state guided” capitalist development (which in the spirit, if not in the words 
of Baumol and his co-authors may not be the best, but it is certainly not the worst either). An 
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alternative explanation is that it is not so much the reasonable or even smart industrial policies 
of the Russian state, which leads to the expansion of the early years of the 21st century, but the 
growth of oil, gas and mineral resource prices. Th e big question what only further careful research 
can answer: was Russia turning away from oligarchic capitalism to state led capitalism but – as 
Peter Rutland suggests – was it merely cash in the revenues of a rentier state.
Th e social science literature has begun to use the idea of rentier state (following to footsteps 
of Karl Marx idea of “rentier capitalism”) since the 1970s (the fi rst usage of the term is attributed 
to Hussein Mahdavy, 1970) to describe those economies, which generate especially high revenues 
from exports of mineral resources, especially petroleum may suff er from the so called resource 
curse. Th e high revenues from natural resource creates disincentives to develop other branches 
of the domestic economy (if natural resources are discovered in already developed countries 
that can cause the so called Dutch Disease, the new resource may draw capital and labor from 
already developed sectors, increases their expenses, a decrease their competitiveness). Hazem 
Behlam and Giacomo Luciani (1987) applied it to the Gulf Countries and in general Arab 
states, Douglas Yates (1996) applied it to Africa (Gabon, but others used it for Nigeria as well). 
Ahmet Kuru identifi ed Turkmenistan as a rentier state (2002) to the best of my knowledge 
the fi rst attempt to conceptualize neo-patrimonial post-communist regimes as “rentier” state. 
Turkmenistan with an estimated40-60% unemployment rate, with then fourth largest oil and 
gas deposits in the world and with the highly authoritarian state qualifi es perfectly for the label. 
Arguably Russia and Kazakhstan in the fi rst decade of the 21st century demonstrated rentier 
state characteristics. Both of these states have large mineral and oil resources and they dramatic 
growth fl uctuated in strong correlation with the oil prices. Being a resource rich rentier state 
tends to be a mixed blessing or indeed can straight be a curse. Economists usually emphasize 
the long term negative impact on economic development, but resource wealth and the rentier 
character of the state can be a barrier to democratization as well (Ross 1999. 312.), rentier states 
can buy peace and diff use political mobilization by generous welfare payments and let us add 
by maintaining strong oppressive apparatuses to keep those inline who does not benefi t from 
those welfare provisions (like the guest workers in the Gulf States).
❖
It is diffi  cult if not impossible to make a clear distinction between patrimonial regimes and 
the authoritarian/rentier state. I call regimes patrimonial, if there is a patron-client relationship. 
So the early post-Soviet Russian state was patrimonial, since the new rich received its wealth as 
“patrimony” from the good-will of the ruler and employers were also expected to take care of 
their employees rather than laying them of and leaving them at the mercy of the welfare state. 
Hence GDP fell, but unemployment remained low. Th e relationship between the ruled and ruler 
was one of loyalty and mutual obligations. Th e oligarchic stage of Russian development (from 
mid 1990s until the end of Yeltsin’s rule) was rather diff erent, the oligarchs threatened the power 
of the rulers and they tended to act in a rather despotic manner towards their subordinates. Th e 
purest type of neo-patrimonial order were the early days of Yeltsin and especially the fi rst years 
of Putin with his rather successful attempt to establish himself as the “good czar”, poverty was 
reduced, GINI was declining and the regime – far from democratic – had substantial popular 
support. But the “good old days” are clearly gone; Russia is more and more obviously an authori-
tarian system. Some of the rentier states treat at least some of their subjects well and combine 
strict authoritarian rule for the majority with generous provisions from rents to a privileged 
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minority. Th e clearest examples are the Gulf Monarchies, in particular Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates where excessive exploitation of the “guest worker” majority (some 95 percent 
of the labor force in these countries are “guest workers”, who work there on three year renew-
able visa) with Scandinavian style welfare provisions for the 10 percent “natives” (Christopher 
Davidson, the best scholar of UAE hesitates to call it “tribal capitalism” ( Davidson 2009.) or 
“retier state” (Davidson 2005. 298.). Undoubtedly, tribal capitalism, or neo-patrimonial regime 
implies more the notions of loyalty, obedience, mutual obligations, while rentier state refers to 
oppressive and exploitative practices. Th e shift  from neo-patrimonial to authoritarian/rentier 
state is discernible in the successor countries of the former USSR, Belarus being on one end of 
the scale Turkmenistan on the other end of the spectrum.
BELARUS34 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
1.5 4 4.1 4.2 6.8 6.4 9.2 9.9 8.2 10 .2 7.6
Unemployment rate
Na 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.0 Na
Labor force participation rate35
59 58 58 58 57 57 56 56 56 55 55 56
Public debt (% of GDP)36
13 17 13 11 10 10 9 8 9 Na Na Na
Population below poverty line
Na Na Na Na 27.1 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
GINI
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 27.2 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na 68.0 68.1 68.3 68.4 68.6 68.7 69.1 70.1 70.3 70.6 70.9
KAZAKHSTAN37
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
1.7 10.5 12.2 9.5 9.2 9.1 9.5 10.6 8.5 2.4 1.2 7.0
Unemployment rate
Na Na 10.0 8.8 8.8 8.0 8.1 7.4 7.3 6.6 6.3 5.5
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na na Na Na Na 13.7 10.5 11.0 7.7 8.9 14.2 16.2
Labor force participation rate38
70 70 70 70 70 69 69 70 71 71 71 71
Population below poverty line
35.0 Na 26.0 Na Na 19.0 Na Na 13.8 12.1 8.2 Na
 34  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 35  Data 1999-2007 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 36  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 37  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 38  Data from www.google.com/publicdata
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GINI
Na Na Na Na 31.5 Na Na Na Na Na 26.7 Ma
Life expectancy at birth
65.539 63.2 63.3 63.4 63.5 66.1 66.6 66.9 67.2 67.6 67.9 68.2
RUSSIA40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
3.2 6.3 Na 4.2 7.3 6.7 6.4 6.7 8.1 5.6 -7.9 4.0
Unemployment rate
12.4 10.5 8.0 Na 7.9 8.5 8.3 7.6 6.2 6.4 8.4 7.6
Labor force participation rate41
61 61 60 60 60 60 60 61 62 63 63 63
Public debt (% of GDP)42
90 63 48 41 32 28.2 12.9 8.0 5.9 6.7 8.3 9.5
Population below poverty line
40.0 Na Na 25.0 25.0 17.8 Na Na 15.8 Na 13.1 Na
GINI
Na Na 39.9 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 42.2 Na
 Life expectancy at birth
Na 67.2 67.3 67.5 67.7 66.4 67.1 67.1 65.9 66.0 66.0 66.2
UKRAINE43
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
-.4 6.0 9.0 4.1 9.4 12.0 2.6 7.1 7.7 2.7 -15.1 4.2
Unemployment rate
Na 4.3 4.3 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.1 2.7 3.0 8.8 8.4
Labor force participation rate44
58 58 57 57 57 57 58 58 58 59 59 59
Public debt (% of GDP)45
51 46 37 34 29 24.7 17.0 12.7 11.7 10.3 30.0 38.4
Population below poverty line
50.0 Na 29.0 Na 37.7 Na Na Na Na Na 35.0 Na
GINI
29.0 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 27.5 Na Na
 39  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 40  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indictor/.SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 41  Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 42  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
 43  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 44  Data 1999-2003 are from www.ebrd/economicsstatistics
 45  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book
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Life expectancy at birth
Na 66.0 66.2 66.3 66.5 66.7 69.7 70.0 67.9 68.1 68.2 68.5
TURKMENISTAN46
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
16.5 18.6 20.4 15.8 17.̀ 17.2 13.0 11.4 11.8 14.7 6.1 9.2
Unemployment rate
Na na na Na na na Na Na na Na na na
Labor force participation rate47
60 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61 61
Population below poverty line
Na na Na na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
GINI
Na na Na na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
63.8 63.9 64.0 64.1 64.3 64.4 64.4 64.5 64.6 64.7 64.8 64.9
Belarus and the Ukraine are outliers. Belarus is poor in mineral resources and the Ukraine 
is also rather poor. It is more the political system what binds these countries together than the 
political economy. While the sharp drop of GDP during the fi rst decade in Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan clearly is related to the moderation of oil prices and their explosive growth for 
the most part in the fi rst decade of the 21st century was caused by the new oil boom, Belarus and 
Ukraine’s economy cycle has more to do with their dependence on the Russian economy (and 
during the Global Financial Crisis the collapse of the Ukrainian economy also on its increasing 
dependence on the world markets and EU).
Despite the spectacular growth of neo-patrimonial regimes during the second decade of the 
transition, it is unlikely the success can be attributed to neo-patrimonial nature of the regime. 
Th ese regimes were turning rentier states with highly and probably increasingly authoritarian 
systems. On balance neo-liberalism performed slightly better, but the only unqualifi ed success 
story is Poland and it is hard to tell whether Poland was so successful, since it was pursuing the 
neo-liberal prescription more closely, or to the contrary, because it was somewhat less dependent 
of international capital. Th ere is little doubt that both neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial regimes 
did better than they would have done would have stayed on the state socialist trajectory, but 
the road from socialism was and remained rocky. Th e nostalgia for the communist past which 
is still haunting the region is on the whole silly – people are freer and most of them live better 
than they or their parents used to live twenty years ago, so the nostalgia is either romanticizing 
the past when people were younger or a reasonable expression of anxiety in a new world where 
there is less security and more risk taking – nevertheless, the hopes of the late 80s or early 90s 
were hardly met and disappointment is widespread – oft en expressed by shift  to the far right – is 
a major fact of post-communist social life in the former communist countries of Europe. Ivan T. 
 46  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 47  Wor4ld Bank estimate, using $1.08 per day per capita consumption with 1993 PPP, see China from Poor Areas 
to Poor People. Report No. 37349-CN, March 2009, Washington DC.: Th e world Bank
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Berend formulated the problem even for the most successful neo-liberal trajectory so astutely: 
1944-1993 was a “detour from the periphery to the periphery” (Berend 1998).
During the early 1990s, I met David Stark several times at various conferences and he oft en 
recited an old Irish joke: two men meets somewhere in Ireland. Th e fi rst one asks: “Which is 
the best road from here to Belfast?” Th e other responds: “Do not start it from here.” Good joke, 
but overstates the importance of the initial conditions and understates the policy errors made 
in selecting the pathways.
Th is leads us to the last section of this paper: the special trajectory China followed. We are 
oft en warned (Sachs 2005.) to be very careful in comparing the Chinese transformation with the 
post-Soviet and post-socialist European transition. Ironically, the argument is just the opposite of 
the Irish joke. Th e Irish joke implies: the problem is with the initial condition, you would easily 
get to Belfast, if you started from a better position. Now the Chinese initial conditions without 
doubt were the worst. So if China – unlike the former USSR or its European satellites – is a 
success story, it should not be attributed to the worst initial condition, it can be the outcome of 
the “advantages” of backwardness (to invoke Gershenkron 1962.), so either the inverse of the 
Irish joke is correct, or the Irish joke is incorrect, what matters is not the initial condition, but 
the selection of appropriate policies.
I am sitting tightly on the fence when I have to evaluate what matters more: initial condi-
tions or policy choices. Both matter. Th e Czechs may have made some policy errors they still 
of all right, since their point of departure was so much better; the Hungarian initial conditions 
were pretty good and they may do poorly by now since they made some policy errors, the Poles 
were not in great shape during the 1980s, now they do better, probably because they made some 
good policy choices.
So the big question for the last section: can one claim that the Chinese did something 
right or they simply do fi ne because, they started from the very bottom (the benefi t from the 
advantages of backwardness)?
“Capitalism from below”
Th ere is a third pathway from redistribution to markets which can be identifi ed with East 
Asian socialism, China (and Vietnam). In contrast with the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial 
trajectory which created capitalism by design, built the transition from above in East Asia, the 
drift  from state socialist redistributive economy started from below. Th e nature of the Chinese 
formation and the driving forces behind its undisputable (though not necessarily sustainable) 
economic success is the subject of some controversy. According to the offi  cial ideology, China 
is “market socialism” (which is just a stage on the road to communism), while most Western 
commentators emphasize the capitalist features of China today. Some underline the “Chinese 
characteristics” (Huang 2008.) of its capitalism, Victor Nee is his earlier work saw “hybrid” ele-
ments in the Chinese formation, but in his latest book, “Capitalism from Below” (Nee 2012.) he 
sees private entrepreneurship as force behind China’s growth. Philip Huang (2012) in contrast 
objects to the binary opposition between public and private, capitalism and socialism but he 
emphasizes the central role of local (and central) government and the public sector in ferment-
ing social and economic development. He is inspired by the work of Jean Oi and her theory of 
‘local state corporatism’ (Oi 1992, 1999.) who emphasized that the success of rural China cannot 
be merely attributed to raise of the private sector; the local state manages to use revenues from 
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Township and Village Enterprises (TVE’s) to meet local social needs (fund education, healthcare 
etc.) when the central state cannot provide for such goals any longer. Is a “state centered” – change 
from above – (Oi) or “society centered” change from below – (Nee) centered explanation a better 
fi t with the data? 
Greatly infl uenced by Nee’s early work (Nee 1989.), I introduced the idea of “capitalism 
from below” (Eyal and all, 1998. and King – Szelenyi 2005.) to distinguish the Chinese way 
from the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial trajectory away from socialism. My proposal was not 
quite as radical as Nee’s new theory is, but I made the following assumptions: 
Unlike the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial shock therapeutic ways of making capitalism 
the drift  away from redistribution to markets has been gradual in China (and aft er the mid 1980s 
in Vietnam). How gradual it was is disputed (Sachs for instance argues de-collectivization in 
China was suffi  ciently a ‘shock’, Sachs, 2005) , but “transformation from below” never experi-
enced fast mass privatization; deregulation of state control over the economy was spread over 
years or decades, while it (convertibility of currency, elimination of tariff  barriers etc) occurred 
in neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial regimes almost over-night; 
(ii) In China the transformation started in the agrarian sector by shift ing fi rst production 
and next marketing/distribution of products from the agricultural collectives to individual peas-
ant households. Another engine of early economic take-off  for reform China was the success of 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). Th e property rights of TVEs during the 1980s were the 
subject of heated debates. TVEs offi  cially were collectives and operated under local government 
control. Hence many commentators regarded the success of TVEs as proof of the central role 
collective (rather than private) fi rms (see Huang 2012.; Oi 1999 among others). Others (Yasheng 
Huang and others) claimed that the majority of TVEs were private businesses. According to 
Yasheng Huang, only 1.5 million out of the 12 million TVEs during the mid 1980s were publicly 
owned (Huang 2008. 79.). Incidentally one unanticipated – by most Western observers on the 
political left  and right – outcome of this “market transition” (Nee pointed this out in 1989) was 
the improvement in the living conditions of rural masses, the shrinking of inequality between 
rural and urban population, between cadres and the rest of the society, especially peasantry.
While I still believe this was a reasonably correct analysis of the Chinese reform of the 
1980s, my earlier position needs to be reconsidered. During the 1990s and the fi rst decade of the 
21st century there was some convergence with the neo-liberal/neo-patrimonial model. Yasheng 
Huang called this as the “great reversal” – the shift  away from an entrepreneurial trajectory to a 
state directed one ((Huang 2008. 109–174). Yasheng Huang is far from an advocate of socialism 
– to the contrary, he has been critical of the evolution in China during the 1990s since it drift ed 
away from entrepreneurial capitalism a more statist mode (what Philip Huang – much more 
sympathetic to the causes of socialism – is inclined to call “state capitalism”). Nevertheless, it is 
hard to dispute that there was substantial re-centralization during the 1990s (the most impor-
tant was arguably the change in the taxation system, Beijing regained a great deal of taxation 
authority and the balance of power shift ed back from the province and localities which were quite 
well off  during local state corporatism” the center, which suddenly was fl ooded with resources).
Let me illustrate this one anecdote. In 1995, I was in Beijing with my dear colleagues, Andrew 
Walder and Donald Treiman. One evening we were walking around – thirsty – in the Forbidden 
City. We saw light on in an ancient building and it turned out to be a “Bier Stube”. So we had our 
Tsingtao Beer when it turned out Andy actually knew the manager who was making his tour 
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around the guests. Th at person turned out to be an employee of the National Archives where 
Andy did a great deal of research. We eventually learned that the “Bier Stube” is a side-branch 
of the National Archives. Th e funding was so much cut for the archive that in order to survive, 
they had to start some business venture to supplement their resources. We gathered around that 
time even the central Chinese intelligence agency had to run a hotel in downtown Beijing not 
so much to have easier access for the surveillance of foreign guests, but because they needed the 
funds from the business. Th ese were times of the poor central state (with reasonably well to do 
local states). When I was back in Beijing in 2010, all seem to have changed. Beijing was fl ooded 
with resources. Th e Sociology department at Tsinghua University had better resources than Yale 
and Beijing was fl ooded with money (I also recall the rather inadequate facilities of the People’s 
University in Beijing during our visits during the early 1990s).
Well, one can object: but was it not 1997 that China started to privatize the corporate sec-
tor? Absolutely, but the question is: how did that “privatization” take place? But Yasheng Huang 
casts some doubts on the privatization of public sector. He suggests that IMF statistics which 
claims that only about 25% of the non-agrarian production comes from the public sector simply 
identifi es “legal persons” when they are indicated as owners of a form as “private owners”. Ac-
cording to Yasheng Huang, these “legal persons” oft en stand for public entities, for instance for 
government owned banks or fi rms largely owned by government banks (Op cit, 15–16). Hence 
Chinese privatization maybe quasi-privatization and the contribution of the public sector to the 
non-agrarian GDP may be somewhere 50-75% (these fi gure are similar to the data provided by 
Philip Huang, who is of rather diff erent political persuasion).
While it can (and IS) be contested how large the private vs. the public sector is, whether 
the state or the private sector leads Chinese economic growth all sides tend to agree that during 
the 1990s social inequalities increased substantially in China. During 1978 and 1985 GINI was 
moderated (much to the surprise of Western left -wingers GINI was actually quite high at the 
end of the Mao area and during market reform it was moderated) but aft er 1985, and especially 
during the 1990s inequalities (and most disturbingly the urban-rural inequalities) skyrocketed. 
While GINI in China today is not all that diff erent from the USA most commentators agree 
(and in this respect by Yasheng Huang and Philip Huang are on the same side) it is untenably 
high and unlike the fi rst decade of the reform the second two decades had some serious negative 
social consequences, which eventually needs to be addressed.
According to Yasheng Huang, China during the second half of the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century, during the Hu-Wen regime China began to address these issues, paying more attention 
to rural development and social inequality. Th e dominant ideology of the fi rst decade of the 21st 
century is “social harmony”, an idea borrowed more from Confucianism rather than Marxism. 
While in Marxism-Maoism the emphasis is on equality the idea of social harmony can live with 
inequality as long as it accommodates the idea of harmony – some can be more privileged than 
others but they also need to have responsibility for those beneath them. It involves more the idea 
of solidarity and responsibility rather than equality.
Hence China’s post reform (aft er 1978) development can be classifi ed into three various 
stages, or epochs, “capitalism from below” (1978–1985 or possibly until the late 1980s, though 
following 1985 the Chinese leadership begins to respond to the dissatisfaction of the urban 
population to the “rural” bias of the early reform, but not suffi  ciently to prevent the 1989 revo-
lutionary upheavals ); the “great reversal” (or the Chinese equivalent of capitalism from above, 
1992–2002, the Jiang Zhu era, with 1989–1991 as a temporary reversal to pre-reform policies, 
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with a strong pro-urban bias) and the post 2002 epoch (the Hu-Wen era) with an emphasis on 
“social harmony” and rural development.
What is constant in the Chinese case (and strikingly diff erent from the former USSR and 
its European former satellites) is the fact that the CCP retained its power monopoly (though 
the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is losing credibility and Confucianism is gaining 
ground) – it appears that it is still true in China by the second decade of the 21st century that 
“politics is in command”. In political terms China is still a “communist country”. 
Th e performance of Chinese way of drift ing away from redistribution to market arguable had 
less social costs and more social and economic returns than the neo-liberal and neo-patrimonial 
trajectory. During the fi rst three decades of its transformation, China produced double digit 
(or close to double digit) annual economic growth, and while inequality increased substantially 
aft er the fi rst decade of the reform the number of Chinese below the poverty line was reduced 
by hundreds of millions. China also was almost unscratched by the global fi nancial crisis. Th e 
Chinese entered the global fi scal crisis not only without sovereign debts, but with gigantic re-
serves and applied a massive doze of classical Keynesian stimulation package in a timely manner 
(Keith Bradsher, 2009). Th e way the $US600 billion Chinese “stimulus package” was spent is also 
indicative to what extent China is now driven “from above”, almost all the stimulus went to the 
public sector and local governments (while the main benefi ciaries of the Bush-Obama stimulus 
packages were private enterprises, especially banks and other fi nancial institutions)
Economic performance of “Capitalism from below”
China, social and economic development3
Entrepreneurial epoch (Capitalism from below) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Annual GDP growth
11.7 7.6 7.8 5.2 9.1 10.9 15.2 13.5 8.8 11.6 11.3
Population below poverty line, headcount48
Na Na Na 65.2 Na Na 47.7 Na Na 30.2 No
GINI49
Na Na Na 29.1 Na Na 27.7 Na Na 29.9 Na
Life expectancy at birth50
66.5 66.7 67.0 67.2 67.5 67.8 68.0 68.3 68.6 68.8 69.0
Th e Great Reversal (Capitalism from above) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Annual GDP growth
4.1 3.8 9.2 14.2 13.5 12.6 10.5 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 8.3
Labor force participation rate51
Na 72 73 73 73 73 73 72 72 72 71 71 71
 3  National Bureau of Statistics, China statistical yearbooks (http:///www.cinability.com/GDP.htm; CIA World 
Factbook gives slightly diff erent fi gures from 1999
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GINI
Na 32.4 Na Na 35.5 Na Na 35.7 Na Na 39.2
Population below poverty line, headcount52
Na 35.0 Na Na 30.3 Na Na 18.7 Na Na 19.9 Na 15.6
Life expectancy at birth
69.3 69.5 69.7 69.9 70.1 70.2 70.4 70.6 70.8 70.9 71.1 71.3 71.4
“Social harmony”
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Annual GDP growth
9.1 10.0 10.1 9.9 11.1 11.4 9.6 8.7 10.4 9.4
Labor force participation rate53
70 70 70 69 69 69 68 68 68 Na
GINI
42.6 Na Na 42.5 Na Na Na Na 47.054 Na
Unemployment rate55
Na Na 10.1 9.8 9.0 4.2 4.0 4.3 Na Na
Public debt (% of GDP)
Na Na 31.4 24.4 22.1 18.4 16.2 16.9 17.5 Na
Population below poverty line56
Na Na 10 Na Na Na 8 8 2.8 2.8
Life expectancy at birth
71.6 71.8 72.0 72.2 72.4 72.6 72.8 73.1 73.3 Na
When tested against empirical data, Yasheng Huang’s theory fares well for the early 1980s, 
but it does not off er much support to his hypotheses concerning the “social harmony” epoch. 
Indeed, 1978–1985 produced impressive growth together with a moderation of social inequality. 
I take this is strong support for Victor Nee’s 1989 “market transition theory”. But as capital-
ism shift s from “below” to “above” Nee’s theory does not seem to stand any more, but Yasheng 
Huang’s optimistic expectations about a new policy of social harmony, or a social democratic 
phase of Chinese capitalism or market socialism (you name it the way you want to) does not 
get much support. Economic growth remains around the same level as it was in the 1990s, but 
there seem to be no evidence for anymore “social harmony”, social inequality reaches its highs 
at the end of the epoch.
 48  Data from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook
 49  Data from Index Mundi, CIA Factbook
 50  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 51  World Bank estimate, using $1.08 per day per capita consumption with 1993 PPP, see China from Poor Areas 
to Poor People. Report No. 37349-CN, March 2009, Washington DC.: Th e world Bank
 52  % of total population ages 15+ , see www.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TFL.CACT.ZS
 53  CIA World Factbook, 2007. China ranked #33 among the countries of the world, the US #41 with a GINI of 
45.0
 54  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Fact-book 
 55  People living below $1.25 a day
 56  Data from Index Mundi, CIA World Factbook
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Some now regard to Hu-Wen epoch as a “lost decade” and incoming president Xi is expected 
to open a fourth epoch, with further liberalization of the economy and Singapore like political 
reform of the party.
Let me off er a few concluding remarks on the case of Vietnam – the case I am the least 
familiar with and which is also the least covered in scholarly literature. Most commentators I 
read see Vietnam as following the Chinese strategy of transformation (Guo 2004. 393.; Yamaoka 
2007. 13).
Th e reform in Vietnam came though substantially later. Aft er the Vietnam War the com-
munist leadership imposed the most doctrinaire policies on the South, creating a major eco-
nomic crisis and food shortages during the second half of the 1970s (Yamaoka 2007. 12). Th e 
Vietnamese orthodox leadership resisted pressure from reform even when it came from their 
staunchest ally, the Soviet Union and from Gorbachev – the door to reform only opened up when 
the arch-conservative Le Duan in 1986 passed away and another conservative, though one with 
reformist inclinations, Truang took over the leadership (Bunck 1996). Th e reforms introduced 
by Truang were called Doi Moi and they resembled in some ways “perestroika” though when 
the chips came down it was closer to the Chinese rather than the late Soviet and especially early 
post-soviet Russian model. Vietnam, much like China some seven years earlier, dismantled the 
agricultural cooperatives and gave agrarian production back to the peasants (this is something 
Russia never did and the Central European countries did not do either). So in one stroke Vietnam 
eliminated food shortages and as far as we can tell dramatically reduced poverty during transition 
(while as we saw poverty skyrocketed in the former USSR and its European satellites). Vietnam 
also followed China by NOT combining perestroika with glasnost, hence retaining the political 
monopoly of the Communist Party, what arguably was the precondition – but for a price what 
many would judge to be unaff ordable – of a gradualist transformation (this again is something 
what distinguished Vietnam and China from the European post-communist regimes – see this 
point in Yamaoka 2007. 9.) 
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s reforms were not only later than the Chinese, they also had more of 
a shock element. While Vietnam did not rush to mass privatization, it moved more aggressively 
to market liberalization, shut down early state enterprises, opened faster rooms for the private 
sector and opened up its borders to FDI (Bunck 1996. 236.). Hence I may argue Vietnamese 
“capitalism from below” came with a “neo-liberal” fl avour. Nevertheless, Vietnam never expe-
rienced the transitional recession/depression mainly because in the fi rst stages of reform the 
rapidly expanding household sector absorbed most of the costs (and labour freed from SOEs 
– see McCarty 2000.) 
So far Vietnam is a “success story” – much like China is. Th ey managed the transition 
without the frightening costs other post-communist transformation trajectories could not avoid. 
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VIETNAM57
1986 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP annual growth
2.8 5.1 9.5 5.5 4.7 6.0 7,2 7.7 8.5 8.2 8.5 6.2 5.3 6.8
Unemployment rate
Na Na 25.0 Na Na Na 6.1 1.9 Na 2.0 4.3 4.7 6.5 2.9
Labor force participation
Na 76 75 74 74 74 74 74 74 73 73 73 73 73
Population below poverty line
Na Na 37.058 Na Na 28.9 Na 19.5 Na Na 14.3 Na 12.3 10.6
GINI
Na Na 36.159 Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 37.6 Na Na
Life expectancy at birth
Na Na Na 69.3 69.6 69.9 70.1 70.4 70.6 70.9 71.1 71.3 71.6 71.9
But both for China and Vietnam the BIG question is – much like for the neo-patrimonial/
rentier states, but for a diff erent reason – sustainability. Th ere are two major reasons why the 
East Asian transformation from below is vulnerable: (i) will they be able to retain their export led 
industrialization once the price of their labour will catch up with the rest of the world? (ii) can 
the political monopoly of the communist party maintained under market capitalist conditions 
and if it cannot is a “gradualist” transformation of the political system conceivable? If it is not 
and political systems either stay or fall, what would be the social and economic consequences 
of such a political disintegration?
Victor Nee in his Capitalism from Below (Nee 2012.) off ers us the most optimistic scenario. 
Th e main meta-theoretical implication of this formidable book is that the natural or normal way 
capitalism evolves is “from below”. Aft er all, capitalism came also “from below” in England, 
the United States or the Netherlands. Gershenkron’s 19th century cases of fi nance capital led 
capitalism in Germany or state-led capitalism in tsarist Russia were aberration just as capitalism 
by design either in neo-liberal or in neo-patrimonial way may be. Let me add: democracy did 
not come fast and free. Early capitalism operated sweat-shops, did not have universal suff rage, 
workers resistance was broken by force. Democracy is a late-comer and came only aft er strenu-
ous fi ght for liberty and equality. Hence Jeff rey Sachs may be right (Sachs 2005.): democracy 
will come to China, but let me add: in due time. Let’s not put then wagon ahead of the horse.
But a fi nal word of warning: comparing the various pathways out of state socialism is tricky 
however. One may just compare apples and oranges. East Asian socialist formation faced very 
diff erent challenges when reforms began. China during the late 1970s was still an overwhelm-
ingly agrarian society, while before the fall of communism the USSR and its European satellites 
completed industrialization. China could – and still can – extensively grow and fl ood the world 
market with inexpensive industrial goods. Th e domestic market in China has extraordinary 
potentials. It is estimated that only about 200 million Chinese from the population of 1.3 billion 
lives in a mass-consumption society. China in responded to the Global Financial Crisis and the 
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shrinking of world markets for its products by expanding domestic consumption. On the other 
hand Russia and Central Europe did not have much of a choice. Th eir political regime melted 
down in 1989–1991, no room was left  for “gradualism”, building capitalism “from below” – be-
ing integrated into the world system without much or any qualifi cation was inevitable and the 
crises which followed were logical consequences of such integration.
 So can we learn from each other or we only can learn from our own mistakes? I do not 
want to end this paper with a totally agnostic note. If there is a lesson to be learned it is certainly 
a complex one.
Th e road from socialism to capitalism certainly proved to be rockier, costlier (and lasted 
longer) than anticipated. Some of those costs should be discounted given the “initial conditions”, 
but other costs incurred due to policy choices governments made. Some of the benefi ts of arriv-
ing at the “destination” also might have been overestimated hence popular disillusionment – a 
common post-communist experience – can be attributed for less benefi ts than hoped for higher 
costs than society was prepared to pay.
Let’s return to the Irish joke. What could be our response to the stranger somewhere in 
Ireland lost his way and asks us: which is the best road to Belfast?
First I would ask: Are you sure you want to go to Belfast? Th ere are many other possible des-
tinations why don’t you compare at least some of them with Belfast? Would you consider London 
or Stockholm instead of Belfast? How much do you know about Belfast anyway? Is it possible 
that Belfast is actually not quite as nice as you think it is so, if you get there you may regret it.
Th e second point I would make: well, as you should know there are many roads which will 
get you to Belfast. Some roads may not be for you. Some needs a lot of climbing and given the 
conditions of your knees, I would not recommend you to take those. But do not allow anybody to 
fool you and claim: there is only one (or the “best”) way you can get to your destination (whatever 
that may be). So our fi rst task is to eliminate some of the roads which are obviously not suitable 
for you and once that was done you evaluate carefully what are the costs and benefi ts of each of 
the roads open to you.
My fi nal point: each destination off ers various kinds of benefi ts and each road has various, 
multiple kind of costs. To decide which benefi ts you want and what costs you are willing to pay 
cannot be established in a scientifi c manner, these are political choices a well-informed public 
needs to make in a democratic process. Belfast is cosy and the beer is good, but the place is bor-
ing. London is exciting, but you might fi nd it too big and you would feel lost in it. Stockholm 
may be of the right size with just enough excitement, but will you stand the long and cold winter 
nights? So it depends on your preferences what you want. Th e same goes with costs: if you take 
road A rather than road B, it may take you longer, but it may be shadier so you will suff er less 
from exposure to intense sunshine. So how much are you willing to pay from what kind of cost?
Aft er all, with more or less costs, with more or less disillusionment all transitional societies 
are at some sort of “destination”, the “transition” by and large is over. But less illusion, more 
cool-headed rational calculation by a well-informed public in a democratic discourse may have 
made this transition less frustrating. And fi nally, let’s not forget: there are no fi nal destinations 
in history. Market transition is over but there are other transitions (making a welfare state for 
some, transiting to democratic policy for others or all of the above…) ahead of you. So you are 
again – always – at cross-roads. Th ink about the advice we just gave to the lost stranger in Ireland. 
And do not forget: once you got to Belfast you may continue your journey to London, New York, 
or who knows, probably to Singapore?  ❋
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Romania has moved from being an offi  cially atheist country to being one of the most religious 
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likely to achieve its goals in the long run.
Keywords religion, Romania, desecularization, secularization
DOI 10.14232/belv.2015.1.2 http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2015.1.2
Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this article:
Kiss, Dénes (2015): Desecularisation in Postcommunist Romania. Belvedere Meridionale 
vol. 27. no. 1. 27–37. pp
ISSN 1419-0222 (print) ISSN 2064-5929 (online, pdf)
 Studies BELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E . .28
Presently, Romania is one of the most religious countries in Europe (Voicu 2007, Tomka 
2005). However, this situation is relatively new, as twenty three years ago Romania was offi  cially 
an atheist country, in which religion – at least offi  cially – was considered the anachronistic, 
tolerated relic of the past. And although in reality the population of the country was probably 
quite religious back then as well, the social importance of religion was signifi cantly lower than 
today – thus this leading position of the country at the beginning of the 21st century is the result 
of developments of the past 20 years. In my paper I attempt to review these developments by 
analysing the events that led to the present-day situation.
Th e expansion of religion in Romania is not an isolated case, as from the 1990s onwards 
several comprehensive studies report a religious revival as well as the rise in the social signifi cance 
of religion (Casanova 1994, Berger 1998a). Based on Berger, the concept of desecularization 
is accepted to name the phenomenon, which should be understood as counter-secularisation, 
that is the expansion of religion in societies previously characterized by secularizing tendencies 
(Berger 1998b). In his detailed explanation of the concept, Karpov (2010) defi nes desecularisa-
tion as the opposite process of secularisation, and uses the same dimensions in outlining it as the 
ones applied by the theoreticians of secularization. Th us, one of the areas of desecularisation is 
represented by previously secularized institutions, in which religious norms gain new ground, 
both in the formal and informal sense. Th e process of desecularisation can be realised in the 
practice of religion and religious faith, leading to the revival and intensifi cation of religious life, 
but also through the fact that religious practice moves from the private sphere to the public one 
in a more accentuated way. Desecularisation can also manifest itself in the character of cultural 
products (art, literature, philosophy, etc.), the contents of which have become more religious, 
and last but not least in the “substratum” of society, that is in its material culture (e.g., in the 
building of churches and parochial buildings, in the growth of the economic wealth of the 
churches, in the appearance of religious market products, etc.). Th ese diff erent areas of social 
life can become desecularised more or less independently from one another, and thus we can 
encounter very diff erent cases of desecularisation in real life (Karpov 2010. 250). Th e areas in 
which desecularisation processes take place are mostly determined by the social actors they are 
the result of: while the simple religious actors achieve outcomes mostly in the fi eld of religious 
practice and faith (“desecularisation from below”), the activist groups with greater social infl u-
ence are capable of de-secularising the system of institutions and culture in the above sense as 
well (“desecularisation from above”) (Karpov 2010. 251–255).
While I agree completely with the above outlined concept of desecularisation, in my analy-
sis – which is not based on my own empirical research, but aims to be a synthesis of available 
empirical analyses – its application is diffi  cult as it includes many dimensions that have not yet 
been investigated in Romania. Th us, preserving the logic of Karpov’s conceptualisation, the de-
secularisation processes which have taken place in Romania are discussed below using the three 
dimensions of secularisation defi ned by Dobellaere. Dobellaere, in systematising the voluminous 
scholarly literature on secularisation, determines three “levels” of the phenomenon (Dobellaere 
2002). According to him, secularisation means a diminishing commitment of the individuals 
towards the church, which he calls “individual secularisation”. Th is therefore covers the increas-
ing diff erence between the actual religious knowledge, attitudes and everyday behaviour of the 
believers and the expectations of the church related to these. Th e second level of secularization 
is institutional secularisation, which means the internal, organisational restructuration of the 
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churches and denominations, including the changes in the message and in the values represented 
by the organizations. As a third level of secularisation he identifi es societal secularisation. Th is 
is the result of the functional diff erentiation of modern societies, and covers the phenomenon in 
which, due to gradual professionalization, certain sectors (sub-systems) of modern societies gain 
more and more autonomy, becoming independent in this process from religion. As a result of 
this level of secularisation, religion becomes an independent social sub-system, which in addition 
is being gradually transferred from the public sphere to the private sphere (Dobellaere 2002. 
29–40). Th e cause of the diff erentiation of the sub-systems is rationalisation, as a result of which 
the actors of the sub-systems are regulated by instrumental control rather than moral control.
In the light of Dobellaere’s theory, in the following I consider the changes that have occurred 
in Romania in the relationship between religion and the main institutions of society, that is in 
the societal position of religion, as well as the processes on the level of religious organisations, 
and the way in which individual religiosity has been transformed.
Religious change at the societal level
One of the most common explanations of the change occurring in the societal status of 
religion in social modernisation is linked to the theory of social diff erentiation, according to 
which the sub-systems specialising in performing certain social tasks and “functions” become 
more and more self-reliant and more independent from other sub-systems, they start following 
their own instrumental rationality and take the more general moral considerations less into ac-
count (Pokol 1997). Th e independence of the individual sub-systems from religion can occur 
as an unexpected consequence of professionalization (latent societal secularisation), but also as 
the conscious eff ort for the laicisation of the given social sphere (manifest societal secularisa-
tion) (Dobellaere 2002). As it is known, in Eastern Europe the latter type of secularisation 
was dominant, and the reduction of the infl uence of the churches and religion over certain sub-
systems occurred as the result of violent intervention on the behalf of the state. Such secularising 
intervention was for example the nationalisation of religious education, of the religious health 
and social institutions, or the banning of the economic activities of churches by confi scating 
their property. Th is aspect of the socialist transformation of society was not legitimate in the 
eyes of large groups of the population, thus the political motivation of societal secularisation 
between 1945 and 1989 was one of the reasons and prerequisites of the opposite, desecularisation 
processes aft er the regime change. As the result of the latter, religion and the churches have been 
re-gaining infl uence over the previously secularised institutions of society, and their infl uence 
seems to be growing steadily. Th e presence of the church in such institutions is oft en merely 
symbolic, which in itself is not a negligible phenomenon; however sometimes the intertwining 
of the religious and other sub-systems exceeds the symbolic level and religion comes to aff ect 
the functioning of the sub-system (Moise 2004; Andreescu, G.–Andreescu, L. 2009). 
Th e process of desecularisation in question is perhaps the most spectacular in the case of 
the political sub-system. From the point of view of this relationship it is crucial, that orthodox 
theology mutually defi nes the Romanian nation and the church by each other, and that – ac-
cordingly – any attempt to separate the church and the state is interpreted as an attack against 
the church (Stnescu 1996). Its relations with any kind of political power are viewed by the 
Romanian Orthodox Church in the light of the “Byzantine Symphony”, according to which the 
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proper arrangement is the close co-operation between the two. Even in the communist decades, 
this co-operation worked better than in the majority of socialist countries, as a result of which 
the suppression of denominations in Romania was less powerful than in the other countries 
of the communist bloc. Th e desecularisation of the political system aft er the regime change is 
especially striking on the symbolic level, as the presence of the leaders of the Orthodox Church 
sanctifi es almost every political event. In addition to this symbolic presence, the church and state 
structures are intertwined in their institutions as well, through the State Secretariat for Religious 
Aff airs. Th is institution, although part of the state apparatus, is virtually the representative of 
the Orthodox Church in the state apparatus by the fact that the ones occupying offi  ce positions 
are almost without exception church people with a degree in theology, and who try to enforce 
the interests of the Church rather than those of the state in their offi  ce. 
In addition to the symbolic and institutional intertwining, the Orthodox Church also in-
fl uences the functioning of the political sub-system. Th is is achieved on the one hand through 
the close relationship between the Orthodox Church and ethnic identity, as in every political 
decision with an ethnic dimension the infl uence of the Orthodox Church as an ethnic church 
is obvious. In addition to their role in the formation of ethnic politics, in the last twenty years 
denominations have frequently played a role in shaping public opinion in political issues not 
related to ethnicity as well. In this respect the role which can be considered even more impor-
tant than infl uencing the voters’ choice options, which the Orthodox Church gained through 
the development of policies and infl uence, is that in the public debates it has become the most 
important social partner at the expense of the institutions of civil society.
Th e process of desecularisation is similarly spectacular in the case of educational institu-
tions. Th e symbolic presence is strong in this case as well, as the events at the beginning and end of 
school years are rarely without ecclesiastic presence, religious symbols on the walls of educational 
institutions are oft en found – one of the public debates in the topic has been provoked exactly by 
the issue of icons (sacred images) in schools (Bakó–Horváth 2009). Establishing school chapels 
and college churches is no longer of a merely symbolic signifi cance, as there is real religious 
activity going on in them, and as such they are the bastions of church(es) in the educational 
system. Th e most important interlocking of religious and educational institutions however has 
not been achieved by these, but by the introduction of religious instruction in schools, as the 
result of which church representatives with a degree in theology have become a constant presence 
in public schools. Th is presence infl uences the specifi c rationality of education, regarding the 
pedagogical principles on the one hand, and the principles of cognition on the other. Pedagogy 
is an independent science, with particular notions regarding education and training, as well as 
particular methods developed for these, from which the principles and methods of the churches 
may be more or less diff erent (Moise 2004).1 In addition to these particular pedagogical issues, 
the presence of the church infl uences the functioning of the school in the way that it spreads a 
world view and cognitive logic diff erent from the scientifi c world view and the rational cogni-
tive principles behind it that are propagated by education. Th is eff ort is well represented by the 
attempt to exclude the theory of evolution from the biology curriculum, as well as that of the 
philosophical concepts of God from the philosophy curriculum.2 In these cases the autonomy 
 1  Th e diff erences between the pedagogical principles are well presented in an educational story written by 
Moise: in the story from the Orthodox religion textbook the little boy tries to destroy a swallow’s nest, but due 
to God’s intervention the ladder falls, and the little boy lies in bed all summer as punishment (Moise 2004).
 2 A comprehensive overview of this attempt to infl uence the curriculum can be found in the open letter ad-
dressed to the Ministry of National Education by the Solidarity for the freedom of conscience organisation. 
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and independence of these scientifi c fi elds are damaged as a result of the intervention of the 
religious sub-system. Besides the attempts to infl uence the contents of the curriculum, there is 
a similar infl uence upon the actually taught material as – especially in rural schools – due to 
administrative reasons the teachers of religion with a theological qualifi cation are forced to teach 
other subjects as well (Moise 2004, Stan–Turcescu 2005, Andreescu et.al. 2007).
In addition to politics and education, a strong presence of the church has been established 
in the social and health care sector. In these the situation is similar to the above, except for the 
fact that the impact on the functioning of these institutions is presumably weaker, than in the 
case of political or educational institutions. Th e infl uence of the church upon the economic 
sphere seems also to be minor.
In the above we have mainly discussed the transformations of the relations between the 
Romanian Orthodox Church and the institutions of the state, as the societal status of religion 
is determined fi rst and foremost by the religion of the Romanian majority. Th e situation of 
the Hungarian minority denominations is also worth an analysis. Taking into account the not 
purely religious social engagements of the Hungarian historical churches, it becomes obvious 
that – unlike the Orthodox Church – these primarily take place within the framework of civil 
society. Th is is consistent with the Western European models, where the emergence of religion 
from the private sphere (de-privatisation) and the strengthening of its social presence (revitali-
sation) also happen within the frameworks of civil society. By its presence in civil society, the 
public appearance of religion is realised without infl uencing the systemic operation of these 
societies (Casanova 1994).
With regard to the societal expansion of religion and churches, the question of the social 
legitimacy of the phenomenon can also be raised. In a nationally representative survey conducted 
in 2008 we formulated questions about the public perception of the political infl uence of priests. 
Th e answers revealed that the majority of the population does not agree with the infl uence of the 
church upon politics: infl uencing the opinions of the voters was rejected by 80% of the respond-
ents, while 73.5% does not agree with the infl uencing of political decisions. We have not found 
any signifi cant diff erences in these opinions of the diff erent ethnical groups.3












Priests should not infl uence
 the way people vote 50.1. 28.9 9.3 5.4 6.2
Priests should not infl uence
 political decisions 48.9 24.6 12.1 7.7 6.7
http://www.humanism.ro/articles.php?page=62&article=225
 3  Th e data are from the “Social cohesion and inter-ethnic climate in Romania 2008” research, which was car-
ried out by the Interethnic Relationships Research Centre in October-November of 2008 for the Romanian 
Institute for Research on National Minorities.
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Changes in the organisation of the church, modifi cations in the denominational 
structures and the nature of religiosity
I fi nd particularly remarkable two aspects of the manifold processes of transformation in 
the mid-level of the Romanian religious context: the organisational growth of the large churches 
and the changes in the religious patterns within these.
From the point of view of organisational changes the large churches have gone through a 
process of obvious growth. Th e end of the bans formulated by the communist regime was fi rst 
followed by an increase in the number of the clergy, and together with the introduction of religious 
instruction in public schools a new body of individuals with a theological degree appeared, that of 
the teachers of religion. Th eir number reaches in order of magnitude that of priests, as according 
to the 2011 statistics of the Orthodox Church, in addition to the latter group of 14,231, the group 
of around 7,700 of the teachers of religion is active in education. 4 Th e growth of the clergy and 
that of the training of teachers of religion both have contributed to the growth of a third group 
of religious experts, that of teachers of theology. Th e expansion of the latter group was further 
strengthened by pairing theology with other university courses, as a result of which theological 
training became available in a much larger circle. Th e integration of theological education in 
state universities – which means that the fi nancial burden of the cost of the training does not 
need to be borne by the churches – resulted in the facilitation of the rise in the number of both 
the students and the teachers. Th us the number of institutions providing theological education 
increased from three to fi ft een in the fi rst ten years aft er the regime change, and the number of 
the enrolled students exceeds ten thousand (Andreescu–Kacsó 2009). And fi nally there is a 
signifi cant rise in the number of groups of monks, whose massive presence mainly characterizes 
the Orthodox Church: according to the aforementioned statistics in 2011 there were 8476 monks 
living in the country. Overall the number of people with a theological qualifi cation has multi-
plied in the last twenty years. Th is organisational and personnel growth mainly characterises 
the Orthodox Church; however similar processes took place in the case of the other churches as 
well. Th e smallest increase occurred in churches with less signifi cant resources for growth: the 
ones, which – due to the fact that they have less members and to their geographical dispersion 
– were not entitled to start groups within the system of religious education in schools, and in 
which there are no religious orders functioning.
In addition to the institutional growth within the church, another organisational change is 
the institutionalisation of church movements. Two types of such movements should be distin-
guished, the ones organised around visions, and the reform movements created with the purpose 
of changing the churches from within. Movements built around visions mainly characterise the 
Orthodox Church,5 however we have knowledge of similar events in the Hungarian population 
of the country, the most important of them being the one organised around the Seuca visions 
 4 Th ese data refer only to Orthodox priest and teachiers of religion. Th e source of the Romanian Orthodox Church 
Staff  statistics: http://www.patriarhia.ro/_layouts/images/File/ADM_2011.pdf (accessed: 2014.02.05) Th e 
numbers of teachers of religion is mentioned in the following: http://www.noutati-ortodoxe.ro/b-raspunsul-
patriarhiei-romane-la-ultimele-dezinformari-asur-b_l24744_p0.html (acessed: 2014.12.15)
 5 In his textbook “Misiologie şi ecumensim” [‘Missiology and Ecumenism’] David Pestroiu presents several 
movements organized around visions: Noul Ierusalim, Petrache Lupu de la Maglavit, Miscarea de la Vladi-
miresti (Pestroiu, 2010)
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(Peti 2009). Th e common characteristic of these movements is that they are popular among 
the members of lower classes, and institutionalised movements are rarely developed from them. 
Churches treat them with reservation; any type of institutionalisation usually leads to excom-
munication and exclusion. Th e reform or revival movements are created with the purpose to 
renew worship and moral order within the church. Th ese movements therefore signal the need 
for internal change, while their constant presence in the church may trigger the transformation 
of the dominant forms of piety. Th ey are more organised than the ones built around visions, 
and thus their exclusion is more diffi  cult, especially when members of the clergy are involved in 
them. Table 2 lists the most important reform movements of the three largest historical churches, 
without being exhaustive.
Table  v Th e renewal movements of the three largest churches in Romania
Romanian Orthodox Church Roman Catholic Church Reformed Church
Oastea Domnului [‘Army of the Lord’]
Miscarea Rugul Aprins 
[‘Th e Burning Bush Movement’]
Miscarea Ortodoxa de Reinviere 




Hit és fény [‘Faith and Light’]
Karizmatikus Megújulás 
[‘Charismatic Movement’]
Ferences Világi Rend [‘Secular 
Franciscan Order’]
CE Szövetség [‘CE Association’]
Zimányi – mozgalom [‘Zimányi – 
movement’]
Miskolci Missziós Csoport [‘Mis-
kolc Missionary Group’]
A part of these movements were established as far back as the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. Before communism, most of them were considered sects to be excluded by their churches, 
and the communist regime did not tolerate them because of their self-organised, civil nature. 
In order to eradicate them, secular power oft en used the help of priests working for the secret 
police as well, and as a result these movements survived until the regime change as underground 
movements, in confl ict with their own churches. Aft er the regime change the most important 
ones were reconciled with, and a more or less formal integration was achieved as well (Kiss 
2003; Blaga 2009).
Th e analyses on the most popular reform movements of the three largest churches, the 
Oastea Domnului [‘Th e Army of the Lord’], the Catholic Charismatic Movement and the CE 
Association, have pointed out several common characteristics within these. All three movements 
are organised as integrated systems of small groups, as multi-centre horizontal networks consist-
ing of local small communities. Regarding their teaching – compared to their churches – they 
are characterised by a greater ethical rigour on the one hand, on the other the members play 
a more active role in the shaping of individual religious world views than what is usual in the 
large churches; nevertheless this happens with a frequent emphasizing of doctrinal unity with 
the church. From the point of view of religious practices the importance of personal repentance, 
the evangelization ambitions, the high emotional loads of community events, the high impor-
tance of music and song, as well as the relative laxity of physical discipline can be highlighted. 
As there is no common root of these movements, the similarities in the movements operating 
within the framework of the diff erent churches probably indicate a more general shift  in religious 
needs, regardless of denomination. Such common features are the practice of religion in small 
communities, the religious egalitarianism within these small communities, the high degree of 
individual freedom and spontaneity in the experiencing of religion, as well as the appreciation 
of emotions. Th e unusual success of the Pentecostal Church featuring many of the above also 
supports our interpretation, as the membership of this church has increased by 64 percent in 
the period following the regime change (from 220,000 to 362,000).
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Apart from the spectacular growth of the Pentecostal Church, the denominational structure 
of the country aft er the regime change is characterised by a high degree of stability, the smaller 
changes are partly explained by the fact that many Hungarians have emigrated (the decrease in 
the percentage of Roman Catholics, Reformed and Unitarians) or by the aging membership (the 
decrease in the percentage of the Israelites). Concerning the changes in the membership of the 
diff erent denominations, the slowing growth of evangelical churches is conspicuous, especially 
in the past ten years, as well as the minimal success of the newer “sects” and new religious move-
ments: the category of “other denominations” increased from 0.4 percent to only 0.6 percent in 
twenty years. Knowing that half of this, 49,820 people belong to Jehovah’s Witnesses, 15,514 to 
the Romanian Lutheran Church, and 14,385 to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the remaining 
“other denominations” make up only 0.2 percent of the denominational structure.6 Although 
the exact composition of this is not known, according to our knowledge it is largely made up of 
evangelical communities, while the presence of new religious movements that have made a great 
stir in the Western countries in the past 50 years seems insignifi cant. However, it is essential 
to mention in relation to the latter that most of them do not expect an exclusive membership 
from their followers, that is they do not expect them to give up their previous religious affi  lia-
tions, and the options to connect off ered are not the usual (for example they off er participation 
at courses rather than membership), so the number of followers is almost impossible to grasp 
from the statistical point of view.
Table  v Romania’s denominational structure according to census data, as well as the changes in the 
membership of the denominations between 1992 and 2011.
1992 2002 2011 Change between 1992 and 2011 (%)
Eastern Orthodox 86.8 86.8 86.5 -17.7
Roman Catholic 5.1 4.7 4.6 -25.1
Greek-Catholic 1.0 0.9 0.8 -32.6
Reformed 3.5 3.2 3.2 -25.1
Pentecostal 1.0 1.5 1.9 64.1
Baptist 0.5 0.6 0.6 3.1
Seventh-day Adventist 0.3 0.4 0.4 4.4
Unitarian 0.3 0.3 0.3 -24.8
Muslim 0.2 0.3 0.3 15.0
Evangelical Christian 0.2 0.2 0.2 -14.9
Old Believers or Old Rite Christians 0.1 0.2 0.2 15.7
Lutheran Synod Presbyterian 0.1 0.1 0.1 -5.0
Lutheran (Augsburg Confession) 0.2 0.1 0.0 -86.2
Israelite 0.0 0.0 0.0 -63.6
Other denomination 0.4 0.5 0.6 25.0
Non-religious and atheist 0.2 0.1 0.2 14.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 -
 6 All the numerical data regarding the denominations are based on census data. Source: http://www.recensa-
mantromania.ro/ 
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Changes in individual religiosity
Besides the changes outlined above regarding the social presence of churches and their 
systemic roles, there has been an increase in religiosity in the individual aspects as well. Despite 
all their shortcomings, the most frequently and periodically repeated surveys used to measure 
personal religiosity allow the tracking of the intensity of religiosity over time. To this end, they 
diff erentiate several dimensions of religiosity, for example the practical aspect of religion consist-
ing of actions, the (cognitive) dimension of faiths and knowledge, the dimension of experience 
and the organisational dimension. In the period following the regime change an increase can 
be detected in all of these. Th e following fi gure shows several indicators of the cognitive, practi-
cal and organisational dimensions of religiosity in three diff erent points in time: in 1993, 1999, 
and 2008. Th ere has been an increase in every one of these indicators. Th e increase was more 
signifi cant between 1993 and 1999, followed by stagnation: between 1999 and 2008 the values 
remain roughly the same.
Th e international comparative studies draw attention to several other additional explanatory 
factors of this high degree of religiosity. Th ese show that in Europe the economic situation of the 
countries, the level of education, as well as religious pluralism determine the level of religiosity: 
the richer the country, the more it is characterized by religious plurality, the higher the level of 
education of the people, the less religious the population of that particular country is. In the case 
of Romania all three indicators determine a higher degree of religiosity (Voicu 2007).
Th us Romania, as the result of a complex process, has become one of the most religious 
countries in Europe, but the question is how long this religious fl are is going to exist. On the dif-
ferent levels of the analysis regarding the expected changes in the societal signifi cance of religion 
contradictory predictions can be made. On the level of individual religiosity the explanations 
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used by international comparative studies predict a temporary nature to the religious fl are, as 
a possible economic boost and the expected growth in the education of the population will in-
duce a decrease in religiosity in the light of these. A similar eff ect on personal religiosity is to be 
expected from the slow increase in religious plurality, which is also facilitated by international 
mass migration, which makes facing religious otherness inevitable even if the background of 
the migrants does not become pluralised from the religious point of view. Based on the systemic 
and organisational changes presented in the fi rst part of our analysis however, in these scenes 
of religious revival the persistence of religion is more likely, as the increased systemic presence 
of the churches and their position of power can hardly be reduced. For the manifold multiplied 
group of religious experts it is also an existential necessity to preserve the current position of 
power, and knowing that we are talking about probably the most eff ective opinion-forming 
group, it is not likely that there will be any attempt on behalf of the political class to limit the 
political power and infl uence of these groups.
It is possible that in the future in Romania, besides a highly de-secularised system of insti-
tutions and the presence of an enlarged group of religious experts, the slow decline of personal 
religiosity can be expected. Th is can be inferred not only from the above described system of 
interconnections between welfare, education, religious plurality and religiosity, but also from 
the fact that the religiosity of the growing generation seems not to be greatly infl uenced by the 
now stronger religious socialization through religious instruction in schools. As shown in Figure 
3 above, the religiosity of the successive generations presents a continuous decrease regarding 
most indicators, and this linear decrease is not broken by the fact that the generation born aft er 
1981 received full religious instruction in schools. Th ese data thus indicate that in spite of the 
systemic spread of churches, in the case of individual religiosity the continuation of the trend 
of secularisation is to be expected in the long run. ❋
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Abstract In my study, I intend to give a brief overview of the development of Hungarian 
communist built and Western-European industrial towns. What makes this topic worthwhile for 
exploration is that towns currently experience a number of core changes in their fabric. Naturally, 
these stem from their history, which in turn aff ects the current urban development schemes, 
the landscape of towns, and modifi cations in spatial arrangements. Another important aspect 
is that substantial variations are observable between the Western European and the Hungarian 
urban development models. On the one hand, past development policies refl ected the economic 
and political realities of each country, which was further coupled with the east-west divide, thus 
impacting development priorities. As a consequence, there are still clear divergences among the 
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goals.. Th e article provides a detailed analysis of the various models, emphasizing peculiarities 
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Th e generally accepted theory of the stages of urban development was fi rst elaborated by the 
so-called Dutch school (Klaassen, Paelinck, van den Berg) in 1981. According to this thesis, the 
development of urban regions can be broken down into a number of stages in which population 
does not evolve in a haphazard way but rather, especially in developed countries, follows a general 
pattern. Th e stages encompass urbanisation with rising core city populations, suburbanisation 
with the development of suburban regions surrounding the core city, disurbanization whereby 
rural areas experience higher population gains, and reurbanization with a signifi cant rebound 
in the population of the core city.
György Enyedi, an economist and geographer, supplemented the general urban develop-
ment theory on two points. He provides an alternative reading of the fourth stage by claiming 
that there are no actual population gains in the reurbanization stage, rather an alteration in the 
pattern of urban space takes place. (Enyedi 2011.) Furthermore, he argues that the shift  from 
one stage to the other is triggered by long-term economic cycles, the Kondratiev waves.
A brief survey of the development of Western European industrial towns
During history, even prior to the 20th century, there were numerous examples in Europe 
of the planning and subsequent foundations of entire towns or new sections of existing ones. 
It is not accidental that politics always played an integral part in the decisions related to urban 
development; however, it was during the historical developments of the 20th-century Europe 
which elevated political ideologies to a distinguished position in the foundation and life of 
newly established towns.
From the 1930s, but especially from the beginning of the 50s both in Western and Eastern 
Europe the wave of newly established towns in essence created new urban centres all across 
the continent and rearranged the settlement patterns of individual countries to some extent. 
Following World War II on both sides of the divided continent, new towns were founded, but 
generally speaking all of them in their spatial design, functional and structural makeup followed 
and adapted to their physical, spatial surroundings. In Western Europe, newly built towns pri-
marily appeared in the outlying metropolitan areas of large urban centres and secondarily in 
well-established but resurging industrial areas. In Eastern, Central-Eastern, and South-Eastern 
Europe communist industrial development carved out a prominent role for the newly established 
towns in industrial regions, mining areas, and transport centres. Simultaneously, the planning 
of towns with commercial (industrial) and residential functions in the vicinity of large urban 
centres with already existing industrial capacities served the pre-determined goal of industrial 
development, so there were rarely spontaneous suburbanization. (Uzzoli 2013.)
Forced industrialization from the beginning of the 1950s had a tremendous impact on 
Central-Eastern European countries. Th e fi rst phase in this process was the extensive devel-
opment of heavy industry. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the industrial development of 
Central-Eastern Europe did not simply mean the slavish copying of the Soviet example; still 
analogous patterns prevailed as in the case of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 30s when the 
developed capitalist countries tried to strangle her economically (Enyedi 1978.).
For the fi rst phase of industrialization to be successful several factors had to be in place. Th e 
rapid pace of progress indicates that the entire economic potential of Central-Eastern Europe 
was allotted to this task. Th e resulting dominance of heavy industry, especially the energy sector 
and the steel industry in Czechoslovakia and Hungary was unmistakable, yet, in parallel, the 
traditional chemical industries also strengthened during this period.
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Th e rapid growth of heavy industry required major development projects, which was ac-
complished at the expense of other industries. Th ere was also an additional need for labour, 
mainly recruited from unskilled agricultural workers departing the country for the cities 
and for a new life. In the selection of the location of an industrial enterprise, accessibility for 
transportation was traditionally an important precondition. In the case of the resource-poor 
Central-Eastern European countries, this meant positioning the new industrial facilities near 
major transport arteries, e.g. the placement of the Romanian and Hungarian steel mills along 
the Danube. (Enyedi 1978.) Th e heavily politicized nature of industrialization similarly lead 
to industrial development projects in the backward agricultural areas and to an increase in the 
number of industrial workers.
Th e composition of the labour force underwent radical changes with employment in agricul-
ture being increasingly supplanted by industry-related jobs. Th e migration of rural populations 
into urban areas accelerated, thus the proportion of urban populations on the planet doubled 
in half a century from 19.4% in 1920 to 38.4% in 1970. In Western Europe already 70% of the 
population lived in cities by this time. (Perényi 1978.)
Th e chief characteristics of communist urban development consists of strong state in-
tervention in spatial and urban development; forced development schemes and limited actual 
urbanization and slow pace of growth in the existing urban areas. Th e prime motive in the 
establishment of new towns was the industrialization of predominantly rural areas and for 
that end the new urban centres became the key benefi ciaries of state funding allocations. Th e 
state economic policies guaranteed the privileges of the status of towns to the new settlements, 
which as showcases enjoyed extra funding and opportunities through regular economic plan-
ning and special development programmes. In most cases, medium-sized towns built around 
a single factory or industry were representative examples of communist development aims and 
spatial development programmes. (Germuska 2002,2004.) Th e forced communist urbanization 
schemes generated this unique type of urban settlements, which continue to exist and function 
to this very day. (Uzzoli 2013.)
Naturally, each country exhibited its particular form of urban development. Th e results 
were diverse depending on economic conditions and opportunities, and the socio-political 
agendas set. Following World War I with the creation of the Soviet Union and aft er World War 
II with the emergence of communist satellite countries, the social achievements and the political 
maturity exhibited by the working class demanded greater attention from the governments in 
the west in aff ordable housing policies, utilities and infrastructure improvements, as well as in 
local public transport development.
Th e primary purpose of the construction of new towns was to neutralize the damage caused 
by the destruction of World War II. Some European countries, e.g. the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and France, suff ered considerable destruction. At the same time, reconstruction heavily 
impacted the theory and practice of urban planning and construction. Besides the elimination 
of war damage, the need to build adequate housing and the commencement of infrastructure 
development projects were also of high priority.
Th e construction of new towns began mainly in the form of residential or satellite towns of 
large urban centres. In the newly developed industrial regions, new industrial towns developed, 
while already existing industrial areas maintained their oft en unhealthy and cramped living 
environment. At this time, the concentration of industry and population created large urban 
agglomerations increasing challenges. Concomitantly, the expansion of road and transporta-
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tion systems had its downside as well, since new road networks and hubs were created radically 
altering the existing relations among settlements. As a general rule, it can be stated that the 
faster the speed of urbanization was, the less advanced a country had previously been. Among 
Eastern European cities, fi tting examples for rapid reconstruction and growth are Warsaw and 
Gdynia-Gdansk in Poland, Berlin, Dresden, and Rostock in East Germany; while in the west 
Birmingham and Coventry in the United Kingdom, and Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt-am-
Main in West Germany can be named. Th e reconstruction of towns and the defi nition of the 
principles for building entirely new towns or sections can be approached from multiple angles; 
fi rstly from the concentration and strengthening cooperation among plants and factories scat-
tered within city limits, secondly from the revitalization or demolition of obsolete living areas 
and the construction of modern multi-purpose residential zones, and thirdly from the building 
of new urban industrial and commercial zones. (Uzzoli 2013.)
In addition to reconstruction, the emergence of entirely new communist-built towns also 
played a signifi cant role. Despite the common misconception, the new communist-built towns 
played a limited albeit signifi cant role in the post 1945 urbanization of Central-Eastern Europe. 
(Hamilton 1979.) In reality, very few genuinely newly founded towns were built during the 
communist era. Rather, the majority was constructed through hurried development or merger 
of already existing settlements, mainly villages, such as Tatabánya, Kazinbarcika, Tychy, and 
Nova Dubcina. Although the general assumption is that these towns owe their existence to heavy 
industrial functions, oft en their raison d’être was merely to alleviate the congestion of large cities 
by being constructed on their peripheries as purely residential settlements, e.g. Petrzalka next 
to Bratislava, Halle-Neustadt, Rostock-Lütten-Klein, and New Belgrade. (Kovács 2008.) Th e 
advent of Soviet-style socialism off ered new horizons in urban development, as it could become 
a consciously executed eff ort based on all encompassing objective analyses. Prior to World War 
II, urban development was simply the spontaneous fulfi lment of a collection of ad hoc needs; 
during the communist era carefully executed regional planning schemes covering the entire 
country established the time, place, and budgetary requirements needed for the realization of 
every new project. Th erefore, it became essential to prepare in every case a thorough economic, 
geographical, social, and technical feasibility survey. Essentially it was the conclusions thereby 
gained which delineated the directions of urban development schemes in the country. (Rados 
1975.)
Functionality and ideological consistency also manifested in the architecture and urban 
development planning of the new towns. Th e town centres with their public functions, the fac-
tories and productions plants, and the residential districts consisting of prefabricated blocks of 
fl ats were designed to be separate units. (Aleksandrowicz 1999.) In their design the examples 
of Soviet style architectural philosophy appeared, which originally derived its inspiration from 
Western European urban planning and development theories. Although residential districts 
were distinct from industrial zones; however,  the green belts oft en separating the various func-
tional units were either not planned at all or insuffi  cient attention was paid to them. Th e level of 
infrastructure and public services, as well as the service sector usually took roughly ten years 
aft er the establishment of the new town to reach the degree of sophistication that is suitable for 
a genuine urban settlement. (Uzzoli 2013.)
When referring to urbanization in former communist countries, it is a question of open 
debate whether urban development in these countries had some uniquely peculiar features. 
Many expert believe that the distinctly communist-built towns are not more than industrial 
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complexes with residential units housing the necessary labour force and were devoid of any 
genuine features of urbanization. Enyedi(1988) claims that no signifi cant changes occurred 
in these towns during the decades of communist rule. Th e towns simply evolved into liveable 
living environments which functioned simultaneously as places of employment and residence, 
and for each, given its socio-economic status, as the venue for suitable leisure activities. Due to 
the lopsided development of the fi ft ies in the following decade, complex social-economic chal-
lenges surfaced. Th is was partially because of the newly created towns and their lack of proper 
urbanization as seen in the quality and number of residences, in infrastructure development, in 
services, and shortage of consumer goods available for the public. By time it became obvious that 
the labour market was unevenly tilted toward heavy industry which aff ected the whole economy 
negatively. Th e fi rst signs of the gradual devolution of the Hungarian rustbelt were appearing 
in the sixties; a decade later it became an obvious reality with the emergence of attendant un-
employment in industrial regions. (Sykora 2009.) To mitigate the negative impact of the latter, 
job creation in the public services sector, education, municipal administration, and commerce 
could have been a possible solution; however, in many aff ected localities either not at all or only 
aft er a considerable time lapse did such a shift  take place, mainly because of a shortage of funds 
to fi nance such employment initiatives. Nevertheless, from the sixties onwards, especially in the 
chemical industry, a qualifi ed modernization had occurred, which strengthened the industrial 
emphasis of the newly built towns as well.
During the decades of communism in the settlement hierarchies of Central-Eastern and 
South-eastern Europe, newly built towns with a specifi c industrial purpose existed in paral-
lel, e.g. the East German Stalinstadt, from 1961 Eisenhüttenstadt, the Polish Nowa Huta, the 
Bulgarian Dimitrovgrad and Kremikovci, newly built towns with industrial and/or residential 
functions constructed in the vicinity of existing large or medium-sized industrial cities, e.g. the 
PolishNowe Tychy, and the Slovakian Nova Dubnica, as well as heavy industrial centres built 
with the expansion of already existing smaller settlements with an industrial focus, e.g. the 
Czech Kunčiceand Vitkovice. It should be emphasized that it is oft en diffi  cult to diff erentiate 
the clearly greenfi eld investment from the urban development projects; therefore a number of 
overlaps are discernible in this part of Europe. (Barta 2010).
Following World War II, similar to Central-Eastern Europe, in South-eastern Europe 
urbanization had also speeded up reaching its apex by the end of the fi ft ies. Communist indus-
trialization, the establishment of new factories with connected development projects all acceler-
ated migration into urban areas. Population growth and the transformation of the nature and 
functions of localities lead to a modifi cation in the designation of settlement types. In Serbia 
fi ft een (Jesenice, Krani, Titovo Velenje, Borovo, Zenica, Valjevo, Majdanpek, Titovo Uzice, Priboj, 
Bor, Vranje, Niksic, Titov Vales, Stip, and Kocani) and in Albania four (Elbasan, Qytety Stalin, 
Ballsh, and Memaliaj) newly built communist towns were founded. Th e majority of these are 
mining towns or centres of steel industry. It must be noted that they were not entirely newly 
built towns, as they had already existed as small settlements from the Middle Ages, but with 
rapid industrialization they expanded to towns of tens of thousands of inhabitants and became 
major industrial centres. (Faragó L. – RáczSz. 2010. – quoted in Uzzoli 2013.)
Th e radical social and economic transformations caused by the regime change in Eastern 
Europe found the newly built towns unprepared, usually lacking any binding customs and 
traditions. Upon the collapse of the soviet style communist social and economic system, it 
became manifest that they were inferior in innovativeness and less suitable to react eff ectively, 
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fl exibly, and successfully to global challenges and the ensuing severe competition. From the 
1980s, it became increasingly obvious that the artifi cial communist built industrial towns faced 
a multitude of deteriorating social, socio-economic, and environmental issues. Adapting to the 
global challenges from the beginning of the 1990s brought forward a new set of inequalities, 
although signs of their emergence had become apparent from the seventies onwards. High rates 
of unemployment, superfl uous but fragmented heavy industrial production capacities, obsolete 
technologies, underdeveloped infrastructure, and the enormous scale of environmental pollu-
tion even today adversely impact the post-communist newly built towns as spatially manifesting 
social problems. Partly the causes but also the consequences of the socio-economic problems are 
a number of demographic processes and phenomena. Subsequent to the regime change, both 
in a political and economic sense, in many of these towns the fl ight of active age populations, 
population aging, and the resulting population loss occurred on a dramatic scale, unfavourably 
aff ecting their mid- and long-term development prospects. (Uzzoli 2013.)
A brief history of industrial towns in Hungary from the 1950s until the regime change
In the communist era, the so-called socialist town was one of the last architectural utopias 
of the 20th century. Originally it was designed to be the ideal urban space for the workers and at 
the same time a potent symbol of the new society under construction. During the Stalinist pe-
riod, the ‘socialist’ town became a rigid system of dogmatic planning formulas. With the gradual 
erosion of communist orthodoxy, the stiff  architectural planning regulations also eased. By the 
1970s-80s, the idea of the ‘socialist’ town became an empty shell and existed merely as a vague 
collection of preconceived solutions for urban planning. (Germuska 2004.)
In the creation of the communist industrial towns a primary role was played by the post-
World War II social-economic and political processes. In one respect, this generated a level of 
dependency, while on the other it generated new economic, social, and political venues which 
infl uenced the landscape in some parts of Hungary fundamentally.
Th e fi rst generally accepted settlement hierarchy of this country was laid down in György 
Markos’s book Economic geography of Hungary. Th e author emphasized that in the defi nition 
of the status of a settlement not only its current, but also its inherited functions must be taken 
into account, such as population size, the particular historical development traits, spatial char-
acteristics, and the pace of former growth. Nevertheless, it was the contemporary functions 
which served as the principal basis of qualifi cation of the various types of towns; these were 
classifi ed as administrative centres, transportation hubs, industrial towns, and agricultural 
towns. (Germuska 2004.)
In Markos’s hierarchy, the new communist-built industrial towns appear as an independ-
ent subgroup and include the towns of Ajka, Dunaújváros, Komló, Kazincbarcika, Oroszlány, 
and Várpalota. He sees these settlements as the products of the planned economies of people’s 
democracies. Barta believes (Barta 2010) that the new towns built during the communist era 
do not deserve to be called even ‘socialist.’ Although they have no precursors and considerably 
diverge from previously existing towns in their social, economic, and architectural character-
istics, they do not possess any attributes to be socialist in essence.
Weclawowitz in his work Th e Socio-spatial structure of towns in Eastern Europe (1992) 
states that there is no universally accepted defi nition of what constitutes a ‘socialist’ town. In his 
opinion, socialism in the classical sense had not existed in any of the Eastern European countries 
in the preceding decades of communist rule. All defi nitions of ‘socialist’ towns can be grouped 
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around two basic principles or preconceptions. Th e fi rst analyzes the planning of these towns 
and the principles to be applied in the construction of a ‘socialist’ town. Th e second is based 
on a wide array of analytical analyses of post-war urban development. (Weclawowitz 1992.)
One common aspect of the defi nitions is that the notions of socialist and industrial towns 
are intertwined in both. Th e already established and especially the large-sized settlements could 
not be easily adapted or moulded to fi t the ideological needs of the communist regime; whereas 
the new industrial towns were viewed as the prototypes of the future, as truly ‘socialist’ towns. 
(Weclawowitz 1992.)
Pierre Merlin in his New towns and European Spatial Development identifi es three types 
of new towns. His thesis distinguishes the newly established capital cities such as Canberra, 
Brasilia, Islamabad, the new industrial towns, the majority of which were located in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern European satellite countries, i.e. Poland, Hungary etc., and a few 
so-called company towns, set up by corporations in northern Canada and France. Th ese latter 
settlements were created by industrial development in formerly rural regions and most oft en 
were centred on a single large industrial plant or complex. Additionally, he also distinguishes 
those planned newly built towns which were established most frequently in the vicinity of large 
urban centres to alleviate their overcrowding, and to transform existing structures. Pál Beluszky 
considers industrial towns as distinct settlement types. He also identifi es three subgroups in 
his study. He recognizes ‘socialist’ industrial towns, e.g. Dunaújváros, Ajka, Kazincbarcika, 
Komló, Tiszaújváros, Várpalota, Oroszlány, and Martfű, classical industrial towns, e.g. Ózd, 
Paks, Nyergesújfalu, Simontornya, and Téglás, as well as industrial towns with a residential 
function, e.g. Bonyhád, Mór, Dorog, Százhalombatta, Bátonyterenye, Tolna, Sajószentpéter, and 
Lőrinci. (Beluszky 1999.) In Györgyi Barta’s study Th e twofold interpretation of the ‘socialist’ 
town defi nition the ‘socialist’ town registers as a complex socio-economic entity which poses an 
unsolvable divide among the various employment groups. From the economic point of view the 
large state-owned industrial enterprises were at the focus of communist development policies 
and as such oft en played a distinguished role in the life of a particular town or even region. Th e 
top management of such state corporations also became notable and infl uential fi gures in the 
town itself and they had an unoffi  cial, but explicit authority in its administration. Th e peculiar 
economic system and town structure, but mainly the general social fabric of communist socie-
ties was what gave the specifi c character to the populace of the ‘socialist’ towns. In such towns, 
stratifi cation and segregation among diff erent segments of the public did not materialize; in the 
local communities the labour market was dominated by technical and engineering professions 
both in the white and blue collar jobs, whereas humanities were of marginal importance.
Finally, the last defi nition pertaining to industrial towns is focusing on their economic 
prowess by defi ning them as localities where the majority of the population is being employed 
in industrial enterprises established specifi cally there. (TérportFogalomtár 2011.)
In Hungary, industrialization and industrial development commenced with substantial de-
lay compared to Western European countries, in reality it started only in the fi rst half of the 19th 
century. From the 1830s and 40s, politics was an important factor in industrialization, as it served 
as a tool in the struggle for political and economic independence of the country. (Kszegfalvy 
1978.) By reviewing the progress of the pre-1945 industrial development in Hungary, it can be 
concluded that despite some remarkable successes, the country remained industrially underde-
veloped. By 1950, the communist regime commanded the rapid industrialization of the country 
following preordained 5-year plans, which in theory aimed to eliminate the inherited backward-
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ness of the country and instigate comprehensive economic development with a primary focus 
on industry. In the fi rst decades of communism, the emphasis was placed on the development 
of heavy industry, especially on industries directly linked with the extraction and processing 
of natural resources available domestically, such as mining and steel manufacturing. (Kocsis 
– Scweitzer 2011.) Forced economic development, especially industrialization with mining, 
energy, heavy, and armaments industries, were in the centre of the economic policy of the com-
munist regime. With this unbalanced development, within the scope of the fi rst 5-year plan, 
between 1951 and 1955 industrial production was raised by 130% and a rapid shift  occurred in 
the employment structure. Th e majority of municipal development projects targeted the urban 
areas, during this period the level of public services had markedly increased in urban areas and 
large-sized villages. (Kocsis–Scweitzer 2011.)
In Hungary, it became a prime task in the building of the new communist social system to 
bring to an end the unbalanced nature of productive capacities available in the country by utiliz-
ing the advantages off ered by a planned economic model. New industrial plants were founded, 
new high capacity coal and oil powered power plants were built, and the productive use of the 
natural gas deposits began. By 1968 industrial production more than quintupled and the national 
income more than tripled compared to the pre-World War II levels. Th e employment structure 
of the population also underwent dramatic changes; with the rapid growth in the number of 
industrial workers, the country’s obsolescence in productive capacities was ameliorated. In 
the fi rst wave of communist industrialization, from 1947 to 1954, the industrialization of the 
thus far neglected parts of the country began. Th e forced industrialization increased manifold 
the energy needs of the economy, which also entailed the sometimes unsound expansion and 
exploration of poor quality coal and lignite mines, such mining towns are Oroszlány, Komló, 
Ajka, and Várpalota, and the construction of a new oil powered power plant and refi nery at 
Százhalombatta based on the newly discovered oil deposits. Of key importance were the towns 
of Kazincbarcika and Dunaújváros, the latter in addition to the power plant built for the iron 
and steel smelters also gave home to building material manufacturers and light industries. Th e 
communist-built industrial towns in some fi elds showed marked diff erences in comparison with 
the traditional or other types of industrial towns. Th e historian Pál Gemuskain analysis of this 
phenomenon gathered fi ve unique features of the ‘socialist’ industrial towns.
Th e fi rst and perhaps foremost, which was inspired by the ideas Iván Szelényi, is that 
communist-built towns were favoured politically in general and by the state’s economic policies 
in particular and as such were the preferred recipients of the state redistribution system. Th is 
preferential status can be deduced from the designation of such settlements without exception 
as towns and in the generous allocation of funds in med-term economic plans and in regional 
as well as urban development programmes.
Th e second characteristic is that the primary purpose in the foundation of communist-built 
towns was the industrial development of mainly rural areas. (Germuska 2002a.) In most cases, 
this entailed the establishment of a new industry or large industrial enterprise, which functioned 
as the primary employer of the local labour force guaranteeing long-term employment.
Th e third main feature is that in the communist-built towns’ industry was always the 
main source of employment or roughly of 60% of the active working population. (Germuska 
2002a.) In the various settlements extensive relocations occurred only where industrialization 
and industrial presence had no legacy. In the specifi c town under examination the employment 
structure visibly tilted towards industry, and in accordance by 1972 73.5% of the labour force 
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was employed in the industrial sector. However, the mere presence of industry is not suffi  cient 
to transform a settlement into a genuine town for which an essential role is delegated to the ter-
tiary sector. In the view of Lajos Tímár (Germuska 2002a.) fi rstly, it is necessary for a properly 
stratifi ed urban community to possess an employment market fi t for all the diverse functions 
of a town, and secondly, those working in services support the gradual appearance of urban 
functions. He claims that the communist-built towns were not genuine urban , since that seg-
ment was not present in the local community which could serve as its most formative element.
Th e fourth major attribute is that in the communist-built towns’ urban traditions were 
either very weak or nonexistent. (Beluszky 1999.) Th e ‘socialist’ towns were rootless; they lacked 
the traditional urban citizenry and social stratifi cation, while the existing infrastructure and 
institutional background were inadequate as well. Th e development of a more cosmopolitan set 
of values could not materialize due to the novelty of these towns. Th ese communities absorbed 
migrants from varied, though mainly agricultural backgrounds which greatly impacted the 
developing local values and norms in its own peculiar manner.
Th e new housing estates were oft en unable to preserve and maintain the old communal 
structures or to create new lasting bonds among the new residents, thus promoting social in-
tegration. As a further aggravation, the inadequacy of the town centres and the lack of organic 
wholeness among the diverse parts of these towns jeopardized their successful urbanization.
Th e fi ft h trait which applied to the communist-built industrial towns was a sustained 
population growth for a long period of time. Between 1949 and 1990 the population of ‘socialist’ 
towns in Hungary increased on average sixfold, whereas all other towns excluding the capital 
only by 40%. (Germuska 2003a.)
Summarizing the main features of the communist-built industrial towns, nevertheless, did 
not provide an adequate answer as to what qualifi es them to be referred to as genuine towns. As 
we have seen in the chapter dealing with spatial development in Hungary during the communist 
era, urban development and the attainment of the status of a town depended on a recommenda-
tion by the Presidential Council of the state. Th e title of a town also carried special consideration 
and additional fi nancing which clearly benefi tted urbanization and the development various 
distinct sub-units within larger urban communities.
By the 1980s, this urban setting had changed and there appeared new income based spatial 
divisions refl ecting the socio-economic status of their inhabitants because of the spatial develop-
ment concepts and the transforming economic conditions.
Th e current study aimed to off era brief survey on the development spans of European and 
Hungarian communist built industrial towns. Th e importance of this topic is further accentu-
ated by the ongoing transformation of towns in which urban heritage may be a dominant factor 
in shaping of the urban landscape, development policies and spatial adjustments. Th e second 
important factor is that there is a considerable divergence between the domestic and European 
urban development models. Such a phenomenon can be attributed to the varied settlement 
planning and politico-economic systems during the cold war; yet also to the diverse western 
and eastern development models and to the types of development projects they supported. Con-
versely, this means that there are discernible deviations based on former cold war allegiances 
until today, despite contemporary development paths which seem to materialize uniformly in 
urban development schemes.
Th e present work comprises of the description of the various models with their distinctive 
traits and similarities focusing on the issue of how sustainable are the spontaneous, forced, and 
advised forms of urban development in our contemporary world. ❋
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Th e context of Venczel’s orientation towards the analysis of the Romanian agrarian reform
Th e new geo-political context, as modifi ed by the second dictate of Vienna from August 
30. 1940, based on which Northern Transylvania became, once more, part of Hungary, brought 
on an abundance of institutional changes. Th ese changes unavoidably touched the scientifi c 
institutions as well, together with the people who have been activating in this domain.
Th is period has also brought signifi cant changes upon József Venczel’s life, statute, and 
institutional affi  liation. He became a professor at the Erdélyi Tudományos Intézet [Transylva-
nian Scientifi c Institute], and at the same time, he was appointed the chief of the Statisztikai 
és Birtokpolitikai Ügyosztály [Bureau for Statistics and Land Policy] within the Erdélyi Magyar 
Gazdasági Egyesület [Hungarian Economic Association from Transylvania] based in Kolozsvár.1 
Th is institution was responsible for the assessment of the economical and agrarian situation 
of post-1940 Transylvania, and the Bureau led by Venczel was directly responsible for collect-
ing the data pertinent to the situation of the properties in Northern Transylvania. As a result, 
Venczel had direct access to all the data necessary to render and objective interpretation of the 
1921 agrarian reform.
Concerning Venczel’s scientifi c background and intellectual capacity to undertake this 
assignment, it can be stated that he had a twofold scientifi c formation, these complementing 
each other in carrying out the job. Firstly, he had a law degree at the Universitatea „Regele Fer-
dinand I” [“King Ferdinand I” University], where he studied in Romanian language and where, 
in 1939, also obtained the Doctor of Laws title. Th erefore, he possessed the knowledge and 
skills necessary to construe a certain law. On the other hand, he also benefi tted from a second 
professionalization due to his unyielding interest in village work, his years of writing on the 
subject, and also due to his subsequent connections with the Școala Sociologică de la București 
[Bucharest School of Sociology], materialized in a semester of “internship” at this school in Bu-
charest. During this internship, he attended professor Gusti’s lectures, had access to the archives 
of the Institutul Social Român [Romanian Social Institute]; participated in the Muzeului Satului 
[Village Museum] inventory process and in the second monographic campaign of Șanț village. 
Th ese experiences had a marked contribution to József Venczel’s scientifi c orientation, where the 
focus of his professional interest was ensnared by the operationalization of the biological frame 
and the economic manifestation,2 in the spirit of the positivist-quantitative paradigm, which 
analysis became a central theme of his research.
Th e Romanian agrarian reform in the perspective of the members 
of the Bucharest School of Sociology
Here I would like to present three works, belonging to members of the Bucharest School of 
Sociology which, both by their content and conclusions may have infl uenced Vencel’s perspective 
in his critical analysis of the agrarian reform. Th e fi rst is Mircea Vulcănescu’s work published 
 1 Nowadays Cluj-Napoca, Romania.
 2  According to the paradigm developed by Dimitirie Gusti, the social reality can be defi ned correctly along four 
frames (natural/cosmological, biological, historical and psychological) and four manifestations (economical, 
spiritual, legal and political) which, according to the principle of parallelism, have a cause-eff ect relationship 
with each other while none of them has the priority over the others. For more information regarding Gusti’s 
paradigm, please refer to Rostás (Rostás 2000, 2001) and Pászka (Pászka 2008, 2009).
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in Sociologie Românească [Romanian Sociology], entitled Excedentul Populației Agricole și Per-
spectivele Gospodăriei Țărănești [Th e excess of the agrarian population and the perspectives of 
the peasant smallholdings].
Vulcănescu’s analysis is based on country-level aggregated data, both concerning the data 
related to the agrarian properties, and the demographical data, related to the population’s birth 
rate. In his analysis, Vulcănescu perceives the Malthusian problem as being very much of actu-
ality in the rural areas of Romania, where the increase of the population, unaccompanied by a 
signifi cant development in the agricultural production would lead to a further fragmentation 
of the properties and inherently, to an even bigger decrease of the production levels. Th erefore, 
Vulcănescu sustains – for the above-presented reasons – that the benefi cial eff ects of the agrar-
ian reform may disappear entirely without a major change in the agrarian production methods, 
where, under these conditions, the winners of this transition would be the middle land-owners, 
the so-called “kulaks” (Vulcnescu 1937. 96–97.). As such, M. Vulcănescu arrives to a fi rst 
critical observation on the agrarian reform: “[t]hough, socially speaking, it made the Romanian 
peasant the master of his own exploitation, thus consolidating, at least for a generation, the so-
cial peace of the country, from the economic point of view, it is far from being an indisputable 
success” (Vulcnescu 1937. 97.).
Following this, Vulcănescu’s study focuses on the economical facet of the analysis of the 
agrarian reform’s eff ects, lining up, step by step, the arguments sustaining the presented hypoth-
esis. His argumentation starts with the fact that Romania’s agricultural production remained 
centred on cereals, which yield a signifi cant output only when cultivated extensively (at least 
at that time), stating that the “productivity of the agrarian cultivation has decidedly decreased” 
(Vulcnescu 1937. 97.). Th is argument is sustained by the agrarian statistical data, which shows 
that the production level before World War I was higher before the war then in the aft er-war 
period. Hence, this decrease in production is the unintended eff ect of the agrarian reform, due 
to the fact that the land redistribution was carried out without adequate agricultural know-
how. In addition, regarding the peasants’ mentality, Vulcănescu quotes Ciajanov, according to 
whom “this never pursues the maximal profi tability, as the capitalist entrepreneur, but always 
the optimum effi  ciency, this being the perfect balance between his eff ort and the gain obtained 
out of it” (Vulcnescu 1937. 99.).
Vulcănescu arrives to the fi nal conclusion that, although the agrarian reform was benefi cial 
– at least on short term – from the social standpoint, seems that – from the economic point of 
view – it was a major failure.
In the last part of his study, following the Gustist model of social intervention aft er the de-
tection of the problems, Vulcănescu lays forward a few recommendations which would remedy, 
in his opinion, the described situation.
❖
In the same spirit was written Nicolae Cornățeanu’s study, who asserts, same as Vulcănescu, 
that the Romanian agrarian reforms have followed the logic of politics, instead of the econom-
ics, which led to big mistakes in the conception of the agrarian reforms between 1864 and 1918 
(Corneanu 1937. 100–101). Th erefore, the author suggests a recommendation complementary 
to the ones forwarded by Vulcănescu, arguing that a law that would warrant the indivisibility 
of the properties of less than 3 hectares would put an end to the agrarian land fragmentation 
process, a phenomenon described by Vulcănescu as well (Corneanu 1937. 101–102).
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In the same issue, no. 2-3 from 1937 of the Sociologie Românescă journal, there was an-
other study, closely related to the agrarian life in Romania. Th is was signed by Roman Cresin, 
and entitled Care Este Structura Proprietății Agrare din România? [What is the structure of the 
agrarian property in Romania?].
Th e fi rst critique formulated by Roman Cresin at the address of the involved state institu-
tions is the acute lack of information, more exactly the lack of concrete data, which would make 
any research seem unfounded, based on assumptions only. Th is shortcoming is mainly due to 
the inexistence of a regular agrarian census (Cresin 1937. 90–91.). In this context, any attempt 
to draw up an objective analysis is enormously hindered. Nevertheless, as an accomplished 
intellectual who does not perceive the lack of data as an obstacle due to which one should give 
up their research, and searches for alternative data to give an adequate answer to the problem, 
Cresin uses fi ve other data sources to carry out his research, the fi rst being related to the results 
of the agrarian reform. According to the presentation of the data published by the Ministerul 
Agriculturii și al Domeniilor [Ministry of Agriculture and Properties], it can be stated from the 
aggregated data – which clearly conceals signifi cant diff erences between the diff erent types of 
properties, based on their sizes – that this reform did not ensue as expected. Th is suspicion is 
Cresin’s fi rst conclusion as well, who, presenting the established results, asserts that: “[t]here-
fore, it can be presumed that the situation of the small and medium-sized properties is even 
less favourable than the one presented in the A and B tables [the repartition of the properties 
before and aft er the agrarian reform]” (Cresin 1937. 92.). Knowing Cresin’s scientifi c work, 
characterized by a statistical, quantitative and positivist methodological rigorousness, the fi gure 
of speech “it can be presumed” is very uncharacteristic, and can be construed as a critique of 
the institutions involved.
Analysing the data from other sources then the above-mentioned publication – such as the 
statistics of the direct taxes, or the preliminary results of the 1930 agricultural census – Cresin 
arrives to the conclusion that the diff erences between the results are signifi cant, which does not 
contribute to a correct and adequate assessment of the agrarian reform.
At the same time, he advises that the agrarian policy should treat the small, medium-sized 
and large properties diff erently, as these follow diff erent logics of operation. But, before all else – 
in the spirit of the Bucharest School of Sociology – he declares that a research, a detailed census is 
necessary in order to correctly assess the realities of the Romanian agriculture (Cresin 1937. 95.).
Th e fact that both Roman Cresin, as well as the other members of the Bucharest School of 
Sociology, starting with professor Gusti, felt the need of compiling Romania’s Encyclopaedia, this 
being the declared end-goal of their intellectual eff orts, suggests that the volume of the current 
scientifi c knowledge on Romania, at least of the knowledge considered as scientifi cally funded, 
from Gusti’s point of view, was scarce. Th is argument is sustained by professor Gusti himself 
in the foreword of the 60 sate românești [60 Romanian villages], where he states: “[i]n this era, 
of the intense organization of our nation, the research of the Romanian realities is very much 
needed. Effi  cient actions demand a thorough documentation. Nowadays, the superfi ciality and 
the dilettantism are, more than ever before, a crime against the nation. I am sure that only the 
diagnoses based on the type of research like the one carried out by the [Royal] teams can insure 
the documentation necessary to draw up a complete plan of organizing the national life” (Gusti 
1941. 5.). From this perspective, we can state that Venczel was a consummate Gustist, as he had 
entirely attained the same fi rm attitude towards those who have tried to formulate quasi-scientifi c 
conclusions on untested bases or scientifi cally unverifi ed premises.
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Th ere can be no doubt that József Venczel had knowledge of these works, for several reasons. 
Firstly, the ideas and critiques presented above can be detected in his own works, adopted to the 
analysis of the eff ects of the agrarian reform in Northern Transylvania. On the other hand, he 
had started his analysis by thoroughly researching the pertinent Romanian literature.
Th e primary analysis compiled by József Venczel of the documents regarding 
the Transylvanian situation in the Romanian speciality literature
As a fi rst step of his analysis, József Venczel tried to identify all scientifi c works written 
by Romanian authors pertinent to the agrarian reform of 1921. Th erefore, aft er reading this 
literature, the majority of which was published in the French language, Venczel arrived to the 
conclusion that, in order to form an advised scientifi c opinion on the matter at hand, he needed 
to clarify the premises, namely the database that would serve as a basis for comparing the as-
sessment of the eff ects.
Th e conclusions of Venczel regarding the books, works and studies written by Romanian 
authors in this domain is that these can be divided into two categories. Th e fi rst category is 
composed by those works that quote or refer to the data initially presented by Dr. Ioan Iacob 
at the 1921, 15 July debate on the law regarding the agrarian reform, and in his work entitled 
Chestia agrară din Ardeal [Th e Transylvanian Agrarian Issue] published in 1924. According to 
Venczel, an array of authors continued to use Iacob’s work as an original data source, quoting 
and analysing it. Th e other category is represented by Dr. Ion L. Ciomac, who uses Iacob’s data 
with a certain reserve (Venczel 1943. 4.).
In the next step, Venczel compares the data used by Iacob – these being the result of the 
1919 collection of agrarian data, with the statistical data from the Hungarian archives. Th e re-
sults show a signifi cant diff erence: according to the Romanian data, the territory annexed from 
Hungary to Romania was of 14.933.841 “cadastre acres”3 , while according to the data based on 
the registries compiled in 1909 by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this territory was of 17.794.643 
cadastre acres, Venczel concluding that ”this diff erence of 2.860.802 cadastre acres4 doesn’t show 
in a good light the exactness and the validity of the 1919 collection of agrarian data [mandated 
by the Directory Council of Transylvania] ”
Following this conclusion, Venczel’s analysis extends over each category of land – both 
owned by the natural and the legal persons – and presents the diff erences between the statistical 
registries of the two countries. Based on these comparisons, Venczel discovers that at the basis of 
the data used by I. Iacob is not the 1919 data collection, but the “statistical compilation” (Venc-
zel 1943. 5.) draft ed by Ion and Ioan Enescu. Th e data used by Enescu and Enescu are called 
compilations due to the fact that the recalculation of the surfaces of the diff erent areas based 
on the original data (from 1895) shows signifi cant diff erences, which can be traced back to the 
fact that the agrarian register, and the “statistical compilation” include diff erent administrative 
territories. Th is conclusion of Venczel is based on the fact that while Enescu and Enescu consider 
the totality of the Austro-Hungarian counties annexed to Romania, they did not perform the 
 3 Th e most accomplished people listed by Venczel as belonging in this category are: Livius Lazăr, Constantinescu 
Mititza, Valeriu Bercaru, Constantin C. Damian, and David Mitrany (Venczel 1943:3).
 4 Venczel uses the traditional Hungarian “katasztrális hold” unit, which is equal to 5755 m2. In the text, for a 
better fl uency, I use “cadastre acres” in reference to this unit.
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necessary corrections. Th e aft er-Trianon border was not traced along the borders of the existing 
counties, and as such, the counties of Western Romania aft er 1919 are not identical with those 
from 1895 (Venczel 1943. 5–6).
Reverting to the comparison of the Transylvanian land structure from the properties size 
point of view, Venczel discovers that the major diff erences between Iacob’s and the Hungarian 
authors’ works is caused by the diff erent operationalization of the categories: while at Iacob the 
medium-size exploitations are defi ned as the ones under 500 cadastre acres, and the big ex-
ploitations have over 500 cadastre acres, Venczel – in accordance with the Hungarian statistics 
– considers the limit between the medium and big exploitation as being at 1000 cadastre acres. 
❖
Here I have to mention that Roman Cresin, in his work on the 1941 agrarian census, pub-
lished in 1945, also defi nes the biggest agricultural exploitation category as the properties that 
have over 500 hectares (meaning approximately 870 cadastre acres).
Aft er analysing the exploitations, Venczel moves forward to the analysis of the Transylvanian 
ethnical statistics, and proves that, in this case as well, the results are mostly erroneous, as they 
are based either on assumptions, or on obsolete data.
In conclusion, it seems that the last sentence from Venczel’s presented work has, scientifi -
cally speaking, a universal validity: “[t]he propaganda disguised as science didn’t serve, because 
it couldn’t serve the justice” (Venczel 1943. 19).
Th e refl exions of József Venczel on the 1921 Romanian agrarian reform
Th is process of studying the eff ects of the reform has started in 1940, and aft er publishing 
his results, Venczel also made suggestions with regard to the 1945 agrarian reform, so we can 
state that this scientifi c interest was consistent on this issue.
In his works concerning the 1921 agrarian reform from Romania, Venczel aimed to test 
the main argument called forth by the state authorities, namely that the agrarian reform had 
as purpose the reorganization of the properties in order to guarantee the people’s livelihood.
Firstly, to present the importance of the issue, Venczel gathered all the Romanian biblio-
graphical references dealing with the agrarian reform, arriving to the impressive number of 384 
articles (Venczel 1942. 3.).
Th e problem of the 1921 Romanian agrarian reform starts with the fact that we cannot talk 
about it at singular, as there were two separate laws: one with number 82 from July 17, 1921, which 
regulated the expropriations from the Romanian Old Kingdom, including Oltenia, Muntenia, 
Moldavia and Dobruja, and a second law under number 93 from 30 July, 1921, regulating the 
agrarian reform from Transylvania, the Banat [Bánság], Crișana [Kőrösvidék], and Maramureș 
[Máramaros].
Aft er the delimitation of the territories, materialized in the legislative framework as well, 
Venczel asserts that these approaches were legitimate, as the two territories were characterized 
by diff erent histories and diff erent evolutions of the agrarian life and economy. Given the geo-
political context in which Venczel analysed the eff ects of the agrarian reform, in his works he 
mostly focused on the eff ects of the second law, regarding Transylvania, the Banat, Crișana, and 
Maramureș. At the same time, the data that had been at Venczel’s disposal granted only the 
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possibility to analyse the eff ects generated in those territories which, in 1918–1940, were parts 
of Romania, and as such felt under the Romanian legislation, and at the moment of the 1941 
census were part of Hungary, namely Northern Transylvania.
Th e analysis of the Transylvanian agrarian reform starts with the comparison of the two 
laws, and identifi es in the following ten points the diff erences between them, which concern 
both the circle of persons falling under the incidence of the law, as well as the diff erences in 
implementation:
1. Th e law regarding the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has a more narrow scope, it 
only aims to increase the surfaces of the peasant-owned farms, to create commonage pastures 
and to meet certain public needs, so, unlike the law regarding Transylvania, it does not have 
in its purview the expropriation of forests in order to modify certain aspects of the economical 
balance (such as helping the labourers, functionaries or other categories of people whit small 
means by giving them forest shares). In this respect, the law regarding the Old Kingdom does 
not exceed the concept of “agrarian reform”.
2. Th e law regarding the Old Kingdom has certain limits set concerning the minimum 
surface (100 hectares) of the estates which are subject to expropriation, and to the maximum 
surface (2,000,000 hectares) that can be expropriated, while the Transylvanian law has no such 
limits. In Transylvania 2,655 estates having under 100 hectares of agricultural land were ex-
propriated; 74.9 per cent of these were in Hungarian, 13.1 per cent in German, and only 4.7 per 
cent were in Romanian ownership.
3. Th ere are signifi cant diff erences between the expropriation of the Crown’s estates and the 
estates owned by public persons and corporations, institutions, foundations etc. Th ese proper-
ties are subject to expropriation in the Old Kingdom only with regards to the cultivable land, 
and the law provides that the estates under twelve hectares belonging to churches and schools 
remain untouched, while the Transylvanian law granted fewer such exceptions and established 
a smaller maximum limit.
4. Venczel observes signifi cant diff erences between the two laws regarding the maximum 
surface over which the excess is to be expropriated, in all categories of expropriations (plain, 
hillside or mountain estates). Venczel sums the diff erences in the below presented table:
in cadastre acres Old Kingdom Transylvania
in case of the estates given in tenure at a certain, specifi ed moment 174 50-100
in case of undividable estates, per owner 174 50
in case of hillside and mountain estates 174 50-100
in case of estates situated in plains
in case of big apportionment needs 261 200
in case of moderate apportionment needs 348 300
in case of satisfi ed apportionment needs 434 500
Th e limit of acreages over which the remained area can be expropriated5
5. Th e above presented limits also show diff erences in the construction of the two laws, 
regarding the properties considered as composing one estate. In the Transylvanian law, all the 
 5  Data source: Venczel 1942. 22.
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properties, even if they were situated in diff erent geographical locations, of the same owner are 
considered as one estate, so the surface above the mentioned limit is subject to expropriation. 
In the law regarding the Old Kingdom, only the properties held in the same village or in the 
nearby villages are considered to sum up an estate, and as such, the expropriation can be applied 
separately on the diff erent estates held by the same owner.
6. Th ere is also a diff erence regarding the descendants pursuing agricultural studies. Th e law 
concerning the Old Kingdom insures the possibility of withholding 50 hectares of land for each 
son who is enrolled in a school with agricultural profi le. Th e Transylvanian law allows this option 
for only one son and also decreases the surface which can be withheld by specifying half of the 
fathers’ non-expropriatable property, which in most cases cannot be more than 50 cadastre acres.
7. Th e laws concerning the Old Kingdom and Transylvania also treat the middle-sided 
estates diff erently. Th e law regarding the Old Kingdom provides that the surfaces expropriated 
from the hillside and mountain estates, which were under tenure at the moment specifi ed by 
the law, can be apportioned in parcels of at least twenty-fi ve hectares or more and the surfaces 
expropriated from the mountain and hillside estates cultivated by the owner can be apportioned 
in parcels of minimum fi ft y hectares or more. In Transylvania, the law regarding these estates 
only provides that these can also be the subject of expropriation if needed. Only in Northern 
Transylvania, estates under fi ft y cadastre acres belonging to 1,322 Hungarians, 286 German 
ethnics and 315 others were subject to expropriation in a proportion of 51.4 per cent, and estates 
between 50 – 100 cadastre acres belonging to 140 Hungarians, 7 German ethnics and 66 others 
were subject to expropriation in a proportion of 53.3 per cent.
8. Th e Old Kingdom and Transylvanian law also diff ers in the amount and nature of the 
just compensation given in exchange for certain expropriated areas and also in the amount 
established as a maximum limit of the state reserve.
9. Th e agrarian reform laws concerning the Old Kingdom and Transylvania also diff er in 
regard of the price established for the expropriations. While the price for the expropriations in 
the Old Kingdom is established based on the situation of 1917 and the following fi ve years, in 
Transylvania this price is established based on the situation from 1913 and the preceding fi ve 
years. Th e Transylvanian law also provided a leeway in the price for expropriations by establish-
ing the prices is Romanian lei and the exchange rates with the Hungarian Korona.
10. Finally, Venczel points out the characteristic diff erences in the composition of the 
expropriation comities. While the expropriation comities in the Old Kingdom include one 
representative of the owners and one of the villagers, the Transylvanian law does not provide 
for the representation of any of these categories (Venczel 1942. 19–26.).
Based on the above presented points, Venczel concludes that: “[t]he Transylvanian law is 
much more radical from every point of view: the law of expropriation is extended of every branch 
of the agriculture, tampers incomparably more with the traditional property policy processes, 
mercilessly breaks the secular order of the commonage, constricts the private properties under 
the minimal level, broadens the sphere of the concept of absenteeism disregarding the interna-
tional treaties, and doesn’t refrain from using such means and methods that lead to an economical 
degradation, and, leaving the Transylvanian people aside, entrusts the implementation of the 
democratic reforms to the organs of the authority” (Venczel 1942. 27.).
In the third chapter of his analysis, aft er presenting the diff erences between the two laws, 
Venczel proceeds to the comparison of the agricultural and social situation between the two 
parts of Romania. 
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Concerning the situation of the Old Kingdom, Venczel appeals to Adolf Gustav Klein’s work6, 
according to whom the division of the agricultural properties was the worst possible, as, on one 
hand there were the big estates, concentrated in the ownership of a handful of people, and then 
there were the peasant properties, so small that they could not even sustain their owners. Th ere 
was no such thing as a middle peasantry, but actually, by our construal of the concept, we can-
not talk about a peasantry at all – summarizes Klein. In parallel with this situation – continues 
Venczel, based in continuation on Klein’s work, in Transylvania “the percentage of the land 
owned by the peasants, who also own livestock and tools, is up to seventy percent of the total 
land in usage …. even if the properties are not very big, (between 5-15 acres), and the land is not 
as fertile as in the Old Kingdom, the Transylvanian peasant manages to secure the livelihood 
of his family” (Venczel 1942. 28.).
Another aspect by which the land ownership system diff ers between Transylvania and the 
Old Kingdom is the ownership and the function of the medium and big estates. In this respect, 
those estates which also fulfi lled a social function – such as the commonages, which were almost 
completely absent in the Old Kingdom – fell into the category that was expropriated by the law 
of the agrarian reform, and as such, the peasants who were dependent on the proceeds of these 
properties have lost an important source of income. From this point of view – summarizes 
Venczel – the Transylvanian agrarian reform was more an antisocial, then a social one.
Analysing the legitimacy of the law regulating the agrarian reform, Venczel shows that, if 
we remove the commonage estates over 100 acres or 50 hectares from the list, we see that in 
Transylvania the percentage of the estates bigger then this limit was of 15,5%, while in the Old 
Kingdom this proportion was of 30 % (Venczel 1942. 30.).
Another argument forwarded by Venczel in order to present the cardinal diff erences be-
tween the two territories is the fact that while Transylvania did not see any peasant uprising 
since 1849, in the Old Kingdom there were a string of uprisings and social movements, fuelled by 
the desperate situation of the peasantry who have been pushed to the brink of subsistence level.
But if these diff erences were so sharp, why was an agrarian reform needed in Transylvania? 
– asks Venczel. He attempts to answer this question once again with the help of A. G. Klein, ac-
cording to whom there was a thesis in the Romanian policy which also constituted an internal 
propaganda: “Th is thesis, which had become the common conviction of both the Romanian 
people and their leaders, stated that »the expropriation in Transylvania, based on national policy 
is as much as legitimate as the expropriation abroad (in the Old Kingdom) based on social policy 
«” (Venczel 1942. 31.).
In the next chapter, Venczel proves, based on the data that, at least between 1910-1916, the 
situation that occurred in Transylvania could have been construed as an agrarian reform realized 
in a natural manner, in the benefi t of the Romanian ethnics. (Venczel 1942. 46.).
Aft er presenting the precursory situations, Venczel moves on to actual the analysis of the 
agrarian reform in Transylvania. Venczel bases his analysis on the data published by Mititza 
Constantinescu, Gheorghe Ionescu-Șișești and Emil Petrini, who describe the most accurately 
the eff ects of the agrarian reform between 1920 and 1940. Based on the data of the 1941 Hun-
garian census, which thus included Northern Transylvania, Venczel calculates the percentage 
of the expropriated amount of the estates, broken into categories:
 6  Klein, Gustav Adolf (1927): Soziale und nationale Probleme der Agrarreform in Siebenbürger in Deutsche 
Politische Heft e, Sibiu.
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micro and small estates under 50 cadastre acres 51.4
small estates between 50 – 100 cadastre acres 53.3
medium sized estates between 100 – 500 cadastre acres 44.3
big estates over 500 cadastre acres 62.6
Th e percentage of the expropriated areas out of the totality of the estates7
By these calculations Venczel disproves the declared anti-feudal character of the Transyl-
vanian agrarian reform, given that the small estates were also subject of expropriation, and in a 
quite big percentage, especially when compared to the data regarding the big estates.
Aft er analysing the expropriation of the agricultural lands, Venczel continues with the 
analysis of the wooded properties which were expropriated only in Transylvania, as this regula-
tion was not present in the law pertaining to the Old Kingdom. As a fi nal conclusion, he asserts 
that only one quarter of this type of land was awarded as apportionment of property, the rest 
was either given to diff erent institutions, or retained as a state reserve, which does not coincide 
with the logic of the declared social policy.
Analysing the expropriations and the apportionments of property from the ethnic perspec-
tive, also on the basis on the census data, Venczel shows that, among those persons who did not 
own any property before the agrarian reform were more Hungarians, than Romanians, but the 
apportionments of property intently favoured the latter category. 
❖
Arriving to the analysis of the eff ects of the agrarian reform in Transylvania, Venczel 
proves both by analysing the text of the law and by the statistical results that, from the economic 
standpoint, this was, at least in Transylvania, very unsuccessful. An eloquent example is that 
one of the most populous categories – consisting of 67.288 people – was apportioned only with 
1 cadastre acre parcels (0.58 hectare).
As Venczel presents the dates published by Petrini,8 from 1928, it shows the following 
situation:
receives 1 cadastre acre 67,228 people entitled by the law
receives 2 cadastre acres 83,987 people entitled by the law
receives 3 cadastre acres 68,557 people entitled by the law
receives 4 cadastre acres 43,980 people entitled by the law
receives 5 cadastre acres 14,745 people entitled by the law
receives 6 cadastre acres 999 people entitled by the law
receives 7 cadastre acres 1,183 people entitled by the law
Th e real eff ect of the Romanian land reform9
Venczel, analysing the volume of the land available through expropriations in Northern 
Transylvania, and accepting the arguments of Nicolae Cornățeanu, according to whom the 
minimal amount of land which is worth cultivating in order to insure a limited standard of 
living for a family is 3 hectares (= 5,2 cadastre acres), reaches the conclusion that, even if the 
 7  Data source: Venczel 1942. 54.
 8  Petrini, Emil: Reforma agrară. Transilvania, Banatul, Crișana și Maramureșul 1918–1928. p.310
 9  Data source: Venczel 1942. 67.
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total available land was to be expropriated (regardless if this vas farmland or pasture), it still 
would not be suffi  cient for everyone entitled. Convergent to this reasoning, Venczel reminds of 
Vasile C. Osvada’s protest regarding the project of the law concerning Transylvania, and for the 
economic analysis he mentions Paul Nițescu’s work, who characterizes the agrarian reform as 
a pulverization of the wealth, as the arithmetical mean of the parcels appropriated to the enti-
tled persons was of 2.06 cadastre acres. It is understandable that at this point Venczel quotes a 
phrase of N. Cornățeanu, who characterized the situation of the time by the idea of “peasants 
made equal in misery”.
❖
Aft er analysing the local data, Venczel – as expected from a researcher socialized at the Bu-
charest School of Sociology – switches to the international level and compares the data regarding 
Transylvania and the Old Kingdom with several European countries. From this comparison, he 
determines that, compared to the 1904–13 period, in the 1930–38 period the agricultural output 
of the Old Kingdom and of Transylvania has suff ered a signifi cant decrease – the only excep-
tion being the rye in the Old Kingdom – trend that cannot be detected in most of the European 
countries. Th ese data also support the conclusion that the Romanian agricultural situation was 
better before the implementation of the agricultural reform than aft erwards. In this respect, 
Venczel also quotes A. Frunzănescu’s study, who qualifi es the period aft er the First World War 
as the “regressive period of the Romanian agriculture” (Venczel 1942. 81.). Even if, quoting G. 
Ionescu-Șișești’s work from the Romanian Encyclopaedia, Venczel concedes that these negative 
results are not entirely due to the agrarian reform, he still asserts very strongly that this reform 
has been carried out in a most unprofessional and – in the case of Transylvania – ethnically 
biased manner. At the end, he also states that “[t]his isn’t only a national or political problem, 
but we are talking about the science of building a nation” (Venczel 1942. 81.).
Th is last remark can be interpreted as a critique towards the former political leadership 
of Romania who seem to have neglected – at least in the case of the Transylvanian agricultural 
reform – the social and economic realities of this area, making its decisions based exclusively on 
political arguments. Even more, this argument can be conceived as a nod to Dimitrie Gusti and 
the Bucharest School of Sociology (at a time of them being citizens of diff erent countries, holding 
several opposite interests) who, by his “science of nation” established the scientifi c groundwork 
of constructing a nation based on the social and economic realities.
Following the changes underwent aft er 1940, materialized in a territorial adjustment of 
several countries, the censuses became an eff ective tool of procuring information regarding 
the demographic and economic realities of the newly-formed countries. As such, in parallel 
with Hungary, an agricultural census also took place in the 1941’s Romania – that is, without 
the territories annexed to other countries from the Greater Romania: Northern Transylvania, 
Bessarabia and Southern Dobruja. Th e technical leadership of Romania’s General Census was 
entrusted to Dr. D. C. Georgescu and the works of the Agrarian census to Mr. Roman Cresin.
Th is pair of Gustist disciples, engaged in key positions of the census, guaranteed its correct 
and professional execution. Th is census also had the aim – which it successfully completed – to 
provide data about (quoting I. Butoi’s title) “Th e interwar Romanian village, a »Terra Incognita«”. 
(Butoi 2011.). 
Although the publication of this data was only a compilation of provisory data, it managed to 
provide a detailed image concerning the situation of 1941 Romanian agriculture. In this respect, 
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it is an informative work, and as such it lacks the remarks, interpretations and explanations.
Th e late publishing of this work – in 1945 –did not took away much of its value and actual-
ity, as in 1945 a new agrarian reform was about to be implemented, by the new pro-communist 
government which took over the power in Romania.
From the works presented above, it can be seen that the authors belonging to the Bucharest 
School of Sociology have unanimously criticised this reform as being an unprepared, scarcely 
documented and unprofessionally carried out endeavour. Th ey all agree on the fact that the small 
size of the appropriations caused a signifi cant hindrance in the agricultural production. Th e 
one signifi cant diff erence is that, while the Romanian authors recognize the social legitimacy 
of this reform, on the Hungarian part, namely in József Venczel’s opinion, it was perceived as a 
socially unjust and ethnically biased enterprise. ❋
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In this study I plan to review the application of social network theory and social network 
analysis in the sociology of religion in Central and Eastern Europe. Th is approach of socio-
logical study of religious faith and religious groups is usually based on empirical research and 
interpretation of the research results. Th e sociology of religion has a broader perspective in 
studying religious life, but the religious social networks usually mirror other characteristics of 
the studied religious entities and phenomena to make it an interesting subject of research. Th e 
network science, based on network theory is a fairly new and innovative fi eld, and its approaches 
are groundbreaking in many aspects. Th e social scientifi c applications of the network analysis 
methods and concepts have been built on the results of network science. Th us, the social network 
analysis of religious networks is grounded on the methodological principles and assumptions 
of network analysis, especially social network analysis as it has developed in recent years. Th e 
subjects of research can be the members of religious communities or the communities them-
selves in this approach.
In the social network analysis method, the selected units of analysis, the cases are repre-
sented by nodes, and the connections between them are represented with lines. Th ere can be 
many forms of connections among diff erent nodes, so there might be diff erent lines used to 
represent them. Th e mapping of a religious social network is supposed to be done on an empiri-
cal basis, and the results of the mapping shall be interpreted in an objective way. Th e graphical 
outcome of social network analysis – in other terms the graph – represents the place of the 
diff erent actors in the network by points or nodes, and the connections between the diff erent 
nodes with lines. Th e interpretation of the graphs is done by the researchers with the help of 
the graphics and statistical measures. Conclusions can be drawn based on the examination and 
statistical analyses about the characteristics of the social network. If the researcher wants to 
go into further detail, there are specifi c measures developed by network scientists to test their 
diff erent hypotheses empirically about the network. Th is new method off ers a whole range of 
new possibilities to do more detailed research on religious networks, but its diff usion among 
researchers of religion is very slow.
Th e fi rst instance of using social network analysis in a religious setting can be traced back 
to the work of Sampson who performed the network analysis of eighteen trainee monks in a 
monastery (Sampson 1969; cited by Herman 1984).Th ere were other sociologists applying the 
traditional sociometric approach to religious groups in the sixties and seventies, for example 
for clique detection and clustering of individuals. Th e patterns of the social networks were not 
examined in the works of this era. (Herman 1984).
Another very important boost was given to the SNA method when social scientists realized 
that the social network parameters of local congregations can be crucial in group development. 
Th e social relations developed in the local religious group – congregation settings were vital for 
the longevity of the group itself. Hoge and Roozen (1979) realized in their research that social 
factors, such as relationships in a religious group can be well more important in normal cases 
than the theological disposition. Such result contributed to the widespread diff usion of the social 
network approach and the SNA method in the American sociology of religion.
I follow the concept of Freeman (2004) to identify works that can be categorized based 
on the usage of SNA methods. He states that the works can be distributed into four categories 
based on the depth and methodological instances of SNA’s application. Th e four categories are: 
the scientifi c work either or fully “(1) involves the intuition where the links among social actors 
are important. (2) It is based on the collection and analysis of data that record social relations 
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that link actors. (3) It draws heavily on graphic imagery to reveal and display the patterning of 
those links. And (4) it develops mathematical and computational models to describe and explain 
those patterns” (Freeman 2004). Th e four categories are usually combined in contemporary 
SNA articles.
I have selected Central and Eastern European articles dealing with religion and social 
capital which have at least references to social networks. I present my fi ndings based on Free-
man’s category system.
Th e social network approach in Central Eastern Europe: the transition era researches
Th e historical diff erences in the development of the societies of the region are very signifi cant 
compared to the societies of other world regions, but among the countries of the CEE region 
we can easily identify many parallel processes. Based on the theories of key thinkers such as 
Paul Zulehner, Miklós Tomka and András Máté-Tóth (Máté-Tóth – Miklušák – Zulehner 
– Tomka – Toš ; Miklos Tomka – Zulehner, 1999; Miklós Tomka – Zulehner 2000), 
we can state with a high degree of confi dence that Central and Eastern Europe has its special 
regional characteristics in the fi eld of religious faith and belonging, historical and social issues 
and common value and identity elements determined by the common socialist past.
Th e most important factor of the CEE region serving as the base of cohesion is the com-
mon past that the countries share, and the common experience with the political transition 
of 1989–1991. Th e countries used to belong to a block dominated by the Soviet Union which 
was an absolute power that determined all aspects of social and religious life, and acted like an 
empire. Its political interests and social value system were forced on all countries in its zone of 
infl uence. Th e Soviet “empire” was not new to the inhabitants of the CEE region, as they had 
already known historically other empires, such as the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Em-
pire which had formerly governed them. Th e phenomenon of being controlled from a distant 
political centre with limited degree of autonomy in diff erent matters is a common experience 
in these countries. Th e political transition was a major breakthrough in gaining freedom and 
autonomy in this region which largely contributed to the emergence of nationalism region-wide 
in all the societies in question (Máté-Tóth, 2010). Th e political transition was a major event 
that seemed to be promising for the entire population of the CEE region, and there were many 
illusions attributed to it; it was followed by a general expectation of swift  social and economic 
rise in the respective countries. Th e civil societies of the countries of the region were lacking 
the real communities “healthy” societies usually have. Th e “negative modernization” theory of 
Elemér Hankiss even claimed a general decrease in the communitarian attitudes – a widespread 
atomization in the societies and infantilisation of the general public.
Most of the communitarian activities were controlled by the state itself before the regime 
change in these countries. Aft er the signifi cant political event, societies alone had no basis to 
organize a healthy civil society, whilst the churches already had signifi cant independent social 
activities in process. For example, in Hungary the Catholic Church had the youth small-groups 
movement working underground and in addition to the offi  cial Church structure, the small neo-
protestant churches had the “Council of Free Churches” – (“Szabadegyházak Tanácsa’, researched 
by Szigeti and Rajki (2012), and there were many other known religion-related activities of that 
time. It is fair to say that the transition was preceded and followed by a religious “revival” or by a 
higher average level of activities of religion-based communities in most societies, which shaped 
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the characteristics of the entire event and time period. Social networks based on religious com-
mitment and belonging had a huge role in overcoming the communist past, fi rstly by actively 
helping to eradicate the state socialist system, and secondly by helping to build the democratic 
powers to take over aft er the regime change. Th ese instances of religious social networking were 
the fi rst phenomena widely studied by theologians, scholars of religious studies and sociologists 
of religion. Th is religious communitarianism decreased to a great extent in the late nineties, and 
lost its signifi cance of providing a solid basis of social integration and cohesion.
Th e religious movements of the CEE transition era: Movimenti and others
Th e social integration and the new social cohesion were largely determined by religious 
communitarianism in the era of political transitions in the Central and Eastern European socie-
ties. Th ere are many religious movements – most of them acting as social movements themselves 
– researched in Hungary and in other CEE countries. Th e general theory of “Movimenti” was 
elaborated by the example of the Roman Catholic Church in the nineties, but it may refer to the 
communitarian achievements of the Second Vatican Council as well. Th e theory had the aim to 
distinguish between movements and communities, and it refers to lay people living some form of 
community life. Th e “Movimenti” members of the diff erent countries started to meet regularly 
in 1984 on the World Youth Day.
If attempt to review the basic Hungarian bibliography related to Movimenti, we havet to 
mention the work of István Kamarás (1994) with the title: “Inwardly oriented bases – Bensőséges 
Bázisok” about the small Catholic communities existing in the era of the political transition. 
János Dobszay wrote an important book about the history of the Catholic social movement in 
Hungary “Regnum Marianum” (Dobszay 1991.). András Máté-Tóth compiled a book about 
another infl uential social movement of the time called ”Bokor – Bush” led by a Catholic monk-
priest called György Bulányi (Máté-Toth 1996). Th ese works usually contain details about the 
social structure and networks of these groups, this aspect was inevitably a part of the diff erent 
analyses, but it was not obviously the most important part.
In a review of the era, Máté-Tóth (2011) writes about forty years of persecution of the 
underground Catholic movements aft er the Second World War. According to his opinion, the 
movements served the renewal and passing on of Christian beliefs, and the members of the small 
groups were priests, members of diff erent congregations and lay people as well. Máté-Tóth calls 
these people heroes of faith in his writing, based on their deeds. Obviously, these community 
leaders had a major role in shaping the groups’ norms and values, as well as the important char-
acteristics of the social network in these small religious groups.
Th e research of small Catholic communities
István Kamarás writes about small Catholic communities in Hungary aft er 1945 in his 
book entitled “Intimate Bases” (1994). Th ese small communities represent simultaneously the 
unchanged original ideas, the belonging to the Church and the continuous renewal of religious 
groups. Th ere are major spiritual movements inside the church, and the driving forces of these 
movements are usually the small communities. Kamarás estimated the number of such com-
munities to 2-3000, their total membership around 30-40 000 and the average groups size to 8 
to 15 members. Th e majority of the members were Catholics.
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Kamarás researched diff erent aspects of these groups: he examined the religious practice in 
diff erent groups, the diff erent activities inside the groups and the diff erent types of these small 
groups. He highlighted four diff erent movements: the more than 80 year-old Regnum Marianum 
movement, which was mainly active in raising preadolescent boys but had its organizational 
profi le broadly extended over the time; the Bokor (Bush) movement established by the Schola 
Piae monk-priest Györy Bulányi, which proclaimed non-violence, poverty and the strict following 
of the role model of Jesus; the international movement Fokoláré became popular in Hungary, 
teaching the importance of living the love of Christ in the everyday life, established by Chiara 
Lubich; and the Charismatic movement, which have taught the direct involvement of the Holy 
Spirit in people’s everyday lives.
Kamarás examined diff erent network characteristics of small communities, partly belong-
ing to the four introduced major groups. Th e research questions were about  the groups’ lead-
ership models, integration and legitimacy of group membership and leadership, the openness 
and closeness of diff erent groups, and the characteristics of the members of diff erent groups’.
Kamarás’s important conclusion about social networks is that small group setting in the 
Catholic are usually formed around a priest or a charismatic layperson. Kamrás realized that the 
small groups have diff erent life-cycles, based on group characteristics. He examined in-group 
dynamics and in-group confl icts, and their eff ects on the operation of the group. When he wrote 
about the small groups’ out-group connections, he mentioned, that such connections “are low in 
number even in the early nineties”. (Kamarás 1994. 108.) Th e communities rarelyhad connection 
to the leadership of their own Church; their leaders were usually harassed by the state police and 
the communist secret agents. Half of the small groups had no connection to any kind of religious 
organization at all. Th is is partly caused by intentional self-separation (e.g. Bokor). Kamarás also 
examined the individual members and their sociological characteristic. In conclusion, we can 
say that he did a social network analysis without making a sociometrical analysis or drawing a 
social network map. His research is invaluable to the sociology of religion, as most of the small 
groups have disappeared, and the facts that Kamarás had recorded can serve as important fac-
tors in understanding the religiosity of the transition era Hungary. Th e research is signifi cant in 
the social network researches of religion topic as well. Kamarás applied the concepts and some 
methods of social network analysis because of the nature of his research topic.
Th e research of Regnum Marianum
Th e Regnum Marianum is a Catholic spiritual movement of Hungarian origins. It was 
established by Hungarian priests on the verge of currents of Catholic spiritual movements world-
wide. Its organization dates back to 1896, but it was legally established in 1903. It was founded 
by nine Catholic priests working independently in parishes. Its original idea was to organize a 
worldly priest community without the members taking oaths. Its original goal was to help young 
boys who spent their leisure time on the streets without meaningful activities (Dobszay 1991). 
Th e organization was forcefully disbanded under state socialism in 1951, and its leaders were 
imprisoned. Th e movement became an underground movement, and struggled heavily against 
communist oppression by performing and maintaining its activities, establishing small groups 
and spreading its spirituality. Th e network approach is seldom present in the work of Dobszay, 
as his review is mostly historical, but we can conclude that a strong social network of Regnum 
Marianum groups were active in the 70s, 80s and early 90s. Th ese groups were forced into hid-
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ing and secretive operation, but served as a religious social network for the maintenance of the 
movement’s ideas.
Th e Bokor movement
Th e “Bokor” movement operated in a special way: it was organized the way how Jesus organ-
ized his network in Biblical times (Mate-Toth, 1996; Zsumbera, 1998). Th e organization operated 
with intense and eff ective relationships among members who were organized into small groups 
with approximately 12-15 active members. Th ese small communities were organized into a large 
religiously based social network, with solid personal ties giving the cement of trust this social 
movement had – and which enabled it to resist the eff orts of the communist secret police to invade 
the groups. Th e main idea was about network growth: it was envisaged that the members joining 
the “Bokor” would develop spiritually in the communities, and would eventually reach adult-
hood, and establish new small groups with their leadership. In this manner, the social network 
was supposed to grow like a bush – which did not happen because of the lack of personal skills 
and motivation. Th e communities were held together by organizers who were responsible for 
organizing the meetings and to oversee them. Th e communities were organized into branches, 
and branch leaders were elected to enhance horizontal communication inside the community. 
Th e communities and the branches were independent, and had regular meetings with diff erent 
topics. Th e members were men and women coming from diff erent backgrounds, coming together 
every two-three weeks and in the summer in a larger event to talk about important questions 
of faith, life and society. Th e “Bokor” movement is an excellent example of social networking 
applied, and its scientifi c analyses are the fi rst to apply this network approach to the analysis of 
religious communities in CEE.
Th e leader of Bokor had a lot of infl uence on the organization, and Máté-Tóth (Máté-
Tóth 2011.) introduces his concept of everyday life heroes through the life and work of Father 
György Bulányi, the leader of the Bokor Movement. According to him, these heroes, including 
Bulányi were symbolic fi gures in the religious fi eld and society as well. Máté-Tóth divided the 
communist era into two phases, the fi rst between 1945 and 1974, and the second between 1975 
and 1990. In this paper, I mainly focus on the second phase called analogically the “Babylonian 
Captivity” by Máté-Tóth. Th is second phase was a much less violent era than the fi rst, with less 
obstacles to religious organizations, but the harassments of the state police and secret agents 
did not stopped (Máté-Tóth 2011).
Religious social networks in Hungary before the political transition
We can conclude, based on the works of Kamarás, Dobszay and Máté-Tóth that the social 
network analysis concept was widely used in the research of Movimenti groups in pre-transitional 
Hungary. Th ese groups could not operate freely inside the Hungarian society; they were closely 
monitored by the police and the secret service. Th ere were obvious violent attempts to regulate 
or even restrict the operations of these groups. Th is outside pressure forced these groups to 
organize themselves in a special and protective way to prevent the infi ltration of secret agents 
and other possible invaders.
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Post-transition era examples of social network approach in the CEE sociology of religion
Gabriella Pusztai applied the social capital and social network aspects in her work about 
denominational schools in Hungary (2004). She applied and tested the concepts of Pierre 
Bourdieu and James Samuel Coleman about cultural capital and the strength of religious social 
networks with a survey research among high school students attending denominational schools 
in Hungary. She notes that denominational schools in Hungary are founded on the grounds of 
tight social networks of believer parents. Th e schools have also very strong and connected social 
networks in the grades which makes the students perform better compared to other schools in the 
academic fi eld. Th is advantage is not present in public schools or non-religious private schools, 
because they lack the strong social network surrounding them. Th e students of denominational 
schools  who come from families with religious background perform better that the children who 
come from a non-religious background, according to the fi ndings of the research. Th e concept of 
Coleman about the better performance of students coming from closed social networks governed 
by norms was justifi ed in Hungary (Pusztai 2004).
Bahovec, Potocnik and Zrinscak (2007) wrote about social capital and religion. Th eir 
article is one of the fi rst reviews in Central Eastern Europe about the problem. Th ey put the 
theory of social capital in the centre of their research, and did secondary analysis of available 
EVS survey data to look at the situation in diff erent European countries. Th ey speak about social 
networks, but they do not apply any direct form of network analysis.
In their research about New Religious Movements in Hungary, Máté-Tóth, Török and 
Nagy (2008) applied the concepts of social embeddedness in the surveyed religious groups, and 
the social network concept to see the operation of diff erent NRM networks. Th ey discovered 
that higher level of social embeddedness and inwardly oriented social network were in strong 
connection with the high level of religiosity and religious attendance in the case of the Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses. Th e Witnesses had a very strong inwardly oriented social network, most of the 
individuals’ friends were coming fromthe group, there were only some work colleagues in the 
social network. Weaker social ties linked members to colleagues who were not Witnesses. Mar-
riage connections were formed almost exclusively among the members. Th e inwardly oriented, 
closed social network was based on an exclusivist view on salvation as the utmost religious good, 
and was paired with a perception of hostility of the general society towards the members of the 
group (Máté-Tóth et al. 2008).
Th e same research investigated Hungarian Scientologists as well. Th e fi ndings suggest a 
more heterogeneous social network compared to the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Th e Scientologists 
had strong connections outside the religious group, and marriages were not exclusively formed 
inside the group. Th e Scientologists tried to establish good connections with the outside World, 
but still perceived the society’s disapproval of their group. (Máté-Tóth et al. 2008)
Th e research among Scientologist was extended and continued by Máté-Tóth and Nagy 
(2011). A survey research was performed among more than 400 Hungarian Scientologists with a 
questionnaire putting a special emphasis on social network and social capital aspects. Th e fi nd-
ings suggested strong in-group solidarity, governed by a special set of network norms, built on 
a strong social network of religious group members. Th e social network acted as a safety net for 
Scientologists, it also provided business and employment opportunities for group members. Th e 
social network of the religious group was diverse and homogeneous, and it seemed to be able to 
help the individual members, as a high percentage of respondents said that they have received 
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help from / given help to other Scientologists. Th e most important form of support was friendly 
advice, but there was a high proportion of people lending money to other group members, and 
group members were using their social network to help other members fi nd a job or contracts 
by having a say in favour of them (Máté-Tóth – Nagy 2011).
Nagy (2010) published an article about the connections of social capital and religion, and 
the role of religious social networks in social capital formation. Th e article presented the main 
concepts of social capital, and did a review on the Central and Eastern European researches. It 
can be said that the social capital concept was pretty infl uential, with obvious application in the 
religious fi eld, but social networks were not studied directly. Th e social networks were regarded 
as only one dimension of religious social capital by most researchers.
Sinziana Preda (2011) studied the social network and identities of Romanian and Czech 
Baptists. Th e case of the Romanian immigrant Baptists in the Czech Republic was explained with 
the social network concept. Romanian Baptist immigrants moved to the Czech lands, escaping 
from economic hardships. Th eir religious social network provided protection for them, while 
they were able to fi nd a job. Th ey were also able to secure their place in Czech society. Th eir main 
social network was created from religious belonging, and the Baptist church had an important 
part in the integration of immigrants in their new social settings. Th e social and economic part 
of the process of immigration was made easier, and the trauma was signifi cantly decreased by 
the religious social network.
Th e Central Eastern European Articles
Th e article’s review results are shown in table 2. We should realize that a lot of articles in the 
fi eld of sociology of religion researched and theorized the importance of connections between the 
diff erent social actors. Th ere was a lot of emphasis put on the network aspect study of diff erent 
religious groups, but most of the researches did not collect specifi c data about the links among 
social actors. If we compare the results of Table 2 (CEE) with Table 1 (North America), we can 
realize that the applications of social network analysis methods and theories are more frequent 
and used to a greater extent in the North American setting. Th e theories about social networks 
are very important in Central Eastern European researches, but the methods were not widely.
It is especially interesting that no graphical imagery was used in any of the Central Eastern 
European researches to depict religious social networks. Th e application of these methods is 
the next step to be taken in the adaptation of the social network analysis. Th e demand for more 
elaborate methods of network analysis seems to be realistic, as a lot of works applied the social 
network theories.
Table  v Central Eastern European Social Network and Religion Articles Categorized
Author(s) and year
Category 1
(realize that links 
between social actors 
are important)
Category 2
(collects data about 
links among social 
actors)
Category 3
(uses graphic imagery 
to fi nd patterns)
Category 4
(uses heavy statistics to 
analyze patterns)
Dobszay 1991. X
Kamarás 1994. X X
Máté-Tóth 1996. X X
Zsumbera 1998. X
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Pusztai 2004. X X
Bahovec – Potocnik 
– Zrinscak 2007. X
Máté-Tóth – Török 
– Nagy 2008. X X
Nagy 2010 X
Máté-Tóth – Nagy 
2011. X X
Preda 2011. X X
Máté-Tóth 2011. X
Source v Own editing based on Freeman 2004
Conclusions
Th is paper analyzed the situation of social network and religion related researches in Central 
Eastern Europe. Th e review was conducted on the already published articles. Th e aim was to 
fi nd examples of the applications of theory and methods related to social network analysis on 
behalf of researchers of religion. Th e articles found were presented in Table 1, and the concept 
elaborated by Freeman (2004) was used to categorize the reviewed works.
Th e works were selected based on their usage of the social network method, social network 
theory and the research of diff erent aspects of the religious fi eld. We tried to exclude the topic 
of social capital and religion, and concentrate on those articles which had a clear social network 
related topic. We tried to clarify the connections between social capital and social networks to 
justify the selection of reviewed articles from the overlapping pool. Th e fi ndings based on the 
review have shown that the links between social actors are being theorized in the articles, and 
there are measures introduced to map these links. Most reviewed articles applied empirical meth-
ods, and diff erent survey researches concerning diff erent characteristics of the social networks.
Th ere are still many possibilities in the application of the SNA method and theories in the 
Central Eastern European region setting. Th e social network mapping of diff erent religious 
groups could off er a better understanding of many questions asked by the presently reviewed 
researches. For example, the answer about the specifi cities of religious networks compared to 
other social network could be found, if actual SNA researches were performed on the group 
level. It would be necessary to draw the multi-dimensional social network maps of diff erent 
communities in a graphical way for further analysis, and for the possibility to use social network 
statistics. Th e advantages of the method could be used to answer the research questions which 
are otherwise hard to overcome, and to pave the ways for new fi ndings and new possible ways 
of understanding of religious networks.
Th e possibilities the SNA method are promising for the sociology of religion; it is highly 
probable that a lot of social network researches will be conducted in religious settings in the 
coming years to create accurate and meaningful analyses about the operation of the diff erent 
religious group networks. Connections between diff erent social networks could be also exam-
ined, and to get a better understanding of the workings of the contemporary social structure. 
Th e possibility of doing such researches is enhanced by new research methods off ered by the 
new technologies, such as smartphones, cheap tablets and extensive social network sites.  ❋
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Abstract In Hungary, homelessness has reappeared in the 1990s as a kind of social problem 
and also as a phenomenon. Th e intention of this study is to show how homelessness has become 
visible to society and why the problem was perceived so late, despite the fact that homeless people 
were part of the socialist society, even if in a latent way. Fieldwork was carried out in Szeged, a 
city in southern Hungary aft er 2002. During the research, I have participated in the everyday 
lives of homeless groups as an observer; I have conducted interviews and examined the social 
networks, problems and possibilities of the homeless. In this study, I show that the Hungarian 
circumstances, politics and structural changes were diff erent from their Western counterparts, 
since Hungary took a diff erent path. Th is trajectory infl uences the fate of those who become 
homeless. Even so, twenty years aft er the end of socialism, a number of parallels with the West, 
and with the United States in particular, can be discerned.
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Introduction
During the socialist era, homelessness was a marginal, hidden and understudied phenomenon 
essentially denied by offi  cials, aff ecting primarily people who deliberately resisted socialist 
society, who could not function in it because of its debilitating problems, or who had criminal 
tendencies. Th e dramatic economic and social changes during the post-socialist period, however, 
fundamentally transformed the face of homelessness by adding a growing pool of marginalized 
people without apparent pathologies who simply could not adjust to the new neoliberal economic 
climate. Th e rise of this new type of homelessness and the persistence of old homelessness is 
aggravated by inadequate shelter provision and homeless service which forces homeless people 
to live in public places from where they are frequently displaced, and criminalization as a result. 
So while the proliferation and diversifi cation of homelessness and its causes  are primarily based 
on unique Hungarian circumstances and the dramatic shift  from socialism to capitalism, the 
responses to the problems follow the American pattern with adverse eff ects on homeless people, 
their daily survival, and long-term life chances. 
To substantiate this claim, I  analyse both national and local data focusing primarily 
on ethnographic research I conducted in Szeged. Szeged is the third largest city in Hungary, 
though  in general terms it might not seem as large (the current population is about 170,000). 
Historically, Szeged was an agricultural and commercial town until the building of the university 
in the fi rst third of the twentieth century. In the socialist era, industrial institutions were built 
by the municipality; these were closed down aft er the end of the socialist era. However, the city, 
still plays an important role in the region both from an economic and a cultural point of view. As 
regards the homelessness, impoverished individuals from nearby settlements apparently believe 
that they can fi nd a solution to their problems by moving to Szeged. Lacking resources, many 
become homeless and take up residence in the public places of the city. Research on homelessness 
is particularly important at this time because little attention has been paid to homelessness in 
Hungary in the past. One of the intentions of this paper is to show how the ‘hidden poverty’ of 
state socialism continues to manifest itself in the post-socialist era while the phenomenon of ‘new 
poverty’ is simultaneously created. One part of this new poverty is homelessness, a topic which did 
not offi  cially exist during the socialist period and was considered taboo. Social scientists started 
to study poverty during the mid and late 1980s, i. e. during the years that are oft en  referred to as 
‘soft  communism’ (Bokor 1987; Ferge 1982; Gönczöl 1982 and 1991; Kemény 1979; Eberstadt 
1988; Höjdestrand 2003). As we will see, increasing poverty have become obvious when many 
forms of unemployment, homelessness and permanent social deprivation were perceived. Since 
1990, scholars have oft en concentrated on specifi c aspects of post-socialist economic and social 
changes, but poverty has received little attention from an anthropological or geographical point 
of view. To be  precise, some aspects of poverty – such as rural poverty, the plight of the Roma, 
or the youth in urban housing – have been examined, but there have been  only a few in-depth 
researches on the wider spectrum of poverty caused by capitalist development.
Neither the new poor, nor the winners of the post-socialist transformation have gained 
the attention of Hungarian social scientists, since native ethnographers have conducted almost no 
fi eldwork in urban areas (for a few exceptions, see Kbányai 1980 and 1982; Kürti 2002; Simonyi 
1995). Foreign anthropologists, meanwhile, have dealt predominantly with the concerns of post-
socialist economy, such as market transition and the dismantling agricultural cooperatives. 
Th erefore, being both Hungarian citizens and working as native observers, scholars working 
in Hungary may bring some unique perspectives to the study of homelessness. I am going to 
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apply this insider–outsider perspective in this paper in order to introduce the phenomenon of 
new poverty through the changes in Hungarian history and economy. Th ese are changes that 
give new features to the culture of homelessness which becomes diff erent in this way from that 
of those countries where this aspect of poverty developed gradually (see Costa Nunez 1996; 
Hazra 2005).
In this paper, I examine fi rst the history of hidden poverty and criminalized homelessness 
in socialism in order to set the stage for homelessness’s manifestation in post-socialist Hungary. 
An examination of the rise of new homelessness” aft er 1989 shows the particular nature of 
homelessness in a country that “bypassed” Keynesian welfarism on the way to neoliberalism. 
While this history has assured marked diff erences with “American-style” homelessness, I will 
show that there are signifi cant similarities as well.
Th e taboo: poverty in socialism
Th e Image of Poverty towards the End of State Socialism
Under socialism, poverty was rarely, if ever, discussed and the concept of impoverishment 
basically meant departure from the average income and lifestyle (Szalai 1997. 1403). 
Impoverishment implied deprivation of power and personal rights, as well as departure from 
what was considered to be a respectable manner of life (Bokor 1987). Alcohol consumption, 
misuse of income, poor health, careless hygiene and low levels of education were all noticeable 
aspects of the society of poverty in Hungary under socialism. Education had low prestige for 
the poor, while establishing a family and getting a job had more importance. At the same time, 
for some, alcohol consumption had greater signifi cance than maintaining a certain standard 
of living; a trap which oft en led to crime or domestic abuse directed at the consorts (men or 
women) or children.
Th ough the deterioration of homes due to the unability of residents to maintain or renovate 
was indeed observed by town councils, citizens and researchers (see Timár–Nagy 2007), especially 
in suburban districts, such evidence of poverty did not generate much public discussion, because 
most of these poor people had jobs, and relatively respectable lives. . Consumption of alcohol was 
generally accepted by family members (as well as by researchers), while violence or mounting 
debts were oft en ignored. During the last decade of the socialist rule, poverty as such was still 
considered a shameful and invisible aspect of social life (Bokor 1987). Th us, marked deprivation 
was oft en considered solely to be a phenomenon occurring amongst marginal groups who were 
oft en described as hobos, tramps and ‘dangerous’ idlers. Others successfully concealed their 
deprived status by seclusion or withdrawal from society, such as those who managed to keep 
their jobs, but lived in workers’ hostels, a very common type of accommodation in Hungary 
which provided temporary shelter for unaccompanied workers for a nominal fee. In retrospect, 
some scholars in the post-socialist period have started to see hostel dwellers and the “concealed 
homeless” of the socialist era.
Street Life during Socialism: Dossers, Tramps, and Criminal Idlers
Although homelessness as such was known during the socialist regime, it was not defi ned 
as such. In the scholarly literature, one can fi nd negative labels used to describe homeless 
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people, such as hobos, tramps1 and criminal idlers2 (see Utasi 1987). A tramp is a person who 
wanders between settlements and roams the countryside occasionally accepting menial work, 
but basically preferring easier ways of earning money. Some of them – mainly younger ones – 
armed themselves with a specifi c ideology as they left  home, saying that they were escaping from 
obligations and authority fi gures, such as parents, the workplace as well as schools. Th e sweet 
taste of freedom appealed to them, particularly in the summertime when many of them moved 
out temporarily to sleep under the stars. Many of these former hobos now have respectable 
homes and employment. Dossers3 have also changed their lifestyle, although they appeared 
predominantly in the squares and parks of larger towns and were visible at rock concerts. Th eir 
Hungarian name (csöves) may derive from the large pipes at construction sites in which they 
frequently slept in (Utasi 1987. 181.). A few youngsters were recruited to live in grounds from 
criminals and school drop-outs who had chosen to escape from parental authority, but they live 
outside periodically when they wanted. Finally, there were those who were brought to the same 
fate by having a disability which prevented them from being integrated into homeless society; 
therefore they lived alone.
Youngsters– an overlapping category –managed to get by through a number of means, doing 
odd jobs, pickpocketing, stealing, begging, forging prescriptions, pimping and prostitution. Older 
homeless people lived on collecting litter or even cheating by selling counterfeit gold. Naturally, 
these activities were regarded as illegal by both the homeless and the state. Indeed, government 
policy regarded unemployment as a dangerous menace to society and those youngsters who did 
not start work immediately aft er fi nishing school – putting off  becoming employed for a while 
so that they could live a vagrant life, or just living without working – were seen as parasites, 
maniacs or criminally idle (Ferge 1982). Th e status of the homeless did not only draw social 
disapproval; thepolice could intervene and send them to work (interview with M.R., a former 
criminal idler 1998/24).
Almost no homeless in the socialist era slept in the streets; perhaps they slept mostly on 
park benches in the summer. Th ey preferred to live in summer cottages which were temporarily 
vacant, condemned buildings, cabins built without authorization, or bed-shares.5 Some of 
 1  Tramps (csavargó). Like dossers, tramps lived on the streets, but unlike dossers, they had no homes to return 
to. Tramps oft en fi nished school, became unemployed, begged and lived by casual labour. Some dossers and 
tramps tried to live ‘outside’ society, drawing on an ideology against the established order.
 2  Criminally idle, criminal idler (közveszélyes munkakerülő). During the socialist era, a person’s status was 
dependent on their employment. Th ose who did not seek employment, or did not fi nd a job in a short time, 
were considered penal idlers. According to the public opinion of the time, they were a threat to the existing 
order and the building of socialism, as they would not participate in it. Th is label was noted on their identity 
papers, and policemen checking their identities could march them away, or from time to time the local gov-
ernment off ered them work.
 3  Dosser (csöves). In the socialist era, youngsters living on the streets were called dossers. Many of them escaped 
from parental supervision to the streets, while some of them began living in public spaces as truants. Th eir 
name originates from the drainage tubes (csövek), found on building sites, in which they took shelter. Most 
of them lived only temporarily on the streets. Th eir characteristic clothing also separated them from other 
youth subcultures: ‘tube-like’ trousers, long pullovers, studded leather jackets, gas mask shoulder bags.
 4  Th e numbers aft er the citation of interview means the year and the serial number of interview with a certain 
person.
 5  Bed share (ágybérlet). Th e severe housing shortage made it impossible for all workers to fi nd places in hostels 
or to rent a room in a fl at. People desperate for some kind of shelter could rent a bed in a room holding 10 to 
15 beds, with no access to cooking or other facilities.
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them intended to spend the winter in labour hostels, hospitals or mental hospitals, while others 
considered prisons as a possible solution to their seasonal accommodation needs (for all these, 
see Kbányai 1980; Utasi 1987; interview with Malac 2002/5). 
Redundant Workers in Work Places and Workers’ Hostels
Workplaces and workers’ hostels6 both produced hidden unemployment and homelessness 
(Spéder 2002. 45), especially at the end of the socialist era when many workplaces and almost 
all workers’ hostels ceased to function. Workplaces had a surplus of labour, a phenomenon well-
known from the era of state socialism which created problems for both employers and employees. 
Th ese were not obvious at fi rst, because no one in the workplace seemed idle. Everyone worked 
– socialist ideal was the full employment – but surplus workers produced an unused surplus of 
goods that piled up in warehouses (Ferge 1982).
For labourers, cheap workers’ hostels provided temporary accommodation, but these were 
the permanent or only homes for many7 in reality (Láng–Nyilas 1987. 33.; Veres 1979; Oross 
2001). As Mátyus (1978) pointed out, hostels helped temporarily, but they did not provide a 
future. Hostel dwellers worked long hours in order to earn more money, but they did not save and 
instead spent considerable sums on leisure, and oft en got into disastrous personal relationships 
that produced an even greater cultural gap between them and the mainstream society (Mátyus 
1978). Th e majority of hostel residents were frompeasant backgrounds; consequently their former 
community could not protect them in the city, as Kürti describes for the workers in Csepel 
(2002). Becoming an urban factory worker meant that most of the time these formerly rural 
dwellers abandoned social ties with their home communities. Despite the fact that alienation 
and helplessness was a characteristic feature of this world it still left  an empty space when hostels 
were closed. Th ose who had hostel accommodation provided by the state, or who had neglected 
their relationships with the communities from which they came, had no place to go (Láng – 
Nyilas 1987). If they had a job or savings they could rent accommodation. Th ose who did not 
have, or lost their jobs, had no other choice but to live on the streets. However, the argument 
that hostels concealed homelessness is not entirely true. Th ey were rather institutions that helped 
migration towards urban centres, especially for those who originally came from the countryside. 
However, emerging social, cultural or generational confl icts inside the family led to a situation 
where rural youth could not return and became powerless urban dwellers. Th e workers’ hostels 
started disappearing in the fi rst few years of capitalism, and ultimately made homelessness 
more visible, but in order to understand how, it is crucial to understand the specifi c social and 
economic transformations of post-socialism.
 6  Workers’ hostels (munkásszállás). In order to satisfy the labour demands of rapidly developing industrial 
production, companies established hostels which provided accommodation for workers ‘enticed’ from the 
countryside. Th ere were separate hostels for men and women. People living in these considered them a tempo-
rary solution, but sometimes a temporary solution became a long-term one. On workers’ hostels in Budapest, 
see Kürti (2002).
 7  Oross (2001) says that 92 thousand people lived in workers’ hostels in the 1980s and approximately 30 
thousand of them lived eff ectively as homeless.
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Th e challenges of postsocialism
From Socialism to Capitalism – Overall Trends
With the collapse of socialism, the pseudo-system of security off ered by the state vanished. 
Poorer people had to contend with serious changes in the early post-communist years. Meanwhile, 
they saw a change in those values that had seemed to be evident before: self-identity, ideology 
and faith in their own ability (Šiklová 1996. 537–539.; cf. Laki 2003. 129.). As full employment 
ended, , a need for highly trained and educated professionals emerged due to the closing of large 
factories, mines and state enterprises during the transformation to a market economy. Th us, 
there was much lessneed for manual labourers; so blue-collar workers could expect job security 
or fi nd new jobs no longer, and the threat of unemployment suddenly became a much-discussed 
topic in public discourse (Laki 2003). In socialism, because of the complete employment concept, 
the criminal idlers’ number was around 2.000, but aft er the transition, the unemployment rate 
had grown up to 16.1% (see Nagy 1994).
Similarly, the socialist housing system went through some basic changes. City council 
houses8 were no longer built, and consequently prices jumped sky-high (see Kornai 1980. and 
2007). Mortgage repayments became diffi  cult for many, so was the acquisition of fi rst fl ats for 
young family members. Workers’ hostels and workplaces closed down at the same time. Th ose 
people who were not able to go home found themselves suddenly in a very uncertain situation. 
Contractors in the ‘second economy’9 adjusted to the unstable market conditions by employing 
workers illegally whose futures remained uncertain (Borboly et al. 2003. 195.; Simonyi 1995. 
65–66.; see also Jancius 2002. 63–66) because they could anytime lose their jobs and livelihood; 
at the same time they had problems associated with their illegal work status, such as the lack 
of benefi ts and social security pensions.  Aft er the socialist era, alcohol abuse increased during 
working hours, and this became the reason for possible dismissal. Th ose who could not adopt 
to the new employment standards obviously faced unemployment.
During the socialist period, workers’ incomes were not high, but one could still live off  them. 
People of lower social classes could utilize more of their earnings, because the state subsidized 
some consumer goods. Moreover, payday could be celebrated with small events such as dining 
at a restaurant, going for a drink, or celebrating name days10 and anniversaries. Holidays and 
travel, meanwhile, were supported by trade union holiday vouchers which could be used at the 
union’s own holiday resort for labourers. It was a particular feature of Hungary at the time that 
income was untaxed and contributions to trade unions were set at a low amount. To balance the 
losses of badly run state enterprises, the government taxed profi table companies. Th us there were 
neither enough funds in the state budget for the recreation of labourers at trade union resorts, 
nor fi nancial aid for travelling. All this state support – subsidized consumer goods, trade union 
 8  Th e proportion of the houses owned by the city councils  – especially blocks of fl ats – was60%  in new built 
quarters in the socialist era, but some years aft er the transition it decreased to 8% by the privatization and 
the annulations of systematic building. Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Offi  ce.
 9  Second economy (második gazdaság). Th e second economy was based on work outside working hours. Lots of 
workers used to run a farm or take small jobs at home to supplement their family’s income. Th ey saved their 
strength during work time for the second economy. It was not illegal, because there were no income tax or 
laws about market production at the time; but these activities reduced the productivity of the fi rst economy.
 10  Every single day in calendar is attached to a name (previously a name of a saint) and whoever wears that 
name, celebrates the day on the certain date by inviting separately colleagues and family members to drink 
and eat.
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benefi ts and so on – ceased immediately aft er the fall of socialism. At the same time, incomes 
remained at the same level (Laki 2003. 128–29.), prospects became uncertain, and spending on 
recreation and leisure decreased.
Formerly, moonlighting for secondary incomes11 provided a reliable supplement to salaries, 
as numerous companies closed in the new economic climate, so this sort of money became the sole 
means of support for many people. Th ey had to use all their knowledge and experience to adapt 
to the market economy. Formerly, raw materials, tools, and warehouse stock “wandered” to the 
second economy or to agricultural cooperatives’ household plots. Moonlighting employees could 
use both their knowledge and their ‘borrowings’ to their benefi t. Although there was a period 
of transition when a person’s knowledge of this sort could help them get a foothold in the new 
system, with the institutionalisation of market economy such “moonlighting” and “borrowing” 
became more diffi  cult. By 1995, those who could not adapt found themselves unemployed or 
at risk of unemployment, while those who had gained practical experience from moonlighting 
were much more successful in the new economy.
Post-socialism and Neoliberal Poverty in Hungary
Aft er the transition, the government put the emphasis on resolving economic problems, 
while social issues were ignores. Th e responsibility of individuals grew as the state cut back 
its social provisions. Th e causes of this shift  were, as Tóth (1994. 313.) points out, “partly the 
conscious reform politics and partly the outcome of economic transition, which changed the 
institutional structure [of welfare].” With the end of socialism, and without the step of an 
intermediary Keynesian welfare state, Hungarian society suddenly had to confront a new world 
of individual independence and individual liability. Welfare expenditure rapidly decreased, 
access to subsistence allowances became more diffi  cult, and citizens’ administrative loads and 
burdens grew. Subsidies were gradually removed from energy producers leading to an increase in 
consumer prices and to increased expenditures on basic necessities. Previously, essential goods 
were not subjected to VAT, but a tax on such goods was soon introduced. Taxes also increased 
on luxury goods, such as alcohol and tobacco, of which homeless people are disproportionate 
consumers.
Anyway, in the early 1990s, it was already clear that welfare expenditures increased as a 
percentage of GDP compared to the 1980s (Tóth 1994), even the real value of welfare services 
decreased. During the recent years, welfare expenditures have continuously decreased (especially 
spending on health and public education), and so have remaining price supports. Under socialism, 
and during the fi rst years of the transition, for example, health care was free to all and paid from 
the  taxes; now it is available only to medical insurance policy holders.
As a result of these shift s, post-socialist poverty primarily aff ects two groups. Th e fi rst is 
comprised of the poor and deprived from the socialist era who carried this status into the post-
socialist period. Th e second group is made up of those who fell into poverty from relatively good, 
lower-middle-class positions. Unemployment and loss of social status impacted these groups 
heavily during the 1990s (see Nagy 1994; Spéder 2000 and 2002). Th e main reasons for this fall 
were either retirement (as pension programs were destroyed) or failure as an entrepreneur in the 
new market economy (cf. Spéder 2002. 103.; see also Spéder 2000). Wherever they had come 
 11  Secondary incomes (mellékes or mellékes jövedelem) derived from work undertaken as a part of the second 
economy.
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from, the main concerns for the new poor were loss of savings, and thus the compulsion to live 
day to day, with the resultant problems ranging from the need to fi nd casual or illegal work to 
the lack of medicines, to the precariousness of housing, as making mortgage or rent payments 
became more diffi  cult (Laki 2003; Simonyi 1995). Under the pressure of such processes, family 
networks have frayed and social isolation of the poor has become common.
Th e sudden threat of unemployment (with the end of lifetime work guarantees) impacted 
people both materially and emotionally. Th e mass dismissals which peaked between 1992 and 
1995 (Laki 2003) combined with the formerly “hidden” unemployment problem of the socialist 
era culminated in a crisis.  Th e problem was so widespread that mutual assistance became almost 
impossible; people could not spare money, possessions, or other resources (Laki 2003). “Self-
exploitation” among those who were still employed increased as they worked hard to preserve 
their jobs and support their families. Th ose who could, undertook casual work and for many 
this was the only option. Some worked illegally (feketemunka, svarc) to earn a living, which was 
better than doing nothing. Even so, the chances of obtaining and maintaining a fl at for both 
the new and the old poor continued to worsen. Th ose who had bought fl ats with loans could 
not be sure that they could meet payments. Coupled with the rising energy costs, increasing 
numbers of poor and lower-middle class residents found themselves in a bind, unable to aff ord 
both housing payments and energy bills. Some who fell behind on mortgages or rent moved in 
with other family members. Others went to homes for the elderly, if they could. Th e rest had to 
live on the streets.
A new phenomenon: homelessness
Notwithstanding the existence “dossers”, “tramps”, and “idlers”, homelessness of this sort 
was unknown in the socialist era. People who were integrated into the society had jobs (Ferge 
1982. 91.) and those who had jobs had a place to live. People who “chose” homelessness – the 
dossers, tramps, and idlers – were despised by society. Now, however, those who lost their jobs 
oft en lost their place in hostels as well. And still others with physical or other limitations could 
not fi nd work at all and as a consequence they could not aff ord to live in society. Many of those 
thrown onto the streets in these ways lost all their possessions in the process, compounding their 
poverty.12 Th e increasing numbers of such people – their presence in the streets of Hungarian 
cities – fi rst brought widespread notice, and social concern, in the winter of 1992 (Iványi 
1997). Th e fi rst civil initiatives – shelters for the homeless, temporary and daytime homes, 
food distribution – began at this time. But it has also become clear that state interventionin the 
growing crisis was unlikely.
 Th e Scale of the Problem
According to best estimates, 11 percent of the population was deprived of essential goods (a 
proxy for the people in poverty) and 20 percent was at risk of becoming poor in the last decade 
of socialism (Bokor 1987). (Th ese estimates are inexact. Bokor [1987] emphasizes that under 
socialism “poverty” could not be truly examined: in addition to its “forbidden” political status, 
there was a lack of “poverty identity,” or means of readily identifying the poor13.) However, aft er 
 12  Of course, those few who voluntarily choose homelessness out of an ideological or other commitment or a 
sense that the freedom of the street is better than the confi nes of the house also choose to live with minimal 
possessions (cf. May 2000. 745–748).
 13  Researchers therefore had to construct creative ways to probe the depths of poverty in socialist Hungary, 
especially since many individuals would not answer direct questions out of a sense of shame, distrust of au-
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the demise of socialism, researchers have developed new metrics of poverty more amenable to 
statistical description (Spéder 2002). Using such techniques, poverty was shown to be 13 percent 
in 1997,14 but some 30 percent more of the population was at risk of poverty because of fi nancial 
diffi  culties (Spéder 2002. 57.). By this time, a generally accepted social idea of poverty – a “poverty 
identity” –emerged and surveys could be made among those who identifed themselves as “poor”. 
Some 25 percent of the Hungarian population defi nes itself as poor. Given the diff ering metrics 
used in surveys, it is hard to know whether the 13 percent or 25 percent fi gure is the more 
accurate one. What is clear, however, is that the number of people at risk of homelessness in the 
new Hungary is not insignifi cant.
Obtaining an accurate number of how many people actually are homeless is diffi  cult. Th e 
fi rst census of homelessness, conducted in 2005, recorded approximately 10,000 homeless people. 
Yet, many scholars dispute this fi gure, because there were no fi xed criteria on which fi eldworkers 
could base their estimates. For instance, in my hometown, Szeged, census-takers reported only 
thirteen homeless people, because they only counted them with a “homeless lifestyle” – those 
who actually lived on the street and received no government support. Consequently, more than 
560 people were left  out by the census-takers, because they had contacts with social institutions 
(in addition, other homeless people simply refused to take part in the census). Expert estimates 
of the number of homeless people in Szeged are that in 2005 there were between 800 and 1200 
people who lived on the streets or in the surrounding city (interview with K.J., executive director 
of a shelter). Neither the number of homeless persons in other communities in the region, nor 
the ratio of counted people to uncounted is known. Across the country, while shelters and soup 
kitchens have not reached full capacity yet, turnover in daytime homes surpasses their capacity.
Th e Beginnings of a Response
Over the course of the past decade, the number of shelters (hostels) for the homeless, 
daytime support services, and street social workers has been slowly increasing. A commissioner 
of homeless aff airs has also been appointed. At the same time, however, the neoliberal central 
government has stressed homelessness as an individual’s rather than a direct social problem. 
Cities and towns have been granted entended powers to regulate activities – ranging from 
smoking to begging – in public spaces. As gentrifi cation has advanced, homeless people are more 
and more pushed out of view (Timár – Nagy 2007), and candidates for public offi  ce have begun 
to promise to make the homeless disappear if elected. Decision makers have turned to western 
“best practices” for creating cities that cater to tourists and wealthy city-dwellers, stressing the 
importance of a clean city for public health, aesthetic, and tourism purposes (see also Amman 
2000; Mitchell 1997).
With the withdrawal of state aid for the poor, and despite the availability of some European 
Union money for addressing homelessness, charity-based aid (oft en religiously oriented) has 
arisen to fi ll the holes of the tattered social safety net (providing hostels, daytime facilities, food 
aid, etc.). Human rights-centered activism about homelessness has also begun to function. Yet, 
in common with private charity and activist-based interventions elsewhere in Europe and the 
United States, charities in Hungary perpetually struggle with a lack of resources. Th is problem is 
thority, or a fear that is they complained they might be punished.  Usually they developed data from indirect 
questions about informants’ lives.  Typically researchers asked about material goods that informants had or did 
not have (such as access to cooking facilities or suffi  cient food) and from that determined general minimum 
stands of living.  On the basis of that general standard, researchers could ask, “what do people lack in relation 
to that minimum standard” and thereby derive estimates of poverty.
 14  Th is is roughly equivalent to the U.S poverty rate at the same time (Burt et al 2001).
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compounded by a general scepticism, perhaps inherited from the socialist era stating that charity 
is little more than a way to earn money. Support for charity-based aid is thus highly unstable.
Such facts structure the everyday lives of homeless people in Hungarian cities.
Homelessness in Szeged
Becoming and Being Homeless
Th rough in-depth life-history (Pászka 2007) interviews, my homeless informants recounted 
their past experiences; the reasons for their becoming homeless and their past and current 
experiences of being homeless. Several recurring motifs became obvious: homeless people 
saw their homelessness as a refl ection of society’s morals, for example, while also wanting to 
sensationalize their own histories. Nevertheless, the main trajectories towards homelessness 
can be revealed from their stories. When asked to describe how and why they became homeless, 
most of my informants in Szeged referred both to the transition to the post-socialist society and 
economy, and to the role of confl icts and confl ict-resolution mechanisms in their pre-homeless 
lives. Th ey referred to the uncertainty that dominated their lifes as industrial and agricultural 
workers and how their adjustment to the new conditions of the transition had failed. In addition, 
most of them referred, with a kind of detachment, to the inconsistency of their present life lead 
almost entirely by chance with the one they had hoped to have.
1. Structural and Individual Factors
Becoming homeless is partly a structural, partly an individual process (cf. Burt et al. 
2001). Homeless respondents in Szeged pointed to the structural causes of their homelessness 
by mentioning the changes in the structure of the economy aft er socialism. But they also named 
other structural causes emanating from changes in social policy. Th ey talked of permanent 
unemployment and the instability of illegal (black) employment, and the redundancy of the 
semi-skilled labour force, as well as the closure of workers’ hostels, and deteriorating conditions of 
housing as signifi cant causes of their homelessness. Th ey also pointed to the lack of rehabilitative 
services for those who are released from prisons and orphanages. And, as the economy has 
hardened, they talked about how owners of tiny amounts of capital – micro-entrepreneurs – have 
been squeezed out. Th e inability to pay bills or meet the rent or mortgage payments were also 
discussed. But homeless people also spoke of psychiatric problems,15 and alcohol abuse,16 as the 
main individual reasons for becoming homeless, but informants also linked their homelessness 
to stays in prison, diffi  cult family situations, divorce, and “bad decisions”. It is apparent that the 
combination of these structural and personal factors – and an individual’s capacity to cope with 
them –matters on the path to homelessness in a city like Szeged.
2. Characteristics of Homeless People in Szeged
In Szeged, most homeless people are male; rarely women or children ar rarely found 
amongst the homeless.17 If a woman does become homeless, it is caused by similar reasons as in 
 15  Sullivan et al (2000) note that those homeless people, who suff er from mental illness, also typically suff er 
from other serious health and social problems.  Many of the homeless in Szeged have mental disorders such 
as schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, and others.  Such homeless people are particularly at risk of 
social isolation and disintegration.
 16  Some 10 percent of the Hungarian population suff ers from alcoholism (Elekes 2000).
 17  One cause of this situation, according to many homeless men, is that when they divorced, their wives took 
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the case of men. Alcohol and drug abuse, unemployment and the lack of education are common 
factors contributing to homelessness among both men and women. Unlike in the United States 
where racial groups are over-represented homeless people are mostly white in Szeged – from 
the majority – with only a few professing themselves to by Gypsies (Roma). Th is might be the 
case, because  the ties in Gypsiy families are strong, especially as far as the sharing of resources 
among extended family members is concerned. Even so, the proportion of homeless Gypsies 
seems to be greater in other Hungarian cities. Th is is probably caused by the functioning of great 
cities like Budapest as a magnet for unattached, disaffi  liated people of all sorts, and by the fact 
that in other more industrial cities, where the breakdown of the hostel system coindided with 
Gypsy overrepresentation. Furthermore, Gypsies make up a disproportionate number of beggars 
(who are not always homeless) in Szeged,. White homeless people oft en resort to illegal or casual 
labour before begging. In addition, “entrepreneurs” import Gypsies from Romania to work on 
the streets of Hungarian cities (interviews with Dóm homeless group). Finally, the number of 
immigrants is growing; they come mainly from Africa and move in and out the homeless hostels.
Interviews make it clear that the homeless world is a world defi ned by men. While women 
live and work in it, they have very little control over the social framework of which they are part. 
Men determine the hierarchies that defi ne everyday life, sometimes using physical or psychic 
violence as a mean of consolidating their authority. Homeless life is territorial as well, with a 
homeless man serving almost as “owner” of the territory, for whom women (and the few homeless 
children) act as kind of “employees.” Homeless worlds are in this way more patriarchal than the 
large, ambient world; women are less equal than in general society.
Power and prestige in homeless networks are determined primarily by the ability to secure 
income and arrange accommodation (educational attainment, for example, has little part in 
gaining prestige among the homeless in Szeged). On the top of the hierarchy of prestige are 
the ones with semi-permanent employment; daily workers follow, “illegal” workers (excluding 
beggars), market traders, beggars, freeloaders, and recyclers of used materials are in line(cf. 
Utasi 1987).  Th ose who gain resources through assault, robbery, or prostitution (among other 
proscribed behaviours) are largely considered outcasts in the homeless society. Among city-
dwelling homeless people, those who live independently look down on those who resort to the 
hostels; but both the hostel-residents and those living independently on the street look down 
on independent homeless living in the forests on the outskirts of town. Th e ability to survive a 
winter outdoors bestows a prestige almost as great as having a regular income (through pension, 
disability relief, or welfare payments), because it shows great survival skills.
3. Connections, Social Exclusion and Inclusion: How the Homeless Remain Homeless
Th rough my research, it is apparent that so-called strong relations among homeless people 
(and their housed family, friends, and colleagues) tend to erode and become increasingly 
confl ict-ridden over the time. As older (pre-homeless) relationships deteriorate, homeless 
peoples’ connections to those outside the homeless world tend to be structured around the 
ability and willingness of non-homeless persons to contribute to the raising of the status of 
homeless individuals. Th ese relationships tend to be quite instrumental in nature. Increasingly, 
possession of their homes, though there is no doubt that the chains of causality are much more complex than 
that.
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homeless people form relationships only among themselves. But these relationships are oft en 
weak expressed through friendliness and collegiality which is informal and transitory, waning 
as quickly as they waxed.18 At the same time, many homeless people argue that possibilities 
for escaping homelessness are hindered by their fellows. Together with the already described 
hierarchal relationship between many homeless people – a relationship that replicates a patron-
client form – it is obvious that the  narrow band of relationships that homeless people maintain 
can be one of the major factors of keeping them homeless.
Necessity and mutuality go hand in hand, because homeless people depend on each other 
for survival: needs require mutuality, and mutuality helps to fulfi l needs. Th ese require and result 
in a constant presence in each others’ lives, so homeless people share food, drink, tobacco and 
dwelling place; they also protect each other. Among the lifestyle and the in-group direction of 
their connections, a common loss of faith in the future, and physical and mental deterioration, 
all perpetuate the state of homelessness for homeless people in Szeged. As time passes, these 
factors become more and more serious: the more time they spent on the street, the less chance 
they have of escaping and starting a new life. Th is mutual dependency leads to inescapable 
homelessness, which cannot be interpreted without understanding the context of being excluded 
from the main structures of post-socialist society (Nagy 2004). Being homeless means not only 
a physical exclusion from society, but also exclusion from regular social processes. Homeless 
people are considered to be outside the mainstream society and culture, members of which leave 
the homeless on their own both symbolically and literally (Caldeira 1999. 102–105; Frankfurt 
1997; Jordan 1996. 81.). Living on the street and some phenomena associated with it, such as 
alcohol abuse, results in social disapproval; moreover even the social institutions charged with 
helping the homeless become stigmatized.
Houses and homes – so taken-for-granted by the housed majority – symbolize a world of 
order by providing security and a feeling of importance. Without these, a person is considered to 
be insecure, insignifi cant, defenceless and deprived. Th e homeless are deprived of their security 
and the means for fulfi lling their own desires. In addition, they are deprived of their civil rights 
(cf. Lynch 2002). Although homeless people can theoretically,vote, they oft en cannot exercise 
this right as they have no registered permanent address or they have sold their ID cards. As a 
result, the homeless lack essential civil rights which adds one more dimension to the structures 
that keep them homeless.
4. Use of Public Space and the Criminalization of the Homeless
In the recent years, a few places in Szeged have been “monopolized” by the homeless, and 
as a result there has been an eff ort to “reclaim space” by both the local government and other 
city dwellers. From the early 1990s, Hungarian homeless people have become more visible as 
occupiers of public space and many other residents complained that they have no access to these 
places. Public areas are technically open to everyone, but as individual homeless people began to 
mark them as their own domestic spaces, housed residents turn away. Th e meaning and nature 
of space changed: public space was no longer the impersonal space of the city, now it was the 
intimate space of someone’s home. From the perspective of the homeless people, their occupation 
of public space becomes a kind of legitimate homesteading, marked by territorial control. Many 
 18  Burt et al (2001) reveal the distinctions between well-connected and isolated homeless people, but their 
analysis needs to be complemented with an examination of the quality of the relationships that homeless 
people establish.
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public places, the niches between buildings, park benches, cemetery crypts, sections of forest 
land, and so on, have gone through a process of colonization. 
Th ere is a social and geographical order in this colonization. As a 43-year old homeless man 
explains: “Th is place is ours, mine and my brother’s. If another tramp turns up, we tell him to 
leave this place as this place is ours. All who help us, come back here, for they know that they fi nd 
us here. It’s been ours since last year. Formerly no one was here, only a beggar, no one else. Th e 
promenade belongs to the Csibaks, and Tibor is there, too. Sometimes we come around, but we 
never work [i.e. beg] in their place” (Interview Ocskó F., 2002, Dóm square). Even so, territorial 
challenges oft en lead to skirmishes or even violent fi ghts.
Cities have responded in numerous ways. Szeged was the fi rst Hungarian city to pass an 
anti-panhandling law to outlaw begging. Now it is illegal not only to beg, but also to clean car 
windows. Th e city has installed arm rests across benches to make it impossible to lie down;19 and 
it has criminalized squatting in abandoned houses or on unused building sites.20 In this way, 
places both for “work” – begging – and sleep have been squeezed shut. Th e city also tightened 
the control on the use of streets and sidewalks in the busiest parts of the town which have 
long been central locations for homeless people to beg, hang out (cf. Bridge – Watson 2001; 
Sassen 1999), or scavenge (cf. Mitchell – Heynen, 2009). Civil social organizations argue that 
these restrictions on begging and hanging out violate homeless people’s rights of free action, 
association, and movement (cf. Mitchell 1997).
Th ere has been simultaneous pressure in Szeged to move homeless hostels out of the centre, 
but the geography of social service provision, with services scattered around the city, require 
homeless people to traverse the centre on their daily paths: they have not been excluded entirely. 
Namely the ways between the fi ve service points cross the centre and the primary places of visible 
homeless is downtown (Nagy 2004 and 2009). Th us it is not uncommon to still see shop guards 
shoeing homeless people away on behalf of owners who see them as disrupting their trade.
In all these aspects, homelessness is Szeged and Hungary, looks more and more like its 
American counterpart, even if the pathway to this kind of homelessness and its regulation has 
been diff erent.
Conclusion
In Hungary, homelessness has been produced through special historical-economic-political 
processes to which policy has responded in piecemeal ways. As the situation continues to change, 
so does the response – from an initial sympathy for the plight of the homeless in post-socialism 
to their increasing criminalization. Th e structural and individual causes of homelessness in 
Szeged and in Hungary share similarities– the role of alcohol abuse or illness in compounding 
the structural eff ects of the economy, but they diverge as well, for example in the the historical 
role that workers’ hostels played in housing the poor and providing some social stability (at least 
as long as work lasted), even if they hid poverty in the socialist era. As the local and national 
Hungarian states adopt neoliberal “best practices” – ranging from reduced welfare spending 
to anti-panhandling laws – the relationship between social subsidy and individual liability has 
been reformulated and as a result the plight of the homeless has become even more precarious.
 19  Dome homeless people have responded by tearing the arms off .
 20  On the pretext that illegal use causes a fall in property value and is thus a form of stealing.
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0. Introduction
In this paper we introduce some results of our research concerning the relation between 
social inequalities and social policy. Th e general question whether social intervention can reach 
its goal – such as to reduce or eliminate some aspects of social inequalities – is widely examined 
in both national and international research projects.
In our PhD-research we investigated the appropriateness and eff ectiveness of Hungarian 
regional development policy. Our main goal was to answer empirically whether some mecha-
nisms result in counter-fi nal eff ect, and to demonstrate the regional inequalities of regional 
development policy.
In this paper we shortly outline the theoretical frame which can be successfully applied 
to interpret the connection of regional development policy and (territorial) inequalities on the 
basis of (new) economic sociology, and to demonstrate some results of our quantitative and 
qualitative empirical work.
Our research may be interesting as in the course of the quantitative secondary data analysis 
the problem is examined from an institutionalized point of view: we study whether the institu-
tional regulations and classifi cations generated and applied by the regional policy itself reach 
their aim. According to our assumption, they do not, so we expect the institutional regulation 
of regional development policy to cause unintended consequences.
To examine empirically the counterproductivity of development policy projects, we created 
complex databases on the project-, settlement- and micro-regional levels, and employ models 
that are capable to exclude the alternative explanations to gain high internal validity. We expect 
the empirical investiagation of the mechanisms underlying the counterfi nal eff ects of regional 
development policy to be fruitful for scholars and also policy-makers.
1. Short Th eoretical Introduction
In our research, we focus our attention on the patterns and territorial inequalities in the 
distribution of EU development funds (Crescenzi (2009), Lóránd (2011)). Th e paper presents 
some of the results of our empirical examinations of this issue. Th e relevance of this topic comes 
from the fact that from 2004 there are possibilities in Hungary too gain fi nancial supports off ered 
by EU development programmes, thus it is reasonable to expect unintentional consequences in 
respect of these resources’ distribution. During the exploration of this problem, building on the 
theory of the new economic sociology in the background, we interpret the system of develop-
ment policy as something that intends to help common goods to come into existence (Olson 
1997) – or rather to prevent the situation of common bad (see Hirschman 1995) to come into 
existence – when it employs institutional devices (Elster 1997) in order to enforce territorial 
equalization principle in the central regulation of the resources’ allocation (Stigler 1989). Our 
preliminary assumption is that the state fails (Tullock 2005) which causes counterproductive 
eff ects (Szántó 2006, Merton 2002). In the research, we considerably build on previous studies 
which discuss (Konrád – Szelényi 2000) and empirically show (Vági 1991, 1982) reproduction 
of inequalities in examination of domestic territorial development policy.
We can interpret the framework of the institutional system examined in general by Benedek 
(2006), on the level of the EU by Forman (2000), Kengyel (2008), Horváth (2001), Szigeti 
(2007) putting an emphasis on its special characteristics in Hungary. We argue that changes 
caused by joining the EU can be considered a strong institutional rearrangement (Csite–Kovách 
(2002), Kovách–Kuerová (2006), Kovách (2008)) but the main characteristics and patterns 
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of competing for development resources have not changed considerably; therefore questions 
raised by previous studies still remain (see Voszka 2006).
Th e novelty in setting these problems may be that institutional classifi cations are involved 
in the research that are fi xed as principles to be applied by the actual development policy. Th e 
main goal of our work was to examine the eff ect of these factors that is, to examine the fulfi l-
ment of aims which are set by the regulator itself. We do not intend to examine what eff ect the 
development funds have on certain economic-social problems. It would be diffi  cult to specify, as 
the change of settlement structure is considered to be a slow process, it cannot be interpreted by 
human standards (Fekete 2010. 35.). Th erefore we intend only to shed some empirical light on 
the distribution of development funds. In this way, the research may contribute to reveal some 
factors and mechanisms which determine the distribution of development policy resources on 
the one hand, and to helping future planning processes on the other.
2. Research Question
Th e actual question of the research to be presented below is whether the institutional 
regulation of the distribution of the European Union development funds in Hungary is success-
ful – taking into consideration its aim; i.e. to enable the less developed territories (settlements, 
micro-regions) of the country to absorb development funds. In order to reach this objective the 
government explores – using statistical data – the development level of every micro-region and 
according to these diff erences defi nes for every EU planning period the least developed micro-
regions and settlements of the country listed in a decree. Th e importance of the content of this 
decree comes from the principle of the EU-funds allocation mechanisms, namely that (only) the 
underdeveloped areas listed by the decree (preferred or favoured micro-regions and settlements) 
can apply for development projects with smaller ratio of own sources, i.e. with higher support rate. 
3. Methodological Description
In the analysis, we investigate empirically whether the regulation described above facilitates 
the absorption of development funds. To carry out the analysis, we have built – and aggregated 
on several diff erent territorial levels1 – complex statistical databases2 containing all the infor-
mation needed to fi ll the variables in this general model below:
Ŷ = b0 + b1×XR + b2…n×XC1…n
 1  While data-processing and interpretation of the results special attention should by payed to the fact that 
territorial analysis has its own methodology and system which is in connection with the use of statistic 
data in territorial analysis (see Dusek 2004., T.E. 2005.). Th is is because in the statistic analysis of territorial 
inequalities the indicators have diff erent values – that is they show minor or major inequalities – depending 
on what territorial unit we have as the basis of analysis. Th is mechanism coming from the choice of the given 
territorial unit is named scales eff ect (Dusek 2004. 115.). Th edirection of distortion is systematic and tenden-
tious – in the case of simple statistic methods and correlation. Using the same statistic method we can see that 
the higher aggregation level we investigate, the less territorial inequalities can be shown (Dusek 2004. 117., 
119.). Th e changeability of territorial units results in another problem, the zoning eff ect. It derives from the 
fact that a given territorial unit can be divided into subparts of the same number in alternative ways. Statistic 
analysis on alternative divisions results in diff erent degree of territorial inequality (Dusek 2004. 118–119). 
Th us it is needed to take into account these factors even if it is not referred or mentioned constantly during 
the analysis. 
 2  In the course of quantitative data analysis we do not present and refer to the p-values or signifi cance levels 
of the test results as we employ statistical data and there is not neccessary to further generalize to the ‘whole’ 
population, i.e. we examine the real situation.
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In the equation3 the dependent variable (Y) measured the amount of EU development funds 
allocated (source: downloaded from the webpage of National Development Agency, Hungary), 
the main explaining variable (regulation, XR) contained the information – coded in a dummy 
format – if the micro-region or settlement is a preferred micro-region or not (source: recoded 
from and according to the decree list). We applied a specifi ed impact analysis design (‘regression 
discontinuity design’) in the course of data analysis to ensure statistical control (see Moksony 
2005). Furthermore, we introduced more relevant statistical data4 (as control variables; XC1…n) 
on the actual regional level (source: downloaded and merged from the webpage of the Hungar-
ian Statistical Offi  ce) in order to reach higher level of internal validity (Moksony 1985), i. e. to 
control the estimation for as many alternative and potentially distorting explaining factors as 
possible and to measure the net eff ect of the regulation (Moksony 2006).
4. Results of Data Analysis
4.1 Selected Quantitative Results
Considering the results of the secondary statistical data analysis, the eff ect of being pre-
ferred seems to be frequently controversial, counter-fi nal in the light of the intended objectives.
Analysing the development fund indicators of the micro-regions of the Great Hungarian 
Plain – taking it as an example – the before mentioned experience can be seen well-marked in the 
case of the development-fund absorption rates of the preferred rural development micro-regions. 
Th e main question here is whether being classifi ed as preferred, favoured rural development 
micro-region provides better options to gain development funds (AVOP; Agrár- és Vidékfe-
jlesztési Operatív Program; ARDOP; Agrarian and Rural Development Operative Programme) 
which were directly designed to support rural- and agrarian investments. Th e results of Table 1. 
do not confi rm this presumption. Th e diff erence between the preferred and not preferred rural 
development micro-regions can be most easily seen, if we examine the last column of the table, 
the so-called ‘rural-development multiplier’, which we calculated as a ratio: the value belonging 
to the favoured rural-development micro-regions was divided by the value belonging to the not 
preferred micro-regions. So this simple indicator refl ects in one single number how the preferred 
micro-regions were more likely to acquire development funds. Aft er surveying these numbers, 
it can be seen that the highest diff erence between the micro-regions is in the case of the total 
amounts of the OPARD-funds: the preferred rural development micro-regions applied for only 
68 percent of the total amount of OPARD-fund applied by the non favoured micro-regions. Th at 
is, the micro-regions preferred because of their agrarian and rural profi le applied for a smaller 
share of agrarian- and rural development funds. However, the value of the rural development 
multiplier in the case of all the variables is under 1, so it can be concluded that the preferred rural 
development micro-regions perform regularly worse compared to the not preferred micro-regions 
in the case of rural development funds.
 3  To investigate the relations between the variables we mostly use comparison of means, logistic 
and linear regression method. Th e latter ones makes us capable to show the relation between 
variables with the help of a single indicator (Moksony 2006. 54.).
 4  We should take into consideration the role of this kind of statistical control as for casuality analysis real 
experiment is the most suitable method regarding internal validity doe to randomization. When we control 
alternative explanations statistically – that is, in the case of quasi-experiment tests – we get weaker internal 
validity. However ‘regression discontinuity design’ enables us to get a level of internal validity similar to the 
experimental methods but without the need of randomization (Moksony 2005. 99.).
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Table  v Diff erences of project absorption
Dependent variable Mean Standard deviation R.D.M.








Total amount of AVOP funds (HUF)
0 2 017 305 663,30 1 335 799 644,64
0,68
1 1 377 044 974,13 775 492 996,75
Total amount of AVOP funds won (HUF)
0 1 178 452 305,30 559 099 678,77
0,72
1 852 042 399,33 590 956 391,67
Abbreviations: 0 = not preferred rural development micro-regions, 1 = preferred rural development micro-
regions; R.D.M. = Rural Development Multiplier: the quotient of the values of preferred rural development 
micro-regions and not favoured micro-regions.
Source: Own calculation on a complex data-base containing the micro-regional level data of the National 
Development Agency.
In order to refi ne the previous results, we step down to micro-level data and examine 
directly the Regional Development Operative Program (RDOP) projects of the Hungarian De-
velopment Plan (HDP I.). Th ough the eff ect of the decree-level institutional regulation of being 
preferred or favoured seems to be also problematic: in Table 2. we presented the results of linear 
regression models estimating the eff ects of being preferred micro-region and preferred settle-
ment respectively on diff erent absorption indicators. Except for the variable of support rate, all 
of the ‘b’-coeffi  cients are negative, i.e. the preferred micro-regions and preferred settlements 
perform worse than their more developed partners. For example, a project-application coming 
from a favoured micro-region has nearly 37 millions HUF smaller contacted total sum of the 
investment on average – only to take the highest diff erence –, and if a project comes from a 
favoured settlement, it has 46 million HUF drawback on average taking the same – and in this 
case also the highest – indicator. Only the support rate is infl uenced in the expected, i.e. the 
offi  cially aimed positive direction: the projects of the favoured micro-regions have on average 
2,2 percentage higher support rate, and the projects of preferred settlement have on average a 
4,1 percentage advantage:
Table  v Eff ects of diff erent levels of regulation
Explaining variables. Dependent variable





Total sum of funds won Constant 215,601 213,060’b’ -19,492 -25,025
Granted total sum of the investment Constant 267,343 262,766’b’ -35,548 -45,816
Total sum of funds contracted
Constant 218,201 214,418
’b’ -22,814 -26,827
Contacted total sum of the investment Constant 268,234 263,140’b’ -36,891 -46,497




Source: Own calculation on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National Development Agency.
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We can unfold the connections above, if we analyse further the eff ects of the regulations 
separately. For this we use the variable ‘amount of funds paid’ as this is an indicator represent-
ing a realized and already absorbed fund, and fi rst take the preferred micro-regional status. Th e 
initial eff ect is again replicated by the results of the fi rst model (Table 3: M1): a project from a 
favoured micro-region has on average 25 million HUF smaller amount of fund compared to 
a project from a not disadvantaged micro-region. At the fi rst step, we calculated and included 
a new variable in the linear regression procedure (Table 3: M2) so as to control the impact of 
the factor arising from the obvious diff erences of the circumstances (for this we constructed a 
principal component containing several aspects of information – number of population, rate 
of unemployment, number of enterprises per capita – about the actual micro-region all at once. 
Th e results of this calculation show that aft er controlling for the features of the micro-region the 
eff ect of favoured status decreases to -8,6 million HUF, i.e. the disadvantage of the preferred – 
less developed – micro-regions may be explained partly by theit disadvantaged circumstances 
itself. But it can not be said that the drawback is fully due to these factors, as there is still a 
remarkable negative impact related to the preferred micro-regional status. In the next model, 
we applied another dimension of the development level of the micro-regions investigated: the 
rate of favoured settlement was treated as a new explaining factor. According to the results of 
this model estimation (Table 3: M3), the amount of funds paid is smaller (i.e. the eff ect of this 
variable is negative; -0,18 on average with every 1 percent) with a higher level of preferred – un-
derdeveloped – settlements in the micro-regions. But the more important outcome is that in this 
model also – now controlled for the share of underdeveloped settelements – the self-employed 
impact of being preferred micro-region is still negative: a project coming from a favoured 
micro-region – no matter how high or low the ratio of preferred settlements is – has smaller 
(‘b’= –16,067) amount of fund paid on average. Finally, we included in the estimation both of 
the former control variables beside our main explaining factor, and there seem to be again an 
unfavourable eff ect (Table 3: M4). Separated from the – in this fi nal model positive – eff ects of 
the features of micro-regions and the rate of underdeveloped settlemenst, the impact from the 
institutional regulation of being preferred micro-region is negative: a project from a favoured 
micro-region has an average nearly 11 million HUF less amount of funds paid compared to the 
more developed territorial units.




 constant and ‘b’ coeffi  cients (million HUF)
M1 M2 M3 M4
Constant 210,937 201,977 214,300 200,983
Xpreferred_micro-reg. –24,857 –8,605 –16,067 –10,733
Xdev.level of micro-reg. – 24,108 – 24,393
X rate of preferred settl. – – –0,183 0,048
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
Th e other control regulation concerning a lower territorial level (preferred status of settle-
ments lagged behind) shows similar disparities. In this case we also need to start the exploration 
of the eff ects from the basic two-variable model (Table 4: M5): it says that – as it can be seen 
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in the relevant part of table 2. – the projects handed in from a preferred / underdeveloped set-
tlement have on average almost 30 million HUF less total amount of funds paid. Controlling 
for the previously introduced micro-regional development-level factor (principal component), 
the extent of the drawback of the favoured settlements decreases (Table 4: M6) from the inital 
-29,4 value to -18,6 million HUF. Th e next model takes into consideration the other alternative 
explaining variable; the overall rate of settlements in a disadvantaged position (Table 4: M7). Th e 
results show that if we control for the relative frequency of favoured settlements in the micro-
region, a project coming from a preferred settlement has on average 22,8 million HUF less total 
amount of funds paid. And this dimension of disadvantage also seems to consist according to 
the results of the fi nal model (Table 4: M8) containing all the two alternative factors examined 
separately previously and the main explaining variable. In this case the average lack of funds 
paid for a project handed in from a lagging behind settlement – aside from the (positive) eff ects 
coming from the development features of the micro-regions and the level of underdeveloped 
settlement – is close to 27 million HUF.




constant and ‘b’ coeffi  cients
(million HUF)
M5 M6 M7 M8
Constant 206,883 203,335 210,945 196,981
Xpreferred_settlement –29,443 –18,612 –22,773 –27,733
Xdev.level of micro-reg. – 23,667 – 25,509
X rate of preferred settl. – – –0,139 0,208
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
Staying at the project level and using the same database of the Regional Development 
Operative Program (RDOP) we also calculated the so-called eff ect of interaction between the 
preferred settlement variable and support rate variable constructed by multiplying their values 
with each other as explicated below:
Ŷ=b0 + b1*Xpreferred_settlement + b2*Xsuport_rate + b3*XINTER   , that is
Ŷ=b0 + b1*Xpreferred_settlement + b2*Xsupport_rate + b3* Xpreferred_settlement*Xsupport_rate
Th is special kind of indicator measures the eff ect of one variable from the interaction in the 
function of the value of the other variable from the interaction. Th us the – symmetric – indica-
tor quantifi ed this way can inform us about the eff ect of one variable depending on the value 
of the other variable. In our analysis, the main focus is on the eff ect of the favoured status of 
settlements, so we rearranged the regression equation in order to estimate the impact of being 
a preferred settlement in the light of the value of the support rate – as presented below: 
Ŷ=b0 + b2*Xsupport_rate + (b1 + b3*Xsupport_rate)*Xpreferred_settlement
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Using this (b1 + b3*Xtam.arany.) formula we can calculate the actual value of the examined eff ect 
from the preferred status at every possible value of the support rate. Th e interaction eff ect itself 
is positive (‘b’=0,387), which means that with higher support rate a higher positive eff ect of the 
preferred status can be expected (this is illustrated in Figure 1. using a green line with positive 
slope). Th is relationship itself could be regarded as a fortunate result, as it would imply that if 
the support rate is high enough, then the disadvantaged settlements can benefi t more from the 
institutional regulation. However, if we calculate not just the interaction eff ect but the actual 
eff ects separately for the not preferred and the preferred settlements we can conclude that the 
positive eff ect is only a quasi positive eff ect. Actually the level of fund absorption is initially higher 
in the case of the more developed, i.e. not favoured settlements, and these applicants preserve 
their better position: although in the case of the preferred settlements the line representing the 
level of fund absorption is more steeped – due to the original positive value of the interaction 
eff ect –, this steepness is not high enough for the settlements lagging behind with preferred sta-
tus to catch up the more developed ones – at least in the range of realistic values of the support 
rate with a natural maximum of 100 percent. So it can be stated that although the eff ect of the 
interaction is positive at higher value of support rate, we witness a higher eff ect of the favoured 
status, it is still insuffi  cient to eliminate the drawbacks of the underdeveloped settlements – not 
to mention to enable the latter ones to overtake the settlements in better positions.
Figure  v Diff erences of fund absorption
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
So far we can conclude that both on micro-regional level and project level the eff ect of the 
institutional regulation offi  cially planned and expected to enable the areas in disadvantageous 
position to catch up for the less underdeveloped ones in the fi eld of the absorption of European 
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Union development funds proved to be unsuccessful. Th ese empirical results imply that the 
less developed applicants – no matter micro-regions or directly projects – are at a disadvantage 
during the competition to gain development funds. 
❖
Now, we turn to a special group of projects in the Hungarian development policy and ana-
lyze the so-called priority projects. Everyone may admit that the priority projects are rather a 
special kind of development intervention considering the fact that the decision about the refusal 
or acceptance of a particular priority project is taken by the government itself. So in this case 
there is not that kind of competition to acquire the fund as we may suppose it in the previously 
analyzed instances, rather there is some kind of administrative decision – even if we take into 
consideration the evaluation process itself during which two separate professional reviews are 
included with recommendation about being supported or not. Th ere is another angle why the 
priority projects can be regarded as extremely important policy instruments: “a priority pro-
ject is in priority because it contains such important development – either on a national or on a 
regional level – that can not be managed in other project budget due to its monetary dimension 
and uniqueness” (K.D. 2007).
Th e data of the priority projects can be achieved from a given part of the webpage of the 
National Development Agency in a single Microsoft  Excel table, which was supplemented during 
our work with further factors; additional variables from other sources. We assume that this infor-
mation is important to be shared, as the tables shared on the internet include only the status of an 
actual priority project: the result of the governmental decision whether the project is supported, 
must be improved further, or rejected. From this divide we created a dummy variable – with a 
value 0 indicating that the priority project was refused and with a value 1 indicating that the 
priority project was supported or it needs still some elaboration –, so in this analysis the main 
question and our dependent variable can only be the decision, more properly the probability of 
being supported. Accordingly, we will apply likelihood-ratio calculations and logistic regression 
models in the course of data analysis.
Th e fi rst numbers show the regional disparities of the possibilities of having a supported 
priority project: we assembled a simple cross-tabulation of the regional affi  liation and the status 
of support; furthermore we calculated and included in the last column the odds to be supported 
separately in every region. Th e values imply that there are great diff erences in the probability of 
winning a priority project (see Table 5.): in most cases of the regions the numbers are under the 
value 1 – the notable value which means that the likelihood of having a supported project and 
a rejected project is the same; values over 1 indicate bigger possibility to be successful at having 
priority projects accepted, and values under 1 signifying worse performance in this fi eld. So in the 
regions of Dél-Alföld, Dél-Dunántúl, Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország and Közép-Dunántúl, 
the priority projects do not tend to be as fruitful as they are in the traditionally and well-known 
more developed regions – Közép-Magyarország and Nyugat-Dunántúl (in the latter cases the 
numbers are already twice as high; 1,8 odds to have a supported priority project) . Th us, it is 
obvious that it is more diffi  cult to have a granted priority project in the less developed regions, 
but the inequality becomes even more signifi cant, if we consider the diff erence between the odds 
of the group of regional priority projects and the national level priority projects: the national 
ones have more than 6 times higher odds to be supported.
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Table  v Regional diff erences of the odds of priority projects to be granted
In the cells shown: freqencies
Status
(government decision) Total
Odds of a priority 
project to be granted in 
the regionNot granted Granted
Regions
‘Dél-Alföld’ 100 37 137 0,37
‘Dél-Dunántúl’ 41 16 57 0,39
‘Észak-Alföld’ 85 56 141 0,66
‘Észak-Magyarország’ 50 44 94 0,88
‘Közép-Dunántúl’ 55 48 103 0,87
‘Közép-Magyarország’ 51 96 147 1,88
‘Nyugat-Dunántúl’ 40 73 113 1,83
National projects 17 105 122 6,18
Total 439 475 914 (1,08)
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
Besides the regional dimension of diff erences, we also analyzed the eff ect of territorial 
development on the odds of having an accepted priority project. Th e fi rst explaining variable in 
the related models was the proportion of the preferred micro-regions in the county from which 
the priority project was invited in the evaluation and decision-making process. According to 
the results of the logistic regression model (Table 6: M9), the eff ect caused by this so-called rate 
of underdevelopment is negative (‘b’= -1,7), but perhaps it is more eff ective for us to investigate 
the antilogarithm of the ‘b’ estimates, which transforms the raw ‘b’ values into the more easily 
interpretable odds ratio. Th us, it can be stated that there is – in this case as well – a remarkable 
inequality: with a higher proportion of preferred – i.e. less developed – micro-regions at the 
county level there is a lower odds ratio (‘b’ antilog.=0,18) to have a supported priority project. 
However, in the group of the counties where there are not any favoured micro-regions, there is 
a higher possibility of the priority projects to be accepted: numerically – as it can be seen from 
the value of the constant in the same logistic regression model – nearly twice as high odds ratio 
(‘b’ antilog.=1,95) can be measured; in other words it is much more likely to have a successful 
priority project in the more developed counties.
Th e other aspect of this territorial dimension is investigated from a less gradual point of 
view: we divided the units of analysis into two diff erent groups depending on the mean value 
of the variable: proportion of the preferred micro-regions in the county. For the projects above 
the cut point values were coded with 1 (signifying a higher rate of underdevelopment), and the 
other ones were coded with 0 (signifying the counties with less – under the average – lagging 
behind micro-regions) as described below:
If  x ≤ 50%,  then the value of the new variable = 0  (N = 402),
If  x > 50%,  then the value of the new variable = 1  (N = 407).
So this dummy version of the original variable may reveal more visible and more distinct 
diff erences. Applying the logistic regression model in this case fulfi lls this expectation (Table 
6: M10): although the raw ‘b’ estimate of the explaining variable is smaller than at the previous 
model, the antilogarithm of the indicator proves to be higher (‘b’ antilog.=0,32) and marks more 
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notable disparity. It means that if a priority project proposal is given in from a county where 
the maximum share of the favoured (underdeveloped) micro-regions is fi ft y percent, then it is 
one and a half times more possible to be supported – see the antilogarithm value of the ‘b’ in 
the case of the constant(=1,53) –, while in the case of the counties with higher rate of underde-
veloped micro-regions, the odds ratio is only 0,3 – i.e. it has only one-third likelihood to have a 
successfully accepted priority projects proposal.
Table  v Th e eff ect of the rate of underdeveloped micro-regions on the odds to be granted
(N = 809) b antilogarithm of b coeffi  cients
M9
Xproportion_of_underdeveloped micro-regions –1,699 0,183
Constant 0,667 1,948
M10
Xrate _of_underdeveloped micro-regions_dummy –1,149 0,317
Constant 0,425 1,529
Source: Own calculation and edition on a complex data-base containing the project-level data of the National 
Development Agency.
As demonstrated by the empirical results above, it cannot be stated that the decision-making 
processes of development policy would be more egalitarian on a higher level; i.e. on the govern-
mental level: the priority projects also seem to lack any kind of spatially harmonizing impact. 
Rather, we had to face the fact that these particularly important and outstandingly expansive 
investments are more easily realized – or realized at all – by (co)fi nancing with European Union 
development funds in the more developed regions and areas of the country.
4.2. Results of the Qualitative Research: Responses from the Interviews I.
Based on the results of the personal interviews conducted with diff erent types of actors 
and stakeholders in the EU-funded project application system – self-government leaders and 
representatives of municipalities, project managers of micro-regional development associations, 
proposal-writers and project managers of project fi rms; i.e. members of the project class – we can 
shed some light on the factors behind the relations explored above, or the mechanisms laying 
in the background of the quantitative data.
According to the opinions of the respondents (see Figure 2.), the success of the application 
and project management can be traced back – on the one hand – generally to the scarcity of re-
sources. Th is scarcity of resources means in the fi eld of proposal writing and project generation 
itself the lack of own funds. As in the process of competition for development funds some of the 
participants – no matter if they are municipalities, enterprises or non-governmental organiza-
tions – do not possess privately the necessary fi nancial resources to complete their project budget. 
Th is shortage of resources is even aggrevated by the fact that these actors – just because of their 
disadvantaged circumstances – can obtain bank loans only limited or with restricted conditions 
– if they can at all – to complement their development projects and provide the own contribution. 
Th us, the results from the qualitative data highlight an objective impediment which is originated 
in the lack of resources. Th ere is even an opinion that the acquisition of the European Union 
development funds depends solely on the own fi nancial resources. Another dimension relating 
to this shortage of resources is the method of subsequent fi nancing, which – beyond the very 
existence (or lack) of the necessary private resources – demands the availability of further free 
StudiesBELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E. . 97
monetary frame to start and to fi nalize the fi rst phases; accounting periods of the projects. Th is 
problem emerges as an extremely important factor, as it does not concern the applicants of the 
excessively underdeveloped areas alone, rather it proves to be a complicating factor of the project 
funding system as a whole, impeding all the fi nancially less strong stakeholders.
Figure  v Results from the interviews
Source: Own categorisation and edition from the opinions in the interviews by ATLAS.ti
4.2.1. Related Quantitative Results
In order to investigate whether the disadvantage described above and directly caused by 
the monetary conditions generally pervade the project proposal system, it may be fruitful to 
analyze deeply the quantitative data. If the applicants struggling with the shortage of fi nancial 
resources are really lagging behind, it may confi rm the phenomenon explored in the interviews.
We use the data of the projects from the period of the National Development Plan (NDP 
I.; 2004-2006), as these can already been treated as closed, i.e. the trends appearing in the data 
may not change yet. In this case as well, we analyze all the supported projects without sampling 
(N=11720), but we excluded the ones which were funded without competition (the priority pro-
jects and the central projects). Th e complex multi-level calculations (see Table 7) provide a rather 
remarkable result about the question raised: the fi rst part (Table 7: M9) of the outcomes shows 
the eff ect of the preferred status of the micro-region on the support rate regarding the project 
level, and aggregated on the scope of the institutional regulation, i.e. micro-regional level. Th e 
values of the regression coeffi  cients imply that on project level both the applicants from preferred; 
i.e. underdeveloped micro-regions are at advantage – because their projects are realized with 
5,5 percentage higher support rate on average –, and aggregated on the micro-regional level the 
average level of support rate is higher (‘b’=8,4), as well. Th ese results confi rm that it is worth being 
favoured in the European Union funds based Hungarian project allocation system, because the 
preferred applicants can implement their projects with smaller own fi nancial resources – due 
to the higher support rate.
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Table  v Th e eff ect of preferred status on project and micro-regional level












































Source: Own calculation edition and aggregation on micro-regional level on a complex data-base containing 
the project-level data of the National Development Agency.
Th e further part of table 7. also reveals the positive impact of the favoured status where 
we estimated the eff ects on the total amount of funds paid (Table 7: M10-M10.c2). Th e latter is 
higher in the case of the projects coming from preferred micro-regions in the case of the two-
variable model and also in the models containing additional control variables. Th e estimation of 
the simple two-variable model (Table 7: M10) quantifi es the diff erence of the dependent variable 
– total amount of funds paid – when we shift  from the group of not preferred micro-regions to 
the group of the preferred ones. Th e extended model (Table 7: M10-M10.c1) – containing the 
fi rst additional variable; support rate – makes the same estimation simultaneously controlled 
by the aforementioned alternative explaining factor (support rate). In the fi nal model (Table 
7: M10.c2), we included another control variable – development level of the micro-region; a 
principal component constructed from 5 indicators as described earlier –, thus the coeffi  cients 
of this model present the net eff ect of being preferred micro-region – aside from the impacts of 
the value of the support rate and the micro-regional development level.
Th e results of the fi rst basic model (Table 7: M10) indicate that – on the project level – the 
eff ect of belonging to a preferred micro-region is positive: a nearly 19 million HUF higher amount 
of funds can be observed on average. Aft er controlling – the initially likewise positive – the ef-
fect of support rate (Table 7: M10.c1), the independent impact of the favoured micro-regional 
status decreases a little, but remains positive (‘b’=13,7). And in the fi nal model (Table 7: M10.
c2)– which estimates the eff ect of our main explaining variable, the values of the support rate 
and the development level of the micro-regions considered to be constant – there is still a posi-
tive eff ect: if a project is given in from a preferred micro-region, then the sum of funds paid is 
4 million HUF higher on average.
In so far, as all of the models investigated above are examined aggregated on the micro-
regional level, we obtain respectively the opposite results – that is, the eff ect is negative: only to 
mention the results of the fi nal model (Table 7: M10.c2) illustratively – aside from the positive 
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eff ects of the support rate and the context of the micro-regions – in the group of the favoured 
micro-regions the amount of funds paid is 357,6 million HUF smaller. Th is casts doubt on the 
advantageous impact of the institutional regulation of favoured micro-regional status because 
it means that when we move from the group of not preferred micro-regions to the group of the 
preferred ones, the average level of fund absorption is lower.
To sum up briefl y, the advantageous impact of being preferred micro-region can be de-
tected only on project level; on territorial level it seems to be rather a disadvantage. Th us, we 
may conclude that the results of the empirical research above reveal an essential problem of the 
project fund allocation system: it is worth being involved in the institutional regulation of being 
preferred on the project level, as an applicant – because this brings both higher rate of support 
and higher amount of funds paid in the projects. However, generally speaking, the micro-regions 
considered to be the accumulation units of drawbacks and inequalities can not reach any kind 
of advantages – thus generating a kind of trap in development policy. So to say the favoured 
status as an institutional regulation is advantageous and reaches its objective initially intended, 
but on territorial level its eff ect is not advantageous so it is in this respect counterproductive.
4.3. Results of the qualitative research: responses from the interviews II.
However, among the causes of lagging behind or being successful in the processes of project 
generation and fund absorption the factors – related to the fi nancial shortages and strengths – 
described above based on the interviews and also analyzed with quantitative methods can be 
regarded as only one of a more diff erently interdependent group of factors. In the opinions of the 
respondents, more elements could be discovered – connected to a diff erent aspect of the scarcity 
of the resources, too (see Figure 2). One of these elements is the lack of activities – organization-
ally separated – assisting and relieving the course of assembling project proposals, on which 
the investor or applicant can rely. Since the success of proposal writing and the phase of plan-
ning of projects needs and supposes – according to the respondents’ opinions – the availability 
of knowledge and skills which do not always exist in the case of all potential applicants. Th ose 
employees or staff  members who have already been handling such tasks for a long time are far 
more experienced with proposal documents and in this respect they have the know-how and 
expertise that is required to prepare these materials precisely and accurate.
It seems to be actually irrelevant whether this complexity of particular skills and knowledge 
is accessible within the organization itself – even as a separate proposal writing department, or 
just as a few staff  members specialized directly for this purpose –, or this knowledge is achieved 
as a service sold by the market in the form of tender or proposal writing companies. Th ese two 
options are equivalent from the perspective that both supposes the existence of – eventually 
fi nancial – resources. In this way – another – source or aspect of inequalities is created for those 
applicants being in less advantageous conditions. Th e proposal writing companies and their 
employees incorporated obviously wider, deeper and more extensive knowledge. And this can 
be taken into consideration as a cause for the respondents’ opinion which declared that it is not 
even rewarding for a smaller organization – for example a self-government of a small settlement 
or the small- and medium-sized enterprises – to employ or train colleagues who have expertise 
of every given area in depth, because on the one hand their education may be fairly expansive, 
and on the other hand it is likely that during their work it will be necessary for them to rely on 
their specifi c knowledge only rarely (project proposals with specifi c themes or areas are created 
only occasionally). Unlike the proposal writing companies – it can be much more promising for 
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them to invest into the training or employing of a person with experience and knowledge in a 
particular fi eld as this member of the staff  may carry out for diff erent clients the same kind of 
works and duties that require the specifi c knowledge.
4.4. Summary of the results
According to the secondary data analysis, counterfi nal patterns of the institutional regu-
lation of the European Union funds absorption could be explored: on micro-regional level (1) 
the preferred rural development micro-regions have a smaller rate of both projects and funds 
compared to the developed, i.e. not benefi ciary territorial units. Project level data of regional de-
velopment projects implied that (2) the support rate is infl uenced positively by the governmental 
regulation: in the preferred settlements and micro-regions the avareage level of support rate is 
higher, however (3) in both cases of micro-regional and settlement level, the eff ect of preferred 
status proved to be disadvantagesous: even in the control-variable models, the projects from 
preferred territorial units have on avarege smaller amount of funds paid than their developed 
counterparts. Th e (4) positive value of the interaction eff ect can be regarded as favourable out-
come, although a higher value would be more desirable, as the overall tendencies show that this 
advantage of the underdeveloped, i.e. preff erred settlements is not high enough to help the less 
developed ones to catch up. In the case of the especially remarkable priority projects (5), a clear 
regional dimension of inequality could be measured concerning the odds to have a granted 
projects and the (6) distribution of the underdeveloped micro-regions seemed to be a signifi cant 
factor in this case as well: the higher presence of preferred micro-regions decreased the odds of 
the proirity projects to be granted. Th e results of the qualitative research (7) revealed three main 
factors infl uencing the success of development project absorption: besides the indispensable 
economic capital a kind of cultural or human capital, furthermore social resources or personal 
relations prove to be neccessary elements. In the light of the qualitative research results (8) the 
institutional regulation seemed to work as a kind of development trap: some more detailed 
analysis on diff erent levels revealed a controvesial role of the preferred status.
5. Conclusions
Above we introduced some results about the appropriateness and success of the Hungarian 
regional development policy – our main goal was to answer empirically whether mechanisms 
resulting in counter-fi nal eff ects can be explored, i.e. to demonstrate the regional inequalities of 
regional development policy. Aft er shortly outlining the theoretical frame by interpreting the 
connection of regional development policy and (territorial) inequalities on the basis of (new) 
economic sociology, we carried out analysis on several databases on more territorial levels and 
explored some opinions about the issue from personal interviews.
According to the results of the empirical analysis, we can conclude that both on micro-
regional level and project level the eff ect of the institutional regulation of the absorption of 
European Union development funds – offi  cially planned and expected to enable the areas in 
disadvantageous position to catch up with the less underdeveloped ones – proved to be unsuc-
cessful. Th ese empirical results imply – in accordance with the related EU-level results (Bradley 
2006, Crescenzi 2009, Esposti – Buselotti 2008, Martin–Tyler 2006) – that during the 
competition to gain development funds the less developed applicants are at a disadvantage. More 
precisely, the quantitative (secondary statistical analysis) and qualitative (interviews) outcomes 
show that preferred status seems to be counter-fi nal due to the complex combination of the lack 
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of resources. Moreover, the respecting relationships imply a kind of development trap, inasmuch 
it is worth becoming benefi ciary on the project level, because higher support rate and sum of 
support can be achieved, but on micro-regional level the impact of being preferred is negative, 
i.e. disadvantageous.
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Research background
Th is study summarizes a 10-year-long investigation on the socio-spatial pattern of a Hun-
garian city, Szeged and its alterations represented on the mental map of the Szegeders involving 
qualitative and quantitative types of research methods and statistical data.
Th e main motivation to study the socio-spatial segregation within the city of Szeged was 
presented by the theoretical and methodological criticism of Gábor Csanádi, Ferenc Ekler, József 
Hegedűs, János Ladányi and Iván Tosics (Ekler – Hegeds – Tosics 1980; Csanádi – Ladányi 
1988; Ladányi 2008), and their results gained from investigations on the diverse segregation 
patterns of diff erent social classes.
Th e research has undergone several changes with respect to its methodology in the past 10 
years. Initially, we based our works exclusively on quantitative methods, particularly on sam-
pling, and investigated relevancies of social-spatial diff erentiation models set up by classical 
urban sociology theories in the case of Szeged. Rightful and constructive professional criticism 
of our research’s initial direction induced us to extend the theoretical framework of the research 
problem, and investigate it from diff erent methodological aspects as well. Besides the sociologi-
cal approach of socio-spatial segregation, we also extended our attention to theories of socio-
geography and urban economics. In addition to the interdisciplinary expansion of conceptual 
framework, the methodological perspective of the research problem we studied was likewise 
enriched which built on the theory of combining more research methods together.
We grasped the issue of socio-spatial segregation from a peculiar perspective, which may 
be probably considered a novelty in the investigation of territorial-spatial social patterns, as it 
focuses on questions like ‘what kind of distinction occurs between socio-spatial patterns desig-
nated by statistical data and the cognitive representations of those existing in people’s minds?’, 
and ‘what explains these alterations, and what kind of impact can it generate?’.
By analysing the results of qualitative and quantitative surveys, we justifi ed that signifi cant 
changes in the urban structure are still decisive forces on boundaries of cognitive structures 
appearing on mental maps, whereas former borderlines between historical districts are tend to 
exist only in minds – cognitive maps –, and solely those urban areas present distinctions in this 
sense that used to be independent settlements earlier.
Our scientifi c attention was turned to the problem of real and cognitive socio-spatial segre-
gations during the investigation on the correlations between cognitive structures and historical 
districts. For the study of this problem, we performed an experiment in which we scrutinized 
primarily the areal position of two social groups (low or high-status, poor or rich population, 
as it was defi ned during our surveys) that could be well determined and distinguished by using 
the latest census data in delimitations of diff erent areal units, subsequently we compared these 
with their later positions on mental maps occupied seven, eight, and nine years aft erwards.
Th e analysis accomplished on the 2001-census data also verifi ed in the case of Szeged what 
had already been articulated by others earlier (Ladányi 2008), namely that indexes marking the 
spatial segregation – in case of the usually applicable, relatively extensive territorial delimita-
tions – of the people occupying the bottom of social hierarchy are lower than those on the top. 
Th is theory proved to be peculiarly true in case we determine segregation index by means of its 
projection on greater areal units. Th us, segregation, which exists anyway and is concentrated 
in smaller territorial units, became invisible as a consequence of greater social heterogeneity 
in the area.
To carry out an experiment, we investigated whether segregated areas with certain social at-
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tributes exist on the Szegeders’ cognitive maps, or not; and if so, to what extent are these identical 
to our results of the analysis on socio-spatial segregation retrieved from the 2001 census data? 
Ranking by the territorial ratio of those residents of Szeged who were classifi ed as low-status 
group according to census data (educational attainment, and employment status) exhibited 
identity to the results of none of the years in which mental mapping was conducted; however, 
the population belonging to the high-status group bore strong resemblance to the ranking of 
residential areas of the wealthy in the mental mapping surveys.
Results of the mental mappings indicated similar cognitive structure in the case of segre-
gation between rich and poor in all three years of surveying. Conclusively, we introduced and 
defi ned the notion of ‘mental segregate’, as being territorial units where determinant adjectives 
corresponding to mental spheres displayed on mental maps, or the frequency of the mentioning 
of stereotypes bearing identical content were extraordinary.
We proposed three possible explanations for the accuracy or inaccuracy of mental maps: 
as for the ‘static explanation’, and the ‘dynamic explanation’, we explained the diversity of pat-
terns of the society’s spatial arrangement in minds in the fi rst case with the particularities of 
the group-specifi c territorial location of the real distribution (static), and in the second case 
with the diff erence occurring in the frequency of the measures of urban rehabilitation by target 
areas (dynamic).
Th e third, ‘stereotypical explanation’ implies that distinctions between real and cogni-
tive spatial patterns in diff erent social groups’ notions are generated by stereotypes relating to 
mental maps. With respect to the stereotypical explanation of the distinction between real and 
cognitive socio-spatial patterns, the scientifi c question arose whether exaggerating stereotypical 
explanations that are related to areas comprising diff erent segregates have any kind of impact. 
We adopted the urban economic theoretical approach on external impacts (Lengyel – Mozsár 
2002, Kanemoto 1996) relating to the judgement of areas comprising segregates of diff erent 
quality. We expressed degrees of the external impact characterising individual districts in the 
value distinction between areal results of the dissimilation and mental dissimilation indexes, and 
we ranked urban areas subsequently upon the indicators of the 2001 base year and three survey 
years, then we tested/challenged the coherence on the grounds of the correlations among ranking 
lists. On the basis of the results, we concluded that external impacts deriving from stereotypes 
prevail most intensively in areas consisting of segregates.
During the course of this research, we apply the combination of qualitative and quantita-
tive methods in the analysis of the ‘real’ and mental socio-spatial patterns of Szeged, so as to 
highlight the methodological problems of territory-based socio-scientifi c analyses through 
the examples of results that we obtained from a variety of analysis procedures. Th e thesis can 
be regarded as interdisciplinary from a methodological point of view, since the various survey 
methods and research issues that provide the empirical basis of the study represent the subject 
and methodology of several other disciplines (sociology, economy, socio-geography, social psy-
chology, cultural anthropology, urban studies).
Th e main direction of my study is represented by the empirical analyses of the following 
hypotheses:
Dominant segregate hypothesis: Segregates appear on maps regardless of their type.
Mental segregate hypothesis: boundaries that appear on mental maps do not correspond 
to the segregate boundaries measured and delimitated upon quantitative datasets; boundaries 
of mental segregates are more extensive.
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Stereotypical externality hypothesis: Stereotypes related to segregates cover greater units 
of the urban structure comprising these – districts in the case of Szeged –, and have positive or 
negative external eff ects on them.
All three of our hypotheses have been proved to be true during our investigation.
Applied methods
In our opinion, the typology delineated by Peter Blau, which is used most frequently in urban 
sociology, can be perfectly applied for the determination of the complex of parameters decid-
ing spatial segregation on the grounds of social status (Blau 1976, Angelusz 1999. 359–382.), 
therefore we employed the structural parameters included in this typology for the determination 
of the social position of individual units of analysis in the quantitative phase of our research, 
the operationalisation and the analysis.
On one hand, the extension of territorial units represents one of the major methodologi-
cal problems in researches dealing with the correlation between social stratifi cation and spatial 
segregation, and on the other hand, the strongly correlating sample size does another. We would 
be able to obtain the most accurate data possible from similar analyses, if we were aware of those 
parameters of the total population that determine social stratifi cation; however, we are unable 
to fulfi l the latter in most of the cases. Such opportunity to detect individual parameters of the 
total population in Szeged is the ten-yearly population census. Nonetheless, the nominal and 
gradual parameters determined by Blau are not recorded even in this data collection aff ecting the 
entire population, only a few of them, involving gender, age, educational attainment, domicile, 
occupation, marital status, workplace, nationality and religion.
Results of Hungarian urban sociological investigations indicate that in the case of spatial 
segregation by social strata – within the list of parameters by Blau – those parameters can be 
well defi ned by which spatial segregation can be distinguished most apparently (Ladányi 2008). 
On the basis of his investigation conducted in Budapest, János Ladányi classifi es the parameters 
including age, educational attainment, workplace and occupation into those ones by means of 
which spatial segregation by social strata can be detected most precisely.
I intend to give an overview of the changes occurred in the spatial pattern of Szeged city’s 
society between 2001 and 2010 on the basis of objective data and those retrieved from mental 




• Survey by questionnaire 
• Secondary analysis
Th e techniques of investigation we employed are based on the incorporation of quantitative 
and qualitative methods, which provide high levels in both reliability and validity. Our method 
of investigation ranges on a qualitative-quantitative scale whose endpoints are represented by 
‘fi eld-near’ (qualitative) and ‘fi eld-distant’ (quantitative) techniques for achieving higher degree 
of reliability and validity (Letenyei 2004. 56–66).
Our point of view is that only and exclusively valid research results are worth considering, 
although one has to endeavour to achieve adequate level of reliability. Th e greatest advantage 
of combining these two methods of data collection is that it ensures data of higher validity and 
reliability for analysis by the fact that the defi nition of research question and its relevance become 
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more established as a result of qualitative collections in the fi eld, thus providing higher level of 
validity in terms of questions to be articulated by the quantitative research phase.
During our data collection in the quantitative phase of the research, we could work with 
such questions by incorporating more methods – completed on a sample of a large number of 
items and therefore providing high reliability – because of the already processed qualitative 
results whose validity is greater as well. We ensured higher validity in the case of the survey, 
which is anyway highly reliable but less valid as a consequence of inappropriately articulated 
questions, by formulating questions for the quantitative measurement device on the basis of the 
high validity data yielded by the fi eldwork prior to developing the device itself. Th ere is a rec-
ommended sequence of diff erent methods during a research that involves the abovementioned 
combination of data collection techniques that is advancing from qualitative data collection 
techniques toward quantitative procedures. Any variation from this sequence or swapping of 
the two techniques of data collection would occur in one case, namely in the cases of fi eldwork 
and secondary analysis, when the secondary analysis of data obtained from previous results in 
the research topic can overtake fi eldwork phase (Letenyei 2004).
We begin our research in the thesis topic with the examination of the documents introducing 
the society of Szeged, then with a jump to the ‘fi eld-near’ end of the axis/scale we continue with 
data collection that ensures high validity regarding the built-up environments of diff erent urban 
areas and distinctions among social composition of the various districts by applying observation 
technique. Conclusions of this research phase generate the articulation of the study’s research 
problem, and the decision to set up hypotheses in further phases of the study about socio-spatial 
segregation in Szeged, and to employ methods for its measurement at a higher scale of reliability.
Secondary analysis represents one of the higher measurement methods, in which we ana-
lysed the Hungarian Central Statistical Offi  ce’s (HCSO) population census data on the total popu-
lation of Szeged involving variables of the completed level of education and age. We recognise 
socio-spatial distinctions by census districts on the grounds of these parameters taken from 2001.
In the phase of secondary analysis the following two reasons induced us to take into account 
exclusively the number of years of school completed and age:
Researches focusing on segregation in Hungary indicated that these variables (and particu-
larly the completed level of education) are the most dominant factors in the social composition 
of segregates. (Ladányi 2004) Th e other reason is that on the level of evolvable variables census 
data were restricted to these parameters both being applicable on two higher measurement levels, 
and as determinants of social status.1
Data collection necessitated by the mental mapping was conducted in the quantitative 
research phase, specifi cally focusing on the stereotypical notions of individual areas, and 
expressly on the cognitive perception and localization of areas resided by low class (poor) and 
higher-class (wealthy) people.
In this section of the thesis, we analyse the spatial segregation of Szeged’s society on the 
basis of two determinant structural parameters of social stratifi cation, and its extension, as 
well as the mental representation concerning spatial locations of the various social groups in 
the mind of Szegeders.
 1  Census data consist even of economic activity and employment status, which belong to the gradual parameters 
of social stratifi cation; furthermore, gender/sex and ethnic identity, which are to be classifi ed as nominal pa-
rameters (Blau 1976, Angelusz 1999). Nonetheless, we did not consider these variables practical to involve 
in the analysis due to the low level of their measurement and previous results obtained from segregation 
researches.
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We make an attempt to introduce how the research on spatial segregation of the urban so-
ciety can be interpreted with the help of qualitative and quantitative approaches, the secondary 
analyses of the 2001 census data, as well as of observation and three survey questionnaires. We 
determine objective and subjective (mental dissimilation) index values assigned to individual 
areas of the city from larger territorial units to the smallest delimitations possible (functional 
residential area – district – census tract – census block, and interpret the internal diff erentiation 
of Szeged upon these. Th e main questions of our analysis is partly of methodological nature 
and partly concerns Szeged’s internal divisions. Th e methodological issue is to what extent the 
results obtained through mental mapping diverge from or are in accordance with results retrieved 
from quantitative data. A further methodological question is how much mental mapping, as a 
method, is eligible to assess the spatial movement processes of the urban society, and the eff ects 
of urban planning interventions.
During our analysis we strive to better understand what kind of alterations or similarities 
of the separation, segregation of high and low-status population of Szeged by residential areas 
can be indicated by which analytical technique, in other words, how much the objective and 
subjective interpretations of the population’s segregation are in correspondence to each other.
We considered the application of source and document analyses – as a method of data col-
lection – concerning the socio-spatial analysis of Szeged eff ective, because documents, descrip-
tions and social scientifi c and sociological studies emerging on the occasion of the 1879 Great 
Flood, which was a determinant event in the city’s life, refer unequivocally to the fact that it had 
a signifi cant impact on the history of the development and society of Szeged (Lechner 2000, 
Bálint 1959, Erdei 1971, Bálint 1976, Kovács 2003).
Results of document analyses completed on the socio-spatial pattern of Szeged generated 
further research questions in the qualitative phase, namely that:
What does the current spatial structure of Szeged look like?
How much do individual parts separate from each other by the function and physical 
characteristics of residential buildings?
Can one sense some kind of heterogeneity concerning the composition of local society?
In what spatial and social categories do the people of Szeged think about their city?
To put it otherwise and correlate with a specifi c research method: how are the city and 
its population represented on the mental map of Szegeders, and what parts, areas, groups and 
social categories build them up?
For testing the relevancy of research questions articulated in the fi rst research phase, we 
simultaneously applied two data collection techniques subsequently: besides observations taken 
during the city’s visit, we made unstructured interviews with residents of the given districts. For 
selecting the study subjects, we applied the technique of convenient sampling (Babbie 2003:205-
206), as we did not aim to perform representative sampling at that research phase, however, we 
sought to select respondents who possibly bore diff erent demographical attributes. During the 
course of our observations conducted in the period between 2002 and 2007, we conducted some 
150-200 short discussions.
Conclusions of the qualitative research section
As a conclusion to data collection accomplished through observation, we ascertained that 
the building stock of Szeged has more or less preserved its traditional arrangement by districts 
even today with respect to physical and functional attributes. It can also be perceived that tradi-
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tional distinctions among urban areas are gradually vanishing in terms of both the appearance 
of new buildings and the social characteristics of their residents. Th e onetime historical districts 
are steadily losing their particular faces with respect to their characteristics – in case of both the 
build-up environment and the social homogeneity –, and thus their borders are slowly blurring. 
Former boundaries of the historical districts tend to exist only in minds – on cognitive maps. 
Some diff erence is presented by those neighbourhoods that used to be independent settlements. 
Borderlines between these once independent areas and Szeged were and still are sharper (dyke, 
railway, main road), and can rather be interpreted as fault line, whose infl uence can be detected 
on cognitive maps as well.
Conclusions of the quantitative research section
During the secondary analyses of the 2001 census datasets of the HCSO, we analysed segre-
gation and dissimilarity indexes2 of Szeged’s inhabitants, which can be classifi ed into categories 
of unemployed people in active working age with low educational attainment, and those in active 
working age (low-status), and white-collar workers with high level of education (high-status)/ 
unemployed people in active working age with low educational attainment(low-status), and 
those white-collar workers with high level of education in active working age (high-status) in 
four territorial distributions / divisions.3
Segregation indexes exhibited diff erent results regarding the extension of diff erent status 
groups and delimited territorial units. Th e larger an individual unit is, the smaller the segregation 
indexes of studied groups are. Th e diff erence between segregation indexes are striking between 
low and high-status groups in the largest areal unit, namely functional residential areas. It can 
be detected in this territorial delimitation that high-status people are prone to segregate more 
intensely, whereas low-status people are not. But at the same time, if we compare the ranges of 
the segregation indexes by territorial units group by group, signifi cant diff erences are produced. 
Th e extension of territorial delimitation has a great impact on the values of the low-status groups’ 
segregation indexes. In the case of the territorial delimitations of Szeged, the delimitation on 
census tract level is the unit, in which segregation index values of either status groups converge. 
Hence, the segregation curve represents J shape in case of great territorial delimitation, while as 
a consequence of decreasing areal units in Szeged, it nearly followed U shape. Such a signifi cant 
J-shaped curve cannot be experienced by means of decreasing the level of territorial analyses 
either, as in Budapest or other bigger European cities (Ladányi 2005. 147.) which can be inter-
preted by diff erent social composition.
We created two groups for high-status people during the analysis, as a risk of error emerged, 
namely that we could have specifi ed group boundaries for people in the highest social status too 
loosely – since we classifi ed occupations falling under the determination demanding high and 
medium level education into this group.
Th is could have led to the conclusion that we compared the segregation indexes of middle 
class strata characterised by low territorial segregation with indexes of the low-status inhabitants. 
In order to make sure how much this category classifi ed into the high-status group infl uence our 
 2  We determined active working age between 18 and 60; low level of educational attainment at 8 or less com-
pleted classes. Categories of white-collar workers were the following: legislator, leaders of the administration 
and trade unions, occupations involving independent application of university degrees, other occupations 
demanding high or medium level education.
 3  Grouping variables of the database enabled these four diff erent territorial distributions.
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results, we created another high-status group from which we extracted occupations requiring 
other high or medium educational level, and likewise calculated its segregation and dissimilarity 
indexes. Results did not alter remarkably.
Consequently, results assessed on census data support those declarations in Szeged’s case 
as well according to which indexes of those occupying the bottom of the hierarchy indicating 
spatial segregation – in case of the generally used, relatively extensive territorial delimitations 
(functional residential zone, district) – are lower than those being on the top. Our investigation 
apparently verifi es that this theorem is defi nitely valid in the case when we determine segrega-
tion indexes on the basis of larger territorial units, which as a consequence of social heterogene-
ity within the area overlap, and conceal segregation, otherwise existing and concentrating in 
smaller territorial units. Th e reason for this is that high-status people can concentrate according 
to their own volition; they can aff ord, and they are able to choose the residential area they prefer, 
whereas the poor cannot aff ord this from their own resources, therefore they are compelled into 
micro-segregates, where they concentrate occupying smaller areal units (Ladányi 2007. 199–215).
As a conclusion of the thesis we articulated three interpretations concerning distinctions 
in the socio-spatial patterns retrieved from statistical data and mental maps:
Dynamic explanation
By means of our dynamic interpretation concluded by the research, we can detect distinc-
tions between statistical data and cognitive socio-spatial segregation patterns in that urban 
renewal measures dominantly aff ect residential areas of the low-status population; greater degree 
of transformations and various urban ecological processes emerge in these areas frequently due 
to interventions. Habitats of the high-status inhabitants indicate greater permanency, large-scale 
changes do not occur in these areas. Spatial distribution of the low-status population could have 
changed as a consequence of rehabilitation interventions taken place in Szeged aft er 2001, which 
was projected on mental maps as well; while location of the high-status people, which had already 
been fi xed in minds, remained unchanged.
Static explanation
In accordance with the research results produced by Ladányi and his associates, as well as 
our analyses concerning Szeged low-status population’s areal concentration indicates territo-
rial homogeneity only in the case of smaller territorial units, in other words, areas populated by 
the poor, the so-called micro-segregates are strongly dispersed within the city. Consequently, 
cognitive maps of urban districts constructed through individual experience indicate intense 
dispersion in minds due to the same characteristics of poor residential blocks/areas, and thus 
subjectivity is more prevalent concerning location. On one hand, people can encounter poor 
micro-segregates scattered in various portions of the city; on the other hand they meet those 
smaller units resided by poor people frequently that concern their day-to-day visits, thus their 
cognitive territorial judgement tend toward those areas. Urban areas that are believed to be re-
sided by the poor are, on one hand, characterised by greater degree of dispersion in minds on the 
basis of location, and on the other hand, categorisation concerns more areas as a consequence of 
this tendency. In contrast to the latter, one can encounter areas populated by high-status people 
that overlap greater territorial unit only in well separated and defi ned districts, thus distinctions 
in the subjective daily experience do not induce distortive eff ects on cognitive maps; these bear 
stronger resemblance to real spatial social arrangement. During our research we defi ned the 
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term of mental segregation, which stands for those territorial units that exhibit defi nite altera-
tion from other mental spheres with respect to determinant adjectives marking mental areas on 
mental maps, or the frequency of mention of stereotypes carrying identical content.
We supplemented the theory of easily learnable, ‘readable’ city (Lynch 1960; cited by 
Cséfalvay 1990), which throws light on that relatively accurate cognitive map can be created 
easily and quickly about clearly sectioned cities that are characterised by particular architectural 
environment, with the statement that relatively precise cognitive map can be created about cities 
that can be described by more homogeneous socio-spatial segregation.
Based on our research results, in our opinion we can make the general statement by means of 
our two abovementioned explanations that the accuracy of mental maps are heavily infl uenced by 
two factors, as for the analysis on the cognitive representation of either physical or social spheres:
• dynamic factor: frequency of the spatial change of the analytical units (fault lines, 
borderlines, landmarks, mental spheres, stereotypes),
• static factor: spatial extension of analytical units
Stereotypical explanation
We created an index, called mental dissimilation index to measure territorial disparities on 
the basis of the frequency of mention of areas populated by the poor or the rich.
Mental dissimilation index measures the spatial distribution of the mental representation 
of two cognitive categories. Th is indicator is basically symmetric, i.e. functions and sequence of 
the two compared distributions are exchangeable. Th e calculation is, in substance, performed 
upon the formula in which one totals absolute values of the distinctions among territorial units 
of the percentage of the two cognitive categories relating to given mental territorial units, and 
divides them by two.
Values can range between 0 and 100 in the case of mental dissimilation index as well. If a 
certain stereotype is not associated with a mental spheres in minds, its value converges to the 
low limit value, while in case of the connection of a certain stereotype to a certain area it moves 
toward the upper limit. Th e value of mental dissimilation index calculated for each district of 
Szeged relying on the 2007, 2009 and 2010 datasets we study the mental spatial distribution of 
the low and high-status population.
With refl ection to the results, we articulated a third explanation, namely stereotypical ex-
planation. Th is explanation virtually involves – in case of the distinction among real and mental 
spatial patterns of various social groups’ – categorisation, and the frequency and extension of 
exaggerating attitudes accompanying categories, which characterise stereotypes associated with 
mental spheres.
Concerning the stereotypical interpretation on the distinctions between real and cognitive 
socio-spatial patterns we raised the question in connection with further investigations whether 
exaggerating stereotypical explanations have some sort of impact, or one can detect such exter-
nal impact that is a possible consequence of the distortion of cognitive spatial pattern, or not.
Th e main direction of the research is right in compliance with the analysis of stereotypes 
relating to territories, during which we shed light on the fact that negative stereotypes associ-
ated with districts of Szeged correlate unequivocally with the presence of ethnic segregates in 
those areas. Our results reinforce that suchlike areas represent only relatively small portions of 
districts, nonetheless, negative stereotypes concern whole districts, in other words, they have 
negative external impact on districts. ❋
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Abstract Th e students of today have mostly grown up surrounded by numerous digital 
technologies, like cell-phones, computers and the internet; therefore they are called digital natives 
by some scholars. Th ese information and communication technologies are indispensable parts 
of their lives. Th e digital gaps which are caused by the (diff erent) use of digital technologies are 
socially relevant primarily in school, as they infl uence the inequalities in education. In our article, 
we present the possible approaches of digital inequalities in school, the gap between teachers and 
students and the diff erences among students. We introduce the concepts and theories about the 
digital natives then sum up the main criticism about this thesis. Recent empirical studies and 
their results are presented to argue in favour of the heterogeneity of the digital native’s generation.
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1. Introduction
Th e problem of digital gaps or digital inequalities in education can be approached in two 
diff erent ways. First, there are generational diff erences in ICT knowledge and usage between 
students and teachers. Th is is what the sociological literature describes with the popular terms 
“digital natives” and “digital immigrants” (Prensky 2001a). Th e main question that emerges in 
regard of this type of inequality is whether teachers are able to prepare students for their later 
life in an ICT based society? Th e other approach of digital inequalities in education focuses on 
the diff erences of ICT usage and knowledge among the digital native generation, the students. 
Many empirical researches inspired by the digital native–digital immigrant concept point out 
that the present generation of students cannot be considered as a homogenous group as far as 
their technology use is concerned. Th ere are diff erences between them in terms of access, mode 
of use and ICT competence. Th ese divergences among students imply the question how they 
infl uence the students’ chances in education, or in other words, what impact ICT use has on 
school performance. How does ICT use contribute to a better or a worse school performance?
Th is paper aims to give a detailed overview of the two approaches of digital inequalities 
outlined in the introduction in order to off er a better understanding of the implications of ICT 
in education. We will fi rst introduce the concepts of digital gap and digital inequalities in social 
sciences to familiarize the reader with some basic notions of the topic in focus. In the second 
chapter we give a summary of the concepts and theories of the emergence of a new, digitally 
well-equipped and technology-savvy generation. Th en improvements of the concept and criticism 
are presented in the next section, as many scholars questioned the adequacy of these thoughts 
on the digital gap between students and teachers. To support the critics, the latest empirical 
fi ndings of both quantitative and qualitative studies are introduced. Th ese empirical works also 
refer to the second approach of digital inequalities in education, namely to the diff erences of the 
use among students. We intend to highlight the arguments that emphasize the heterogeneity 
of the digital natives.
2. Th e Digital Gap and the Digital Inequality Concepts
Th e interest of social sciences in technologies and their social implications has been a rather 
marginalized territory of research for a long time. However, fi rst the appearance and spread of 
the television, then of other information and communication technologies – like cell-phones, 
computers and the internet – has directed the attention of social scientists gradually on these 
technologies and their eff ects on social life. Sociologists have caught up on these phenomena 
because of their characteristic of creating some kind of inequalities among groups and indi-
viduals in society (Bognár – Galácz 2004). When ICT began to spread, two common views 
emerged concerning the eff ects of them on social stratifi cation. People and scientists had great 
expectations in connection with these technologies. Th ey presumed that by giving access to 
information, knowledge and opportunities, the information and communication technologies 
would diminish social inequalities. Th e other – more pessimistic – view did not expect the ICT 
to decrease but to increase social inequalities as access of and competencies for these technolo-
gies are not evenly distributed in society (Pintér 2007, DiMaggio et al. 2001). Although both 
views can be theoretically supported, the latter assumption turned out to be realistic, since 
empirical studies have revealed huge diff erences both between regions or countries, and inside 
the societies, between individuals or groups of individuals.
Th e empirical studies applied distinct approaches to the digital diff erences according to the 
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level of penetration. At the beginning – when penetration was low - emphasis was put on the 
access, and dichotomous distinctions were made between the ones who have access to ICT and 
who do not, or later between those who use these applications and who do not. Th is is the concept 
of the digital gap or digital divide (DiMaggio – Hargittai 2001). Analyses with the focus on 
the digital divide have tried to reveal the socio-economic characteristics of the users and non-
users. In a huge empirical study Norris (2001) unfolded the variables that infl uence the digital 
gap. It is not surprising that these factors are identical with the traditional socio-economic and 
demographic variables: gender, age, ethnicity, educational attainment, income, occupation and 
type of residence (rural or urban) are the main predictors of ICT access and use. According to 
Norris’s fi ndings, the variable that has the most signifi cant impact on the digital divide is age. 
Young generations are ten times more likely to use the new information and communication 
technologies than older people. Th us generational diff erences, which will be discussed later in 
this paper, seem to beconstitute a signifi cant dimension of the digital inequalities in terms of 
access and use.
When penetration reached a higher level, the focus of research has shift ed from the di-
chotomous distinctions between users and non-users to the diff erences among the users. It 
has simply lost relevance to investigate the characteristics of the ones who have and who have 
no access to ICT, as access and use were available for the majority of the society1. Th is new 
approach directed the attention of researchers from the digital divide to digital inequalities. 
Th us, the term of digital inequalities refers to the diff erences among the users concerning the 
quality of use. Th ese diff erences can be investigated in many dimensions. DiMaggio and 
Hargittai (2001) – who introduced the term of digital inequalities – suggest fi ve dimensions 
of the digital inequalities. Th e fi rst one is that of the (1) technical apparatus including hardware 
and soft ware. Th e quality of the computer or other device that one uses to access the World 
Wide Web generates inequalities in use as the bad status of the hardware or the lack of special 
soft ware limits the use. Technical apparatus also includes the type of connection. Th e dial-up 
connections make many applications diffi  cult or unreachable; while a broadband connection 
does not limit the usage. Researches reveal the huge importance of the broadband connection 
in the ways of use. Th is type of connection leads to quantitative and qualitative changes in use. 
Broadband access may enhance the period of time spent with surfi ng the Internet. In a panel 
survey, Hitt and Tambe (2010) found an increase of 1300 minutes in the use in a month when 
the connection was changed to broadband access. Th ey also revealed changes in the quality of 
use as people visited more entertaining and news sites aft er shift ing to broadband connection. 
Kolko (2010) witnessed in his research a shift  to “socially undesirable” uses e.g. downloading 
music as an outcome of the broadband access. Another dimension of the digital inequalities is 
(2) the autonomy of use according to DiMaggio and Hargittai. Th is category includes the place 
of use, the control of use and other aspects of autonomy. Th e use at home or at a public place 
can diff er a lot. For example, the time of use may be limited in a library or school, and fi lters 
may be applied which hamper the usage. An important dimension of inequalities lies in the (3) 
ICT competencies, skills and knowledge. Th ese cognitive factors vary among users leading to 
diff erences in the use of the internet. (4) Social support may also generate inequalities, as the 
use is facilitated for those who receive support from their family, friends. Th e last dimension 
 1  Of course, the digital divide is still signifi cant in many societies, primarily in developing countries, and the 
investigation of groups excluded from access and the use of ICT can be relevant in developed societies as well, 
but the digital inequalities among users is more in focus.
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on the authors’ list is (5) the purpose of use which can be very diverse. Th ey make a distinction 
whether the use increases economic productivity, political or social capital, or the one serves 
mainly for entertainment. It is foreseeable that the two categories of use have a great impact on 
the inequalities among users.
Both the digital divide and the digital inequality conception are applied in studies dedicated 
to the diff erences between the digital immigrants and natives, and the generation of the digital 
natives itself. Before moving on to the empirical results, we describe the concepts and theories 
of the digital natives in detail.
2. Th e Teacher–Student Digital Gap 
Concepts of the Digital Natives and Digital Immigrants
Th e concepts of an emerging new generation which diff ers in many ways from the previous 
one has begun to appear in the late1990s. Many terms were used to describe this generation 
of which the most popular ones are the Net Generation (Tapscott 1998), the Digital Natives 
(Prensky 2001a), the Millennials (Oblinger 2003) and the Screenagers (Rushkof 2006). Th ese 
descriptions refer to the rise of a new generation that was born at the time when the diff erent 
information and communication technologies began to spread rapidly. Some authors specify 
the period of time when this new generation was born. According to Tapscott, the Net Genera-
tion consists of those who were born between 1977 and 1997. Oblinger defi nes a shorter period 
of time for the Millennials: they are the group of people born between 1982 and 1991. Prensky 
does not give the exact dates for the birth of the digital natives, but his followers estimate the 
rise of the digital natives from the 1980s (Palfrey–Gasser 2008). 
Although there are diff erences in defi ning the roots of the emergence of the new generation, 
all concepts share the view that one of the main characteristics of these children (and adults by 
now) is that they got to know ICT as a natural part of life. Th ey have not known the world with-
out cell phones, computers and internet and could not imagine how things would work without 
these devices. Th e socialisation among ICT has infl uenced the net generation’s skills and the way 
they think and learn. Th at is why most of the theories concerning the digital natives are tightly 
connected to discussions about the education system in the 21st century. 
Th e most popular concept belongs to Marc Prensky (2001a, 2001b) who makes a distinction 
between the so-called digital natives and the digital immigrants. He assumes that all the changes 
we see in the generation of the students nowadays –their clothes, slang, styles etc. - are due to 
the fact that they are the fi rst generation who grew up with the new information and commu-
nication technologies. Th e name the author gives this generation – the digital natives – refers 
to their ability to speak the digital language as a “native speakers” (Prensky 2001a. 1.). Th ey 
have learnt all the skills and knowledge about ICT naturally as a “mother language”. In contrast, 
those who met the new digital technologies later in their lives could not fully acquire the digital 
language they retained an “accent”. Th is is what happens to a migrant when settling in a new 
country getting to know a new culture. Most immigrants retain an accent, although they learn 
the language, the traditions and the norms of a new culture. Th is is why Prensky uses the term 
digital immigrants for the generation preceding the digital natives. Th e accent of the digital im-
migrants appears in many of their actions. for instance when they print out a document to edit 
it rather than doing it on the computer. Th ese diff erences between the generations challenge 
the education system. Education is facing the problem that the digital natives are taught by the 
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digital immigrants. Th is situation results in complaining teachers about their students who do 
not pay attention and complaining students about their teachers, because they fi nd their teach-
ing methods boring and out of date. Th is mutual dissatisfaction leads to ineffi  cient education. 
Prensky emphasizes that the teaching staff  has to adapt to the changed skills, abilities and way of 
thinking of the students. He deduces the change of digital natives’ thinking patterns from social 
psychology and neuroplasticity. Th e social psychological argument includes the presumption 
that the thinking patterns change depending on one’s experiences (Prensky 2001b: 2). Studies 
revealed that the environment and culture in which people are raised aff ect and determine their 
thinking patterns (Prensky 2001b: 3). Th e students of today were raised in an ICT “culture” 
that’s why we can assume that their way of thinking has changed. Neuroplasticity is a discipline 
in neurobiology which studies the physical changes of the brain that occur due to its persistent 
stimulation. Prensky considers the exposure to videogames, the computer and the internet such 
a stimulation which causes physical changes in the brains of the children. What are the diff erent 
attitudes and characteristics of the digital natives and the digital immigrants? In their paper for 
educators Jukes and Dosaj (2006) collected these diff erences (Table 1).
. Table v Characteristics of the digital natives and the digital immigrants. Source: Jukes – Dosaj 2006. 37.
DIGITAL NATIVES DIGITAL IMMIGRANTS
prefer receiving information quickly from multiple 
multimedia sources
prefer slow and controlled release of information from 
limited sources
prefer parallel processing and multi-tasking prefer singular processing and single/limited-tasking
prefer processing pictures, sounds and video before 
text
prefer to provide text before pictures, sounds and 
video
prefer random access to hyperlinked, interactive, 
multimedia information
prefer to provide information linearly, logically and 
sequentially
prefer to interact/ network simultaneously with many 
others
prefer students to work independently rather than 
network and interact
move seamlessly between real and virtual spaces 
instantaneously prefer to operate in real spaces
prefer to learn “just-in-time” prefer to teach “just-in-case”
want instant access to friends, services and responses 
to questions, instant gratifi cation and instant rewards prefer deferred gratifi cation and deferred rewards
prefer learning that is relevant, instantly useful and 
fun
prefer to teach to the curriculum guide and standard-
ized tests
Th e diff erences between the characteristics of digital natives – the students – and the digital 
immigrants – the teachers – generate a tension between these groups which is disadvantageous 
for the effi  ciency of education. For these reasons Prensky suggests that the education methods 
should be adapted to the students’ way of thinking and learning: translated into the digital 
native’s “language”. He encourages education staff  to use computer games as pedagogical tools 
for education. Digital natives are familiar with computer games and with a game designed ap-
propriately for educational purposes students would learn geography, maths and other subjects 
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easily and in an entertaining way. Some teachers might doubt the effi  cacy of computer games 
for providing the required knowledge, however, Prensky shows through examples that games 
can be very useful. He claims that the content of the curriculum doesn’t have to be changed just 
the mean of teaching it. In all subjects new methods can be invented which adapt more to the 
digital natives’ language. Besides the new methods, new contents should be included in educa-
tion like digital and technological knowledge and also disciplines like ethics, politics, sociology 
etc. (Prensky 2001a. 4.).
Many thinkers caught up on Prensky’s concept and developed the idea of a new digital 
generation. Th e students who Oblinger (2003) calls the Millennials are more or less identical 
with the digital natives. She identifi es three generations of “new learners”. Th ese are the “Baby 
Boomers” who already graduated from college, the “Generation X” who are currently doing 
their college studies and the “Millenials” who are just entering higher education. Th ey need to 
be paid a special attention at as higher education has to take into account the expectations and 
characteristics of the new students to retain their competitiveness (Oblinger 2003. 42.). Th e 
Millennials apply distinct learning styles from the previous generations; they prefer teamwork, 
experiential activities and the use of technology (Oblinger 2003. 38.). For them – like for the 
digital natives -, technology is a natural part of life. According to Oblinger’s research those 
students who incorporated technology use within their socialization diff er in their attitudes 
and aptitudes towards learning.
3. Critics of the Digital Native Concept
Th e concept of a new generation of students, especially the thoughts of Prensky, have been 
modifi ed and criticized since their appearance. Th e critiques addressing the digital native-digital 
immigrant concept are of two kinds. One group of critical arguments is more theoretical and 
concerns the dichotomous distinction between the two generations and the implications of the 
concept for a radical change of the education system. Other critiques emphasize the lack of em-
pirical support of the concept and claim that empirical research leads to results that undermine 
the digital native discourse.
Even some of the writers who actually agree with Prensky’s concept refi ne some parts of it. 
In their huge work on the digital natives, Palfrey and Gasser (2008) declare that they do not 
consider the digital natives to be a new generation, but a population. Th ey doubt the rise of an 
entire generation, as children of the same agein developing countries do not even have access 
to or lack the cognitive skills to use the new technologies as digital natives in wealthy countries 
do. For this reason, one cannot expand the digital native label to all people who were born in a 
defi ned period , as the place of birth in terms of developed or developing country also matters. 
Th e authors suppose that even in a developed country there might be groups of people who do not 
belong to the digital native population, although they were born at the same time, because they 
are an underprivileged class in society (Palfrey – Gasser 2008. 14.). Besides the limitation of 
the digital native attribute, the authors also introduce a third group in the digital era, these are 
the digital settlers. Th e digital settlers are a transitive category between the digital natives and 
immigrants. Th ey got to know the new technologies from the beginning , but they grew up mostly 
in an “analogue-only” world. Th ey are familiar with ICT and use these technologies oft en in a 
sophisticated way, but they continue to rely on analogue forms of interaction (Palfrey – Gas-
ser 2008. 4.). Another category that was introduced by Toledo (2007) is the digital tourists who 
cannot avoid entering the digital world from time to time, but they do not do it with pleasure.
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Most of the critics of the digital native concept mention the lack of empirical analysis on this 
population. Th ey consider Prensky’s view on a radical change of the education system as a moral 
panic (Z. Karvalics 2001). Critical approaches on the digital native-digital immigrant concept 
rely on the results of empirical fi eldwork on this generation (Selwyn 2009, Benett-Maton 
2010). Th e fi ndings of quantitative and qualitative research on the one hand confi rm that there 
are diff erences between students and their teachers in their use of ICT and their competences, 
but on the other hand they question the strict distinction of generations and reveal the digital 
natives to be a homogenous group regarding their ICT use. We will present some of the recent 
empirical fi ndings in the next section.
4. Th e Student– Student Digital Gap
Empirical Findings on the Digital Natives’ ICT Use and Attitudes
Researches inspired by the digital native debate have been conducted in many regions mostly 
in developed countries – like the US (Hargittai 2010), the UK (Jones et al 2010, Margaryan 
et al. 2011), Canada (Salajan et al. 2010) – but also in some developing regions like South-Africa 
(Brown – Czerniewicz 2008). Th ere have been investigations regarding the students’ use of 
computers and the internet in every level of education in elementary school and high school 
(Eynon – Malmberg 2011, Jackson et al. 2010) and mostly in higher education (Salajan et al. 
2010). Th e researches dominantly use quantitative methods, but some investigations combined 
these with qualitative methods (e.g. Margaryan et al. 2011) and we fi nd studies with an em-
phasis on the qualitative approach (Ben-David Kolikant 2010). What are the main fi ndings 
concerning the digital natives’ ICT use patterns and attitudes?
Jones et al. (2010) conducted a quantitative research among fi rst year university students – 
born aft er 1983 – at fi ve universities in the United Kingdom to explore their usage patterns of ICT 
and to investigate whether this population can be considered as a homogenous group of digital 
natives. Th e survey consisted of four sections: demographic characteristics of the respondents, 
access to technology, use of technology in university study and course-specifi c uses of technology. 
Th e results are partly confi rmed the concept of the digital natives, as the researchers found an 
extensive access to and use of ICT. On the other hand, the concept of the generational homo-
geneity was not supported by the results, because minorities were revealed who use technology 
diff erently. Some reported a low use of e-mail, others oft en download or upload materials from/
to the internet and there is another minority that contributes to blogs and wikis. Th is research 
found a complex picture of minorities in the same age group which contradicts the  notion of a 
homogenous digital native generation.
Th e study of Margaryan et al. (2011) addressed not only the technology use patterns of 
university students, but their use of technologies for learning as well. Th ey used a mixed method 
of a questionnaire and an interview. Not only students, but also educational staff  were asked 
in the survey to compare the two generations’ technology use and attitudes. Besides the age 
dimension, the researchers added a discipline dimension as their sample consisted of students 
and teachers from Engineering and Social Work. Th e quantitative results show that students 
from a technical discipline and digital natives use more technology tools than students from a 
non-technical discipline and digital immigrants. However, considering the learning styles of the 
digital natives the “... study found no evidence to support previous claims suggesting that current 
generation of students adopt radically learning styles, exhibit new forms of literacy, use digital tech-
nologies in sophisticated ways, or have novel expectations from higher education.” (Margaryan 
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et al. 2011. 438.). Th e interviews revealed that students prefer rather traditional, conventional, 
passive learning and teaching methods. Th e authors conclude that although education has to 
change somehow to adapt to the new challenges the claims for these changes cannot be based 
on the argument of the shift ing learning patterns of the students. 
Th e digital native-digital immigrant dichotomy was put more in the focus of the research 
of Salajan et al (2010). Th ey investigated the inter-generational diff erences in technology use 
and the attitudes towards adopting digital technologies in teaching and learning. Th e research 
was conducted among students and staff  of the Faculty of Dentistry in Toronto. Th e samples 
were asked the same questionnaire at the beginning and at the end of the academic year to 
conceive the changes aft er exposure to technology use in the courses. Th eir fi ndings show that 
there are age-related diff erences in technology use between students and faculty members, but 
these diff erences are minimal and with no universal applicability. According to their results, the 
authors claim that the digital native-digital immigrant divide is “... an overly simplifi ed, narrow 
and potentially rift ing perspective...”(Salajan et al. 2010. 1402.).
Th e mostly quantitative analysis presented above point out that a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the revealed intra-generational diff erences and the implications of ICT use for 
learning should be outlined by qualitative research. A mainly qualitative study was conducted 
by Ben-David Kolikant (2010) among high school students in Israel. Her research question 
was how the digital natives themselves perceive the impact of ICT on learning and school 
performance in comparison to the digital immigrant generation. Th e answers of the students 
revealed an ambivalent judgement of ICT – mainly the internet – regarding its role in learning 
and school performance. Although the majority of the students who all were intensive users of 
the internet claimed that the internet was a helpful and useful tool for learning, they considered 
their knowledge and skills in learning worse than of the generation grown up before the inter-
net. Th e reasons for this view are related partly to the school being “old-fashioned”, as many 
interviewees exprssed. Th ey told that the school does not adapt to the changed ways of thinking 
and abilities of the students who are digitally-savvy. Th e children considered their knowledge 
worse, because they assumed that the generation before the internet read more books and was 
more diligent as they were not “tempted” by the digital technologies.
6. Conclusion
Digital inequalities in education have to be perceived, as they are challenging the effi  cacy of 
education in many aspects. As one dimension of digital inequalities, we introduced the concepts 
of the digital native-digital immigrant divide which concerns the diff erences between teachers 
and their students. Th ese thoughts on the radical change of the education system somehow gen-
erated a moral panic aft er their appearance. However, we underlined the necessity of empirical 
support of this thesis and questioned the concept of a radical change by presenting the critical 
approaches of this concept. Th ere is no evidence that the students of today would be in any aspects 
diff erent to their ancestors due to their exposure to information and communication technolo-
gies. Th e education system has to consider these new skills and communication forms of the 
students, but teachers should not be discouraged by getting categorizedg as digital immigrants. 
Th ey have huge responsibility to guide the students in the digital world and to show them how 
they can use the new opportunities of the internet and other ICT to gainadvantage in learning. 
Th e other dimension of the digital inequalities in education concerns the diff erences between 
the students which were revealed by many empirical studies inspired by the digital native debate. 
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Th e empirical fi ndings – some of which recently published  works we presented– challenge the 
digital native concept by pointing out that this generation cannot be handled as a homogenous 
group. Th ere are diff erences in connection with the access and the use of ICT. We share the 
view of Palfrey and Gasser on the digital natives who are rather a population than a generation, 
as aspects of the digital divide, the socio-economic factors and the dimensions of the digital 
inequalities still play an important role among students. Teachers should take into account these 
diff erences when applying teaching methods that require digital skills and knowledge. A better 
understanding of both approaches of the digital inequalities in education needs more empirical 
analyses for being able to suggest changes for education. ❋
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Introduction
Th e theory of Niklas Luhmann is usually 
called ‘system theory’, even though he himself 
said this term would be only a ‘brand’ and 
nothing else (Luhmann 2009 [1984]. 7–15). 
Based on the brand ‘system theory’, superfi -
cial interpretations declare Luhmann’s work 
to be a kind of structuralism, a maze of rigid 
system-categories. However, a deeper study of 
Luhmann’s theory quickly makes it apparent 
that the Luhmannian systems are structures 
not defi ned by principles outside of them, but 
by momentarily existing operations of ‘sense’. 
Th is paper is about this key term of the Luh-
mannian theory.
Heinz von Foerster’s second order 
cybernetics and the Luhmannian systems
Th e Luhmannian term ‘Sense’ has two 
main roots. One is Edmund Husserl’s phenom-
enology: the Husserlian impacts on Luhmann’s 
work and the relations between the authors in 
general are very nicely presented in Jakob Ar-
noldis’s paper ‘Sense making as communica-
tion’ and they are also expressed by Luhmann 
himself in his book on Husserl. Th at is why this 
paper starts with the other root, which is less 
known, even though it is as important as the 
Husserlian one.
Th is other root of the term ‘Sense’ (and 
Luhmann’s theory in general) can be found 
in Heinz von Foerster’s ‘second order cy-
bernetics’. Th e Austrian author Heinz von 
Foertser worked out a complex epistemology 
on the basis of classical cybernetics (Foerster 
2003.). He tried to develop a point of view that 
replaces the linear and rigid structure of the 
object-subject (observer-observed) distinction. 
According to Foerster, the observer is really 
constructed by the observed and vice versa: 
‘observation’ is nothing else but the circular 
relation between them. Observation as a rela-
tion defi nes the observer and the observed, so 
the observer refers not only to the observed, 
but also to himself by the act of observation. 
Th is crucial self-reference of the observer can 
be taken as another main point of the circular 
way of thinking or – as Foerster named it – 
the “cybernetics of cybernetics”. Humberto 
Maturana’s famous defi nition sums this all 
up: “everything said is said by an observer” 
(Maturana 1987. 65–82.) So the relation of 
observer and observed (subject and object) is 
defi ned more as co-ordination than subordi-
nation.
Foerster sees the main diff erence not 
between subject and object (observer and ob-
served), but between the orders of observation. 
His favourite illustration for this is the case of 
the blind spot. Using Foerster’s terms, the fi rst 
order of observation (our eye’s direct observa-
tion) is unable to get a coherent and complete 
image about the world out there. What we can 
see is something we learnt to see: the image 
we “see” is a result of computing processes. 
Actually, it is our brain that “sees”: it observes 
the observation of the eyes transmitted to the 
visual cortex. Th e blind spot can be seen only 
by conscious observation of the observation 
of our brain. Th is is self-reference (one of Fo-
erster’s a key terms): when we are looking for 
the blind spot, we are actually observing our 
own observation; we are observing ourselves 
as we are observing. In Foerster’s blind spot 
experiment, we glimpse our own blindness. 
A paradoxical situation arises: we can see that 
we cannot see, so we see (that we cannot see). 
With the help of the introduction of a new 
(second) order of observation, the observation 
of the fi rst order of observation will be possible. 
Th e second order of observation in that case is 
self-observation: we can observe how the fi rst 
order of our observation works.
Cybernetics, says Foerster (or rather, “the 
fi rst order of cybernetics”, as he named the 
traditional form of cybernetics), uses feedback 
only on the level of the elements (objects) of 
the observed system. In spite of that, Foer-
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ster’s “second order of cybernetics” is circular 
insofar as the cybernetician takes himself as 
part of the observed system. Th e description 
of reality depends more on the describing 
system (subject) than on the “reality out there” 
(object). Foerster’s “undiff erentiated encod-
ing principle” says that we only have data of 
quantitative kind. Our neural system “knows” 
only the place and intensity of any stimulus. 
All qualities of any impression are made by the 
observing system itself: that is the basis of the 
famous idea of “operational closure” developed 
by Humberto Maturana.
Niklas Luhmann’s oeuvre can be inter-
preted as a combination of the second order 
of cybernetics and the theory of autopoetic 
systems, applied in the fi eld of social sciences 
(Luhmann 1995.) . Concepts like the distinc-
tion between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ systems and 
the self-regulation of these systems were key 
problems of general system theory from the 
1950s on. Closed systems do not take any 
material (possible element of the system) from 
their environment in their functioning. Th e 
elements of open systems are, on the other 
hand, in the condition of permanent stream-
ing: they can transgress on the borders of 
the system. Th ey are tending towards a more 
complex and diff erentiated state. Open systems 
are not only characterized by the production of 
entropy (like closed systems), but also by the 
transmission of entropy. Th e relation between 
system and environment is a specifi c problem 
of the theory of open systems.
One of the most important questions 
of cybernetics was how the states of systems 
can be stabilized under continually changing 
environmental conditions. Th e feedback mod-
els (developed for answering that question) 
seemed universal for classical cybernetics; that 
is why cybernetics could be considered to be 
able to describe technical, social and psychic 
systems.
Aft er this brief summary of cybernetics 
and system theory the main questions of the 
Luhmannian way of system theory and cy-
bernetics can be asked: 1. how can we defi ne 
a system? 2. how is the distinction between 
the system and its environment produced and 
reproduced? 3. what is the exact operation that 
produces the distinction, and how is it able to 
decide (inside the system) what belongs to the 
system? According to Luhmann, these prob-
lems had been considered in two diff erent ways 
in earlier system theory: some arguments took 
systems as substantial, some others as analyti-
cal categories. Luhmann rejects both, because 
both of them constitute observing positions 
outside the systems, so they consider system 
theory itself an observer outside the world it 
observes. Th ey say – according to Luhmann’s 
argumentation – that system theory as a sci-
entifi c position of observation is not a part of 
the “world” it observes. Based on Foerster’s 
theories of observation (summarized above), 
Luhmann can easily reject this position. His 
(and Foerster’s) starting point is the negation of 
objective observation. Th e observer must enter 
into the observation. Th e distinction between 
observer and observed is made by the ob-
server’s act of observing himself as he observes. 
Observed (self)observation produces the ob-
served (the result and matter of observation).
In connection with this, Luhmann claims 
we can see that systems cannot be defi ned by 
their borders because the borders are constant-
ly changing, and there is no (objective) position 
of observation. His answer (and innovation) is 
the dynamic concept of the system. He says: 
“Th e system is nothing else actually but the 
diff erence of the system and the environment.” 
(Luhmann 2004. 66.) A diff erentiated system 
does not equal the sum and connections of its 
elements, but it is built by system/environment 
diff erences – even as the diff erences between 
observer and observed construct the process 
of observation and the process of observation 
makes the diff erence between observer and 
observed in Foerster’s theory.
Th e medium (in this case: tool, territory 
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and matter) is the sense. It is in this medium 
that the systems of communication and the 
systems of consciousness operate: both are 
characterized by specifi c ways of operation, 
and neither can be derived from the other. 
Th e basic operation in the case of the system 
of consciousness is thinking; in the case of the 
system of communication (the social system, 
says Luhmann) it is communication. Th ey can 
appear for each other only as environment (it 
is not possible to derive communication from 
consciousness). We have to understand the 
forms of sense appearing in communication 
systems (the structures of sociality or “social 
reality”) in a “sui generis” way.
Towards the right question about sense: 
“How does it function?” instead of “What 
is it?”
We can thus draw the following conclu-
sions: 1. only autopoietic systems are able to 
observe. 2. the way of observation necessar-
ily contains the element of self-reference. 3. 
the operations called ‘observation’ can be 
performed only in the medium of sense: the 
systems of consciousness and communication 
are sense-producing and sense-processing sys-
tems. (Th ey operate in the sense and thereby 
(re)produce sense.)
Th e ‘world’ as an endlessly complex and 
as such unobservable environment must be 
reduced to forms delivered by the medium of 
sense. Systems are created in the sense: this 
medium enables the distinction between self- 
and other-references, which is the distinction 
of system and environment. Sense also enables 
the temporal continuity of this distinction 
(Luhmann 1997. 51., 54.). Th e complexity of 
the ‘world’ stays unspecifi ed: any kind of order 
can be based only on the forms of sense which 
are done by distinction-drawings of systems. 
(Luhmann 1987. 44–46.) 
Th e context of sense can be created by 
transgressing on the borders of the system: the 
system itself is able to interpret its environment 
as the ‘other’ side of the distinction between 
self- and other-reference (remember: when a 
system observes, it always observes itself and 
the environment, because observation is al-
ways drawing a distinction between self- and 
other-reference, between, so to speak, “Me” 
and the “World”.) Th e main characteristic of 
the forms of sense is that they are able to mean 
themselves (as actual) and something else (as 
potential) at the same time (Luhmann 1997. 
48.). Consequently, the world can be observed 
in the medium of sense, but it cannot be taken 
as something already given (which means that 
it only comes into existence in the process of 
observation). No kind of substantial world-
concepts can be acceptable for the Luhmann-
ian theory. For the systems of sense, the world 
cannot be anything else but information-
potential from which meaningful identities 
(objects, symbols, signs) can be formed by 
the process of observation (Luhmann 1997. 
46–47.).
I will discuss the correspondence between 
sense and information later; now I would only 
like to emphasize that information is closely 
connected to the observing systems. Luh-
mann’s concept of information is deontologi-
cal: information can be produced only by the 
operation of observation of observing systems 
and does not have any ontological character.
Th e Places of Sense
If we want to ask the question “what is 
sense?”, we can hardly fi nd a right answer 
within the Luhmannian theoretical context 
and terminology. Th e question in fact is an 
ontological one. According to the Luhmannian 
point of view, sense is not ‘something’ we could 
defi ne. We cannot observe sense as a whole, 
because it is impossible to take an observing 
position that enables that. It is impossible to 
observe sense, because there is no observing 
position outside of it. Sense contains (makes 
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possible) all potential observations and ob-
serving positions. So we cannot observe sense, 
because we are inside of it when we observe. We 
cannot see it; we cannot defi ne it as ‘something’ 
(Karácsony 2003.).
Th us, the right question should rather be 
“How does sense function?” For answering 
that question, fi rst of all it is worth examining 
where sense functions. In other words: what is 
the vehicle of sense? In the Luhmannian theory 
these vehicles are the autopoietic systems of 
consciousness and communication. We have 
to keep in mind that these are coequal kinds of 
systems. Th at is why it is impossible to say that 
consciousness is the primary vehicle of sense, 
and why Luhmann argues in many texts for 
a concept of sense which is not bound to any 
form of “subject” (Luhmann 1987, 1997, 2008.). 
He rejects the identity between sense and sub-
jective intentions. (He says in that case the next 
question would stay unanswered: “What is 
then the sense of the subject?” – If we accept the 
term “subject”, we already presuppose sense.)
Th ere is no ontological basis or vehicle 
that would bear sense (subject or conscious-
ness for example), so we have to understand it 
independently of all these (Luhmann 2006.). 
Sense is neither the advent of the spirit in the 
world (Hegel), nor vice versa (Husserl) (Luh-
mann 2008. 15.). Luhmann describes sense 
neither as substance nor as phenomenon, but 
as relation or context (Luhmann 1987. 19.). 
Sense is not a content of consciousness but a 
rule of selection. It is a distinction; in fact it is 
a basic medium / form-diff erence (Luhmann 
2006. 217.) in the form of potential/actual. 
Th e self-referential side of the diff erence is the 
actual, which is always connected to the other-
referential side, the potential. Th e medium of 
the sense is a horizon of (potentially referable) 
possibilities, and the forms of sense are actual-
izing some of them: these are the “contents” of 
sense. Sense reduces the complexity of the en-
vironment (world) in that way, and also keeps 
the complexity as the horizon of potential: 
sense is nothing else but a selectively working 
relation between the system and the “world” 
(Luhmann 1987. 23.).
Th e answer for the question about the 
place of the sense can be formulated: sense is 
between the system and the world. In other 
words: it is in the relation of the system and 
the world. More precisely: it is the relation 
itself. Sense appears always in certain forms 
but it always transgresses these forms, because 
it makes other possibilities imaginable. Th e 
relation of the systems and sense is a constitu-
tive and contingent one. (Contingent because 
potential options are always there; any order, 
any form of a system is only a possible one 
among others.) (Luhmann 1987. 20–21. and 
Luhmann 2006. 223–224.). 
Th e functioning of sense is character-
ized by the urge of selection. It must keep the 
complexity on the external side (outside the 
system), and it must reduce it on the internal 
side (inside the system). Systems come into 
existence by selective reduction of the horizon 
of potentialities (which is the medium of sense). 
Systems are the forms of sense. Th e system is 
actual, the world is potential. Th e borders of the 
systems are borders of sense drawn moment 
by moment. Th ey are contingent, and they can 
change in every moment.
Sense as medium and form
Th e term ‘form’ can be defi ned as the 
unity of a certain distinction and marking 
which always takes place in a certain medium. 
Th e form is the actualization of the medium: 
it makes actual some potentialities of the me-
dium by distinction (selection). Sentences, for 
example, are forms of the medium ‘language’ 
(Luhmann 2006. 214–217.). So the form selects 
a certain terrain of the medium, and signs it 
as fi eld of further operations. Luhmann names 
this terrain ‘marked space’. Th is is the inner 
side of the form: then, further distinctions 
can be drawn. Th ese further operations in the 
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marked space are called ‘re-enties’ (Brunczel 
2010. 28–46.). 
If we take a closer look at the medium 
of sense, it becomes obvious that we have to 
specify what we said about its potential charac-
ter. For being able to off er potential options for 
form-creating operations, the horizon of sense 
cannot be infi nite. Its potentialities cannot 
be applied to anything. Th e world cannot be 
“whatever”. Th e infi nite character of possibili-
ties, the reference to “anything” is narrowed 
down by the process of repression which limits 
the possible options (Luhmann 2008. 25.). Th e 
process of repression marks a set of options as 
‘possible’ (this is the marked space), set apart 
from the ‘impossible’. (‘Possible’ is anything 
what can exist or happen.) Th e marked space 
of the possible is open for the re-entry: that is, 
further operations can be done which make 
further distinctions between actual and po-
tential (both must be possible!) – and this is 
how the ‘real’ comes into existence (Luhmann 
2008. 15–16.).
Repression operates with negation. Th e 
possibility of negation separates the possible 
from the impossible. ‘Possible’ is anything 
(and only that is possible) that can be negated: 
this is the marked space open for re-entry of 
further (in that case dividing ‘right’ from ‘false) 
operations. So the possibility of negation is the 
operation of repression. (Sense itself cannot be 
negated, because it contains negation as such. 
Even the sides of distinction meaningless/
meaningful are meaningful.)
Following repression, the next step is 
making concrete forms. One principal tool 
of that is time, which enables the continuity 
of form-making (in the order of before/aft er). 
At this point, it is important to keep in mind 
that operations are happening instantaneously, 
they do not have extension in time. To keep up a 
continuous existence, systems must reproduce 
their operations and exactly that helps time in 
the form (distinction) of before/aft er which 
marks the present of the operation and divides 
it from the past (not actual any more) and from 
the future (not actual yet) (Luhmann 2008. 13.; 
Luhmann 1997. 52–53.). 
In addition to time, there are two other 
dimensions in which sense comes into exist-
ence (makes negations possible): the material 
and the social ones (Luhmann 2006. 225.; 
Karácsony 2003.; Luhmann 1987. 31–32.). 
Th e social dimension of sense includes the 
experiences of Me and Others referring to each 
other (in Luhmann’s words: ego and alter). Dif-
ferent concepts of the world are applied to each 
other in forms of communication: consenses 
and dissenses. Communicable forms of sense 
come into existence in this dimension. (Th is 
aspect of the Luhmannian concept of sense is 
very close to the Husserlian term ‘intersubjec-
tivity’.) Sense creates a kind of normative and 
technical aspect in this dimension in order to 
make possible processes of communication 
(between systems of consciousnesses which are 
operationally closed for each other).
Th e material dimension reduces the world 
to the schema of thingness. It emphasizes that 
the aspect of communication according to it is 
always about something: it marks something 
in the world and the marked object becomes 
actual by the marking (divided from the not-
marked rest of the world which stays potential). 
Th e material dimension is closely connected to 
the social and temporal ones: these give context 
to the material sense (Luhmann 1987. 32.).
Systems operating in the medium of sense 
are able to assign causality to the continuity. 
Th is way they can transgress the borders of 
themselves by assigning causality to their 
environment.
By the interplay of the dimensions the 
form of information in the use of sense comes 
into existence. Th e function of sense (as we 
have seen above) is a selective relation of the 
system and the world. As we have also seen, 
sense is not a content of consciousness but a 
set of rules of selections. Contents enter into 
the experience (in the case of systems of con-
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sciousness) and communication (in the case 
of systems of communication) as information. 
Information is actually also an operation; the 
application of form, selection. It is a conscious 
selection led by sense and as such it is always 
contingent (Luhmann 1987. 26.). 
Regarding systems of communication we 
have to draw the conclusion that we cannot 
conceptualize communication as a transfer 
of information or sense, but only as mutual 
sense-actualization on the basis of common 
structure of sense delivered by the social di-
mension of sense.
Regarding the systems of consciousness, 
the most important term is ‘experience’. Th is 
is nothing but surprising information: in-
formative modifi cation of the expected; an 
overwriting of former premises. Experience 
is the continuous reconstruction of the sense-
ful constructed reality (Luhmann 1987. 27.). 
Information is the selection (and marking) 
of something. Th e structures of sense (its ap-
plied forms) make the preconditions of being 
able to gain information value. Events are not 
pieces of information on their own: they only 
become information in the medium of sense. 
Information can be marked only by selections 
that are interpretable for the system (that are 
contained by the sense-context of the system). 
As novelty (information) cannot appear only 
that has been given formerly as possible (Luh-
mann 2008. 38.). 
Th e novelty and connective potential of 
information mean that during a certain opera-
tion of sense it narrows the terrain of poten-
tiality in which later operations can be done. 
In other words: information makes a re-entry, 
divides new marked / unmarked spaces and 
by that it reduces complexity (entropy). (Luh-
mann 1997. 46.).
Summary
Sense is the universal medium for the 
systems of consciousness and communication 
that enables the reduction of the complexity 
of the world. It makes possible the observa-
tion of the world by forms that transgress on 
themselves (transgress the ‘actual’ in the direc-
tion of ‘potential’). Th e forms of sense mark 
the world as a horizon of potentiality. In the 
forms of sense, systems are able to observe the 
world and themselves. (Keep in mind: system-
borders are always drawn in sense. Th ey are 
sense-borders.) Th e world is formed by sense-
ful operations and as such it is bounded to the 
systems formed also by these operations. Th e 
world as environment (the ‘outside’) and the 
identity of the observer (the system; the ‘in-
side’) are both eff ects of senseful operations. 
Sense is not a substance but a relation. It is not 
essential, but processual.  ❋
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Introduction
In September 1937, a sociological-ethnographic fi eld work was conducted in Dudar, a small 
village in Hungary, with participants from England and Germany. Th e event was organized by 
a Hungarian staff , the members of the College of Arts of the Szeged Youth.
Th e English part of the research group consisted of and was partly recruited by the members 
of the Institute of Sociology / Le Play House, London.1 In the 1920s and 1930s Le Play House 
regularly made research trips to diff erent, mainly rural regions of Europe, including Eastern 
Europe.2 Th e team arrived in Hungary in 1937. Th eir program was a part of the English Regional 
Survey Movement which was very popular at that time. Th e English group visiting Hungary was 
led by Alexander Farquharson, the general secretary of the Institute of Sociology. Th e admin-
istrative work and the preparations for this trip were made by his wife, Dorothea Farquharson, 
herself an active member of the Institute as well.
Th e history of this event is well documented in the Hungarian literature of social history,3 
but almost nothing has been published from the results of the research. Th ey were were supposed 
to be lost or, at best, to be lurking somewhere. It was discovered only in 2013 that a great amount 
of research documentation can be found in the Archives of Keele University,4 where the papers 
of Le Play House and the Institute of Sociology are stored.
Simultaneously with the fi eld work conducted by the English researchers, Sándor Veress, a 
Hungarian composer and folk music scholar, a former pupil, and at that time a colleague of Béla 
Bartók, collected folk songs in the village5. Dorothea Farquharson accompanied him, and made 
extensive notes on these occasions.6 Here, for the fi rst time, we publish her diary in an edited form.
We learnt about the production of the manuscript in a letter of Dorothea Farquharson to 
Sándor Veress, dated 22nd October 1937,7 only a few weeks aft er the Dudar meeting.
I have just fi nished the fi le of Folk Music in Dudar. I am sending it out to you now so 
that you may insert the tunes that you heard there. I am not sure if I have left  enough 
pages in every case for all the tunes that you would like to insert, therefore I have now 
included some spare sheets in case you need to use them. We have had a type-script 
made of this fi le, and I am putting copies of all the photographs in it so that you may 
have it for yourself to keep. I shall send it out to you when you return my fi le, because 
we need to have one here for reference and in case the other were lost in the post.
Unfortunately, due to his actual personal circumstances, Veress could not complete this 
manuscript, therefore it remained a little fragmentary.
Th e manuscript was typed up on a typewriter. Occasionally Hungarian texts of folk songs 
were inserted, each cut out from the 1938 issue (released at the end of 1937) of “Szegedi Kis 
Kalendárium” [Little Calendar of Szeged], which published a part of Veress’s Dudar collection. 
In a few cases the texts have hand-written English translations. Th ere are also references to 
the musical form of the tunes. And, as we can read in Dorothea Farquharson’s letter, there are 
 1  Actually this organization founded the famous periodical, Th e Sociological Review in 1920.
 2  For a detailed history of Le Play House, Institute of Sociology and the Regional Survey Movement see Evans 1986.
 3  See Lengyel 1997.
 4  Foundations of British Sociology Archive, Keele University Library
 5  He collected 37 folk songs there. See Berlász 1982. 140.
 6  Ref. no: LP/4/1/3/7/10/3 ii
 7  Ref. no: LP/4/1/3/7/10/1 i
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empty places for the rest of the texts and translations, almost on every page of the manuscript. 
Empty places were left  for the photographs too, with hand-written comments. Although the 
manuscript itself does not include the photos, we managed to fi nd photographs in other folders 
of the Dudar research material.8 Based on Dorothea Farquharson’s comments we could identify, 
and consequently insert some of them in this edited version of the text. While editing the notes 
we omitted the references for the missing texts, music notes and photos in order to have a fl ow-
ing and readable text containing as much information as possible. Th e omissions are marked 
with (…) in the following text. Our additions are in square brackets […]. Obvious typing errors 
were corrected.
Dorothea Farquharson’s notes can be regarded as a fi eld diary, off ering an interesting insight 
into her English point of view, with observations about the host families, their everyday life, 
customs, personal connections, clothes, houses and surroundings, as well as about the occasions 
when these people sang songs. At the same time, all of her notes refl ect the information she got 
from Sándor Veress, her guide and interpreter on these occasions.
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Notes made in September 1937 when 
visiting peasant houses in Dudar to hear songs 
sung by the peasant men and women.
Professor Veress organized this work, 
took down the tunes and acted as interpreter. 
It is due to his kind help that these notes have 
been compiled. In each case two visits were 
made to the house and peasant family. At the 
fi rst visit we heard the songs and Professor 
Veress chose some that would later be repeated 
for the purpose of record-making. One evening 
was set aside to make some of these records, the 
peasants coming to Professor Veress for this 
purpose. At the second visit to the house, de-
tails of the family history and of the house plan 
and furniture were noted and photographs of 
the family, and of those who sang, and of the 
house were made. Szendi István, one of the 
peasants of Dudar, told us where we could fi nd 
the peasants who knew most of the songs. Th e 
“little boy with the nuts” off ered to carry the 
portfolio and gramophone for Professor Ver-
ess and managed to plead this as excuse for 
absence from school.
He made the acquaintance of Professor 
Veress by off ering him some nuts. Th is led to 
a talk that ended in devoted service.
Song sung by Szendi István: Love ballad 
of the daughter of the Baron of Szedri & the 
shepherd boy.9 (…)
Szendi István took us to the home of his 
mother, Szendi Sándorné whose portrait is here
 9  Hungarian text: „Arra alá, a szedresi határba,/
Kivirágzott egy nagy hársfa magába...” English 
translation is not included in the manuscript.
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Photo  v Professor Veress, Szendi István and the little 
boy with the nuts10
given.11 She was born in Dudar and has lived 
here all of her life. She is now aged 64. Szendi 
Sándorné lives with her widowed daughter, and 
grandson and grand-daughter. She is herself 
a widow.
We were anxious to hear her sing because 
she is one of the older peasants and we thought 
she might give us some of the older traditional 
melodies. She learnt her songs from her mother 
and grandmother and has passed them on to 
her children.
Th e daughter with whom Szendi Sán-
dorné lives married the son of the owner of 
her house, who lives next door. Th is son was 
killed in an accident when he was only 23 years 
of age. Th e little property of the two peasant 
houses that stand on broken ground at the 
S.W. end of Dudar village, and are adjoining, 
is therefore in the hand of the family. But in 
the house of Szendi Sándorné one living room 
is let off  to a woman with three children who 
is not a relative.
Th e widowed daughter of Szendi Sán-
 10  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i
 11  We could not identify this photo so far.
dorné is now away at Szombathely for a course 
of training in midwifery. Th e midwife of Dudar 
is old and about to retire and Szendi Sándorné’s 
daughter will return to take her place. Dudar 
peasants welcome the ideas of having a younger 
midwife, trained in up-to-date methods, as 
though there have been few deaths of mothers 
in child-bed, and the rate of infantile mortal-
ity is high. Szendi Sándorné’s other daughter 
lives in Csetény, and her two sons are in Dudar.
[Comment for a picture12:] Vines hang 
from the roof of the gador. Th e owner of the 
Photo  v [A Dudar house]13 
 12  Not inserted in the manuscript. Probably this could 
be the photo above.
 13  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i
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Photo  v [A peasant house in Dudar.] Maize cobs hang 
to dry in the sun and beans are in heaps on the earthen 
fl oor.14
property outside the door of her house, and 
standing on the gador. Th e ground slopes 
rather steeply away from the gador level.
Th e gador is a narrow passage along the 
side of the house, open on three sides, but 
protected by the slope of the house roof. Th e 
gador is a characteristic feature of the peasant 
house in Hungary and dates back to very early 
types of building. It is not in any sense a form 
of the modern verandah. It is narrower than a 
verandah and is essentially part of the actual 
structure of the house and not a mere adjunct. 
Th e gador usually has an earthen fl oor and 
wooden or dried brick posts to support the 
roof. (…)
[Comment for a picture:] Picture of Szen-
di Sándorné’s house showing the gador, about 2 
or 3 feet wide and raised a step above the slope 
on which the two houses stand. (…)
 14  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix
Th e rooms are on one fl oor, but there is in 
each house an inside ladder in a closed passage, 
rather like a high cupboard, which leads to the 
hay-loft . Th e two grand-children were playing 
on the ladder when we arrived. Th e baby cried 
aloud at [the] sight of someone strange and 
had to be picked up and stowed away indoors 
in the cradle.
In the picture on the fi rst page Professor 
Veress is standing in front of the door of the 
ladder-way into the left . (…)
Th e main entrance led into the central 
kitchen, clear of all furniture except the 4 feet 
square stove of whitewashed brick. On the 
wall at the back of the stove were pretty plates 
of peasant pottery, probably made at the pot-
tery not far from Dudar. Th ese are mainly for 
decorative purposes. In some cases they are 
never used except for decoration: but Szendi 
Sándorné told us that she used them very oc-
casionally for special feast days. Th is central 
kitchen gave a very pleasing impression of 
lightness and colour. Th e walls were white-
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washed and the earthen fl oor was smooth and 
clean-swept. Th e earth itself was of yellowish 
clay that helped to give a bright eff ect. Th e stove 
was placed in a chimney that formed a kind of 
apse against the wall opposite the entrance.
On each side were smaller arches in the 
walls with fl ue holes for pipes from the stoves 
in the living-room. A chimney-corner seat was 
here which would be warm in winter from the 
stove on the other side of the wall. Th e lower 
step was hollowed out to make a warm and 
dry shelter for chickens. On the second step 
was a small fi re-place with a metal top where 
pot could be set to boil. Th e stove in the central 
kitchen is always used for making bread.
Spoons and plates in daily use were ar-
ranged on the stove at the back. A wood fi re 
is made in the stove and when the inside is 
thoroughly hot the ashes are swept out and the 
leaves are inserted.
Th e woman who rents a living-room in 
Szendi Sándorné’s house has the room on 
the left  of the entrance but shares the central 
kitchen. In the living room is a tiled stove with 
the same arrangement of chimney corner steps 
as in the central kitchen. Her stove is not used 
in summer as she can cook on the second step 
and bake in the central kitchen. In her room 
were two wooden beds against the wall op-
posite the door, a table, 2 chairs, some shelves 
covered with a curtain (for wardrobe), and 
some shelves for pots and pans.
Th ere was a hanging lamp in the centre 
of the room and two windows looking onto 
the gador. (…)
Szendi Sándorné’s living-room is to the 
right of the entrance on the other side of the 
central kitchen. We were invited to come in and 
sit down, but fi rst the chickens had to be chased 
out and the chairs dusted. Th e room was of fair 
size – about 12 to 14 feet square, with a raft ered 
roof, earth fl oor and two windows looking on 
to the gador. In every respect it was the same 
as the other living-room, though furnished 
diff erently. We also noticed that there was an 
electric bulb hanging from the ceiling in this 
room, whereas the lodger had a hanging lamp. 
Th e central kitchen had no lighting; portable 
lamps are used there.
In this room were two large wooden beds 
covered with a woollen red and green coverlet, 
two chairs, an old wooden cradle, a small table 
against the window with two wooden forms 
and the stove in the corner. Th is stove was 
not tiled, but was of whitewashed brick and 
stone. A pair of Russian boots hung from a 
roof-beam. Th ere was a wardrobe, a cupboard, 
trunk and sewing machine. Some pegs for 
hanging clothes were fi xed into the wall near 
the door. (…)
Szendi Sándorné was joined by another 
old woman. Th ey sat side by side on the two 
chairs, with folded hands and serious faces, the 
little grand-daughter of 5 squatting on the fl oor 
between them. Th e small grandson of 8 stood 
listening by the table where we were sitting. 
Neighbours came in an out at intervals. Szendi 
Sándorné was dressed in a dark blue linen 
frock, a black shawl on her head. She was wear-
ing black felt boot. She sang quite naturally 
and without any fuss, just as the tunes came 
into her head or were suggested by her son or 
the neighbours. Her voice was sweet and clear.
Professor Veress took down the melodies 
and explained their character to me so that 
notes could be made. 
[a] Th e fi rst song was a well-known tune, 
its chief characteristic being the change from 
2 time to 3 time.
Little long-tailed swallow
Little brown haired lassie
How did you manage to come to this place?
I didn’t come that way! I was taken by coach,
it was my beloved who brought me here.15
 15 Hungarian text: Hosszi farku föcske/Szép barna me-
nyecske, / Hej, hogyan tudtál jönnyi / Ez idegen föl-
dre. / / Nem úgy gyüttem ide, / Kocsin hoztak ide, /
Hej, heles kis angyalom, / Csalogatott ide.
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Photo  v [A woman from Dudar]16
Sung by Szendi Istvánné aged 64. Born 
Suzanne Kis, widow of Stephen Szendi.(…)
[b] One song popular in the Great War 
took as its theme the death of Prince Rudolf 
of Hapsburg . Th ere stands the white cross 
above his grave and one asks “Why did you kill 
yourself and leave your wife alone”. Th e answer 
is; “It was all for love”. (…) All the songs so far 
have been love lyrics.
[c] Another tells how “the church bell 
sounds; my love goes to church; my heart breaks 
because I cannot go there with her.”
[d] Song in a a b a melodic form.
Within the three boundaries of Dudar
I am a Highwayman.
I am so called for so I am &
My Rose, my love, loves me.
 16  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix
In the cemetery of Dudar
Th ree maidens are walking alone
Th ey walk in the cemetery
Because their lover lies there.17
[e] Song in a a5 a5 a melodic form18. Here 
the 2nd and 3d lines repeat the melody of the 
fi rst line but a 5th higher. (…)
 Mazalin Pálné – aged 51. A widow with 
children. She has aged prematurely, but is a 
striking personality. She sings well and is much 
in demand for the house-to-house gatherings 
during the winter when the women and girls of 
the village strip the maize kernels from the cob. 
Later on there are similar gatherings to make 
feather beds with goose-down. Every woman 
brings such beds to her home aft er marriage. 
Th ey are the pride of each peasant household. 
Th ey can be seen, on sunny mornings, hung out 
on the gador to air; it might even be supposed 
that they are shown somewhat ostentatiously 
when airing is not quite necessary. Some 
beds that we saw were piled high with such 
down-fi lled mattresses. Another occasion for 
communal singing is when the maize has to 
be husked and braided. We went to one such 
gathering in a peasant house on evening (Sep-
tember). Notes of this are recorded farther on.
Mazalin Pálné sings while they work, but 
she also teaches hers  songs to the other women 
so that they can carry on the tradition. (…)
We found Mazalin Pálné on her knees on 
the fl oor of the central kitchen, washing the 
grandchild’s frock in a little wooden trough. 
Th e child (of 3 years) sat by her on the earthen 
fl oor. Th e stove was prepared for bread-baking.
We were taken to the living-room to the 
right of the kitchen. Th e chairs were dusted for 
us and clean had-woven  linen coverlets were 
placed on the beds. Th e small grand-child 
 17  Hungarian text: A dudari hármas határ/Magam 
vagyok benne betyár./Viselem a betyár nevet, 
nevemet/Mer a rózsám engem szeret.//A dudari 
temetőbe,/Három kislány sétál benne./Az is azért 
sétál benne, de benne,/Szeretije fekszik benne.
 18  Th is song is missing from the manuscript.
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stood between her grandmother’s knees until 
she become sleepy. Th en she fetched a wooden 
stool, climbed up into the bed and lay quietly 
under the coverlet. Two little girls, of perhaps 
10 and 12 years of age, came into the house with 
large pumpkins and could be seen through 
the doorway cutting them up and putting the 
pieces into a cooking pot on the kitchen stove. 
Th e self-reliance of these young children and 
their complete lack of aff ectation of any kind, 
was really remarkable.
Mazalin Pálné’s songs were all love lyr-
ics. Th e most common metre was a b b a. One 
song began „My love is in Dudar”, and others 
introduced allusions to Dudar. In one song 
the rhythm changed two or three times, as if 
to adapt itself to some occupation which it is 
accompanied. One song referred to the heavy 
taxation of Hungary when the three Kaisers 
met in conference in Vienna. One asked, „What 
is going on in Hungary?” and got for the answer 
„Taxation”.
Francis Joseph while travelling to Vienna
chanced to meet two fi ne Hungarian hussars.
He asked them: well my fi ne fellows, 
what news?
Th e taxes are heavy, poor Hungary 
cannot bear it.
Francis Joseph loves a soldier:
He makes recruits parade in double fi le.
In the middle of them a candle burns before a 
crucifi x,
Oh what a beautiful way of swearing alle-
giance to him.19
Th ere were songs for Name-Day celebra-
tions when parties are held and a special cake 
is made.
 19  Hungarian text: Ferenc József mikor Bécsbe uta-
zott,/Két szép magyar huszárral találkozott./Kér-
di tőlük, szép magyarok, mi ujság?/Nagy az adó, 
nem birja Magyarország.//Ferenc József szereti a 
katonát/Két sorjával állitja a rekrutát./Közepibe 
ég a gyertya, feszület,/Ferenc József jaj de szépen 
esküdtet.
A Christmas Eve carol and a New Year’s 
greeting were also sung.
Some songs were of the forest bandits who 
had gained popular sympathy. Th ey had been 
imprisoned for some small off ence and were 
later outlawed. Th eir only means of subsist-
ence was by robbery of the rich travellers on 
the forest roads. But these bandits (c.f. our own 
Robin Hood stories) only kept from their loot 
what they needed for themselves; the surplus 
they distributed to the poor of the neighbour-
ing villages. (…)
Another such song tells of a man who was 
born a horse-thief; when he was born he had 
stolen a fi lly. Later he stole 6 horses belonging 
to the County. Now everyone is searching for 
him; he is, in fact, the most wanted man in 
Hungary.
[Another] songs sung by özv. Mazalin 
Pálné:
[a] „When I was 18 I wanted to marry and 
I asked several girls but each found something 
amiss with me. I was too short, or too fair, or my 
eyes were blue, or that I squinted, my fortune 
was too small, my money too little, I had no 
horse, my smoke did not smell nice, I had no 
boots. I had not a big moustache, my mother was 
disagreeable and I did not come out enough.”
(Other peasants in the room added fur-
ther versions; one wanted a man with curly 
hair, and fi nally one didn’t want to marry at all.)
„And so I live my life in disgrace because 
no girl will have me. I shall become a soldier. My 
mother always said I was to be a soldier although 
I am not specially fi t for this.”
[b] Harvest Song20 (…)
[c] „Dressing for Christmas”. sung by an 
old man. „Oh my boot! I can’t put enough rags 
round my feet to make it fi t. My aunt Juliet is 
snatching at the „strudel” on the table and my 
uncle is roasting the chicken on the stove.”
Th is song is not sung in the house but as 
a carol outside the window.
 20  Hungarian text: Arra alá learatták a buzát… Eng-
lish translation is not given in the manuscript.
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Farkas József lives on the outskirts of 
Dudar on the road to Csetény. He was a pris-
oner of war in Russia, at Kazan on the Caspian. 
He has a good voice and sings well. All his songs 
were plaintive and he sang them dreamily.
Th e house in which Farkas József lives is 
of the usual type of peasant house. It has a large 
yard in front, with outhouses. Th ere is the ga-
dor, the central kitchen with three stoves, and 
a broad oven below the main chimney.
Photo  v Farkas József aged 4221
We were invited in the living-room. Th is 
was large and airy, with three windows with 
bright geraniums and fuchsias in pots on the 
sills. Bottles of paprika, cucumber with vinegar 
from grape were on top of the wardrobe. Rows 
of apples could be seen on one window-sill. 
Th ere was a hand-woven linen table-cloth on 
the table and a pot of asters. (…)
Songs sung by Farkas József:
 21  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix
[a] A well-known song to a sweet melody 
about a girl who is an angel and loved above 
all else. Th e second verse brings in the inn at 
Dudar – newly painted and full of folk and 
ends with the injunction; „Go home, go home 
young man; it is already time. Th e morning star 
is already in the sky.” Th e village inn is evidently 
intimately connected with love and life in the 
village. (…)
[b] Farkas József sang a ballad. It was an 
old theme but set to another theme as usual. 
Th e story of a man who had 600 gilders, [and] 
who was murdered for his money. Th e body 
was thrown into the river; but the river did not 
bear him away. A fi sherman saw the body afl oat 
on the water and brought it to the bank in his 
boat. Th e father of the man came and spoke to 
his son. Th e murdered man looked as in life 
with his black hair on his shoulders but he gave 
no sign. His wife came and tried to make him 
walk, but he was still lifeless. Th en came his 
girl lover who took him home with her saying 
she would live with him for 3 or 4 days. (…)
One other song [by Csoó Sándor aged 38] 
had the rhythm of cradle-rocking but was not 
a lullaby. Th e usual Hungarian beat is length-
ened for the second note to give this eff ect. (…)
One evening we went to a peasant house to 
see the husking and braiding of the maize. In 
the central kitchen young girls were sitting on 
the fl oor or leaning against the wall, stripping 
the long yellow husks from the maze cob. Th ey 
sang as they worked. In the lamp-light the gold 
of the maize glinted giving a beautiful glow. 
Professor Veress was there taking down some 
of the melodies they sang. (…)
In the living-room with its 4 beds piled 
high with bedding, two or three old men sat 
on the fl oor as they plaited the stalks of the 
maize cobs into a long chain. Th ese would now 
be hung up to dry. Later in the autumn further 
parties would be held to strip the maize fruit 
from the cob. Th e men did not sing on their 
own but sometimes joined in with what the 
girls were singing.
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Photo  v Farkas József and his wife22
Photo  v Kovács Pál, his wife, son, two grandsons, 
daughter, son23
Songs heard in the house of Kovács Pál.
Th is was the most interesting household 
yet seen in Dudar. Kovács Pál is now 69 years 
of age. He is of stout build, square head, long 
moustache – the shepherd type of Hungary. 
He wore a white shirt and white linen trousers, 
long and fringed, with a dark coat and apron. 
He smoked his long briar pipe and kept his hat 
on all the time.
 22 Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i
 23  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 ix
Kovács Pál has had ten children, 
fi ve girls and fi ve boys. Two sons were 
killed in the war, one died in infancy. 
Th e two surviving sons are seen in 
this picture and the two little grand-
sons. Of the fi ve daughters four are 
now married. Th e only unmarried 
daughter is shown in the picture. Her 
name is Kovács Kató. Kovács Kató is 
a very attractive girl, now aged 20. It 
was Kató, who took the role of bride 
in the peasant wedding scenes that the 
villagers staged for us at their Sunday 
festival. On that occasion her dress was 
very elaborate; but when we visited her 
home she was in her usual workday clothes – 
white blouse, red apron, brown 
kerchief on her hand and blue and 
white patterned skirt.
A coloured print on the wall 
showed a prosperous farmer’s 
house where great preparations 
were being made for the wed-
ding of the daughter of the house 
whose name was Kató. A feast is 
prepared; there is to be dancing 
and singing, a great jubilation.
Sürgés forgás készülődés
Ma lesz a nagy leánykérés
Férjhez megy a kis Kató
lesz mulatság dáridó.24
One wondered whether this Kató was 
also making preparations for her wedding, 
especially because the chief activity in the 
living-room was spinning and weaving of 
brown linen, perhaps for her trousseau.
On the right hand side on entering the 
living-room was fi rst a spinning-wheel, and 
behind that a weaving loom. Th e weaver was 
Nagy Imre, aged 79. He learnt spinning and 
 24  Th is text can be found only in Hungarian in the 
original manuscript. Here is a rough translation: 
Th ere’s hustling and bustling around,/Since today 
is proposal day./Little Kató will soon get married,/
Th ere’ll be fun and gaiety galore.
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weaving from his father and has been doing 
it all his life. Th e custom is for the family to 
supply the yarn while he comes to the house 
to make it up into linen cloth. Nagy Imre is 
not related to the family of Kovács Pál. He 
is simply employed there to make the linen 
required for family use and specially for what 
must be made and set aside for the daughters 
when they marry.
Th e spinning-wheel and loom are placed 
in the windows in good light. It can be seen 
Photo . Nagy Imre at the spinning wheel25
that the wheel is worked by both foot and hand. 
When enough bobbins have been fi lled with 
spun wool for the shuttle of loom Nagy Imre 
left  the spinning-wheel and began to work the 
 25  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i
loom. He used a foot pedal to change warp 
and woof, and ran the shuttle back and across 
by hand. Th e stuff  he was making was a rather 
coarse brown linen. When about a yard was 
ready he took his feet off  the pedal, and rolled 
the stretch of material to make it quite fl at, cut-
ting off  any loose ends. Th en he asked Kató for 
a mug of water. He fi lled his mouth with water 
and the most skilfully squirted it up and down 
the selvedge edges of the linen. Th e edges had 
then to be rolled once more. Again he fi lled his 
mouth with water and this time sprayed the 
whole surface of the linen by tiny jets of water 
from his mouth. Long practice has made this 
process perfect. Th e rolling-pin was again used 
quickly back and forth and the whole piece of 
linen thus treated was turned over on the big 
roller and stretched while it was still damp.
While the weaving was going on it was not 
possible to hear songs, as the noise of the loom 
was too great. No doubt if several voices were 
used there would be no diffi  culty in hearing 
the melodies. Professor Veress said that songs 
associated with occupations did not derive 
from industry. Th ey were songs already known 
and sung to make work easier. Th e variation 
in certain phrases of these songs is accounted 
for by the fact that they are sung by diff erent 
people in diff erent occupations. Th e same song 
adapted by the folk to suit their purposes, and 
thus holding a living tradition in folk music.
Th e furniture in this house was obviously 
handed down from past generations. Th ere 
was an old oak table with a drawer for bread; a 
stove; 2 beds; 1 bench with back; 2 chairs; and 
shelves. Th e walls were whitewashed, the fl oor 
was earthen. Th ere was a hanging lamp in the 
centre of the room. Pottery, photographs and 
unframed coloured prints were on the walls. 
A red and white cotton bed-cover, with deep 
frills was also noted.
Kovács Pál sat on the bed by the door, 
smoking his pipe of content. Kovács Kató came 
in and out with what was required for the loom 
– and then sat on one of the chairs to sing to us. 
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Her brothers and the two grandchildren and 
the mother all came in to listen. It suggested a 
very happy family circle. One felt, too, that the 
parents were greatly respected by their grown-
up sons and daughter.
When we passed through the central 
kitchen (with its large stove, the bread brown-
ing in the oven and the pans cooling the mid-
day meal on the top) into the other living-room 
we were shown the family’s household goods. 
Th is was indeed the “fi rst” room. Here were 
three beds piled high with down mattresses; 
a solid chest of drawers; a book-case and cup-
board. Th ere were three windows to this room 
and it was much lighter than the room with 
the loom. A heavy oak beam that ran across 
the centre of the roof bore the inscription K 
P 1865, the date when the Kovács family built 
the house. Portraits of the father, Kovács Pál, 
in his army uniform of the 1914-18 war, with 
ribbons and medals, and of the two sons who 
were killed in the war, also decorated with 
military awards, were evidently the cherished 
possessions here. Th ere was also the portrait of 
a local bishop and in the drawer of the chest 
we were shown several big volumes of church 
history – all Calvinistic and solid reading. We 
noticed one volume with the title: “History of 
the Protestant Church”. Certainly these books 
had been well read and were much cared for.
Kovács Kató sang:
[a]
Didn’t I tell you mother dear that you should
 let me get married?
For now they’ll make me join the army &
 others will take my lover.
Love her comrade, I don’t care
Have you time with her. I don’t mind.
But don’t kiss her in front of me
as sorrow would then break my heart.26
[b]
Th e gate of cemetery is wide open
Th at’s the place for me beauties of Dudar
Come to pluck the fl owers for me.
Pluck the fl owers, pluck the fl owers –
But not that lonely white lily –
If you do pick her, don’t let her droop,
Plant her in the top of my grave
Deep in the black earth on it.27
[c]
How I wish I were an oak in the forest
Th en perhaps someone would light a fi re with 
me.
I should like to light up & burn the whole 
round world –
since they won’t let me love my darling in 
peace.28
 26  Hungarian text: Mondtam anyám, házasits meg,/
Mert elvisznek katonának, / Ha elvisznek katoná-
nak,/Elszeretik a babámat. / / Szeresd pajtás nem 
bánom, / Éljed véle ja világod. / Csak előttem meg 
ne csókold, / Szivemet megöli ja bubánat.
 27 Hungarian text: Temetőkapuja/Sarkig ki van 
nyitva,/Odajárnak a szép dudari lányok,/Rólam 
szedik a virágot.//Szedjétek, szedjétek,/Rólam a 
virágot,/Csak azt az egy fehér liliomot,/Rólam 
le ne szakitsátok.//Ha leszakitjátok,/El ne her-
vasszátok,/Ültessétek a sirom tetejére,/Mélyen a 
fekete földbe.
 28  Hungarian text: De szeretnék tölgyfa lenni az er-
dőbe,/Ha valaki tüzet rakna belőlem,/Eltüzelném 
ezt a kerek világot,/Mert nem hagyják szeretni a 
babámat.
BELVEDEREM E R I D I O N A L E Eyewitness146 . . 
REFERENCES
Berlász, Melinda (1982): Veress Sándor – A népzenekutató. [Sándor Veress, Researcher of Folk Music] 
In: Berlász Melinda – Demény János – Terényi Ede: Veress Sándor. Budapest, Zeneműkiadó [Editio 
Musica]. 136–148.
Evans, D. F. T. (1986): Le Play House and the Regional Survey Movement in British Sociology 1920–1955. 
unpublished M Phil Th esis, City of Birmingham Polytechnic / CNAA. Available at http://www.dfte.
co.uk/ios/index.htm. Last accessed: 16.01.2015
Lengyel, András (1997): Th e Village Exploration of Szeged Youth in Dudar. In Trencsényi, Imre (ed.): 
Dudar 1937. Th e Changing Village in Transdanubia. Researchers of the Changes in Hungary. Hungarian 
Folk High School Society, Budapest. 36–69.
Photo  v Children returning from school29
Th e children of Dudar are as fond of music 
as are their parents. Professor Veress was able 
to take down some of the pretty tunes that the 
school-children sang. ❋
 29  Ref. no. LP/4/1/3/7/10/2 i
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What to anticipate when a German soci-
ologist, a resolute Europe-supporter publishes 
a book entitled “Th e German Europe”? Sup-
port for Europe from a Ger-
man point of view, or support 
for Europe from a European 
citizen who happens to be 
German? Th e latter one and 
there is no contradiction. It 
is possible to debate the left ist 
perspective and conclusions, 
but it would be irrational to 
ignore the opinion of Ulrich 
Beck, the author of Cosmopol-
itan Europe and World Risk 
Society (published in Hunga-
ry by the Belvedere Publisher 
in 2007 and 2008). Th e title 
alone is provocative and Beck knows it. As 
Europe experienced earlier how Germany op-
posed fi ercely its neighbours in the Bismarck-
ian era and had a major part in the outbreak of 
WWI under the leadership of emperor William 
II (not to mention Das Dritte Reich of Hitler), 
citizens and politicians of the continent might 
be overrun by worries and visceral fear when 
they learn that some kind of ‘German Europe’ 
is emerging. However, according to Beck it 
has already emerged: “Everybody knows, yet 
we break a taboo by declaring that Europe has 
become German.” Nobody planned, but the 
economically strong Germany has become a 
great power amongst the decision-makers of 
European policy under the shadow of Euro col-
lapse (p. 13.) Aft er the decades spent with pub-
lic confessing of historical guilt, the Germans 
themselves could not handle this situation at 
fi rst, but this has changed as well. “Suddenly, 
everybody in Europe speaks German. Not the 
language, but the approval of those solutions 
for which Angela Merkel has fought a long, 
but successful fi ght.”– said Volker Kauder, the 
fraction leader of the CDU in the Bundestag 
on an event organised by the party in 2011. 
Even the number of participants at German 
courses has remarkably increased in European 
cities; many of them would like to work in 
“German-speaking countries” or for a German 
company. While most Euro-
pean countries still suff er the 
consequences of the economic 
crisis, with an unemployment 
rate hardly manageable in 
some places, the economic in-
dexes of Germany and other 
“German-speaking countries” 
(Switzerland, Austria, Luxem-
burg or Holland) are excellent, 
the unemployment rate is not 
only low, but there is also a 
lack of labour force in some 
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regions, so there the applicants from European 
crisis zones are really welcomed.1
But what reasons have led to “German 
Europe” and what are the consequences for 
Germany, and especially for Europe? Th ese 
are the questions that the author intends to 
answer. In Europe and mainly in East-Central 
Europe, it is oft en forgotten that the European 
Union despite its defi ciencies and problems is 
indeed a success story. It was not rare that the 
European countries earlier tried to overcome 
their internal problems and interstate confl icts 
with weapons, or with the introduction of 
duties and embargos. Between the countries 
that were integrated there is no war any more, 
and the means of managing economic con-
fl icts have been remarkably improved, even 
if it is not evident at fi rst glance in all cases. 
As the author puts it: the great development 
represented by the European Union – in op-
position to the continental history of colonial 
empires and nation states – can be grasped at 
the fact that Europe and democracy are syno-
nyms (p. 41.). Moreover, the European Union, 
despite being considered infi rm by many, has 
achieved a leading position in world economy: 
with its 18,6% share of the global GDP, the EU 
precedes the avowedly emerging giant, China 
(14,9) and the United States(17,1) as well. It 
is true, though, that the GDP per capita still 
has to improve, since the average of the EU28 
falls behind the values of the Anglo-Saxon 
countries and Japan.2 Nevertheless, there are a 
lot of problems in the EU, unlike in Germany. 
Th e engine of Europe is German economy: it 
gives more than one fi ft h of the 28 member 
states’ GDP, and it is only preceded by the 
 1  Péter Techet: Európa németül fog beszélni (Europe 
is going to speak German). Válasz.hu, 2011. novem-
ber 20., http://valasz.hu/vilag/a-targyalasok-soran-
mindig-europai-szellemben-beszelgetunk-43306 
(Access: 2014. december 14.)
 2  Cited by: Portfólió.hu, 05-05-2014. http://www.port-
folio.hu/gazdasag/na_melyik _a_vilag_legnagy-
obb_gazda saga.198535.html (Acces: 2014. november 
30.) 
more populous USA, China and Japan in the 
world ranking. However, as Beck points out, 
these indexes are no satisfying references for 
the usual European citizen: the German sav-
ing policy divides Europe; it does not matter 
that the member states’ governments support 
it either out of conviction or under pressure, 
if the majority of citizens reject it. One major 
source of tension are the enduringly high rates 
of unemployment which are still increasing in 
some regions despite the austerity measures, 
and affl  ict primarily the young entrants leav-
ing them with an image of a hopeless future. 
In certain Southern countries, the unemploy-
ment rate of the youth even exceeds 50%. 
Moreover, the confl ict between public opinions 
of the crisis-stricken and creditor countries 
is sharpening, as the former one refuses the 
deadly pills of crisis-healing, while the latter 
cannot understand why they should fi nancially 
support the indebted ‘lazy’ countries. In Beck’s 
opinion, this obviously shows that there would 
be various Europes in Europe in the future. As 
he writes: at least three dimensions of new in-
equalities in Europe exist; fi rstly, the inequality 
between the Euro- and non-Euro countries; 
secondly, the division within the Euro-zone 
(creditors and debtors), and thirdly, the in-
equality of the two speeds in one Europe (pp. 
21. and 53.). Th e author believes that all these 
processes contribute to the strengthening of 
Germany’s leading role in the European Union.
Th e economy prospers, the unemploy-
ment is not really high and keeps decreasing; 
the Germans as the teachers of the EU set 
an example to the member countries. Beck 
however, as a sociologist, is not surprised by 
the fact that people in Greece and Spain fume 
at the system where they think the weakest 
have to pay the costs of the crisis and where 
they see disparity and injustice. Th e banks 
that had formerly declared the omnipotence 
of free market and condemned every form of 
state regulations had asked now the greatest 
state help possible and they got it. According 
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to Beck, the fi nancial system is off  the hinges. 
But he proves with clear argumentation that 
interdependency in the common Europe is 
factual, Greece’s secession or exclusion from 
the Eurozone would cause more damage than 
“saving”. Th is concrete example, the assistance 
to Greece reveals the dilemma of the EU leaders 
as well. Th e actual government of Greece has to 
pretend for its voters that it is opposed to the 
forceful intervention in their politics, but the 
chancellor of Germany cannot boast at home 
either with the unsecure fruits of the fi nancial 
support for Greece. Th e author concludes, not 
without bitterness: European internal policy 
nowadays is not oriented towards the Euro-
pean commonwealth, but it is infl uenced by 
national elections, the media and economic 
interests. All this serves the survival at home. 
And everybody thinks that they would be 
more successful, if they displayed doubt, and 
they did not stand up for the common future 
of the EU, but they prized national interests. 
Most politicians do not even consider taking 
risks in internal aff airs for the sake of Europe 
(p. 31.) Anyway, we learn that every cloud has 
a silver lining: Beck says that the crisis not 
only chopped Europe fi guratively into pieces, 
but paradoxically, it brought its citizens closer 
to each other, as some discussed in the last 
months the Greek economy more intensively 
than the issues of the labour market in their 
own regions. Never has Europe be spoken 
about with such intensity by the front pages 
of newspapers, the economic and cultural 
columns, by the local news, in the village and 
at the dinner table (p. 50.) which would hope-
fully result in the emergence of a common 
European consciousness. European problems 
are European problems in Portugal, Germany, 
Greece and Hungary: if one domino falls, no 
one knows how many more it would knock off  
and where the process would lead. Further-
more, the phenomenon called globalisation 
happens parallel to the European integration, 
in other words, Chernobyl, Fukushima, 9/11 or 
the crash of the American credit markets have 
indeed infl uenced the European region and the 
European decisions.
According to Beck, the primary leader 
of the EU is neither the Committee, nor 
the President of the Council; it is in fact the 
crownless queen of (German) Europe: Angela 
Merkel. Th e German Beck believes that the 
source of the German chancellor’s power is 
her “tendency” for not acting, or temporizing. 
Whenever she has to take a defi nite position 
in important question, she does it; but if the 
actual power relations require, she is ready to 
take a 180 degree turn at anytime without feel-
ing guilty, as a true Machiavellist. Considering 
other components (German culture of stability, 
connection to the orthodoxy of nation state, 
etc.) attributed to the Merkellian policy, Beck 
creates the term of Merkievellism (combining 
the essential elements of Th e Prince by the 
Florentine political thinker, Machiavelli and 
the everyday political practice of chancellor 
Merkel). Beck might be a bit too strict with the 
German leader, and at the same time, he might 
overestimate the signifi cance of her personal 
policy, or her possibilities in the European 
governance. Being uninterruptedly in power 
for such a long time (since 2005) is indeed an 
important political advantage, but the German 
diligence, thrift  and economic achievements 
give the real background for Merkel’s nation 
state policy. Th e real merits of the “Mutti” are 
that she has become the reader of German 
souls, her Protestant Puritanism, work moral 
and diligence has met the similar attitude of the 
Germans. And it is indeed her accomplishment 
that unemployment has been signifi cantly re-
duced and her Christian democrat government 
was able to boost German economy.
Beck is right when he states that Merkel 
temporizes on the European level, the real 
question is whether she does it out of wise 
consideration as Beck supposes and as it seems 
aft erwards.
Temporising or decision making, Merkel 
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demands austerity, tax moral and discipline 
in state fi nances as the requirements of Ger-
mans, surrounded by ‘careless peoples’ adds 
Beck mockingly. Although Beck criticises the 
German government, especially because of its 
European policy, he declares: compared to its 
historical antecedents, the present Germany is 
the best that we have ever seen (p. 72.).
As far as the future is concerned, the 
author hesitates, but he is optimistic in connec-
tion with the outcomes. Th e (latent) world risk 
society is a revolutionary one where normal 
and extraordinary situations cannot be sepa-
rated. Th e danger that casts doubt on the ex-
istence of the Euro and the EU is implicitly an 
extraordinary situation which is not restricted 
to the nation states. Th is an extraordinary 
situation of transnational characteristic that 
is used by diff erent participants (politicians 
of nation states, the non-voter representatives 
of the European institutions [e. g. the Euro-
pean Central Bank], social movements and 
managers of powerful fi nancial concerns) in 
various ways (with technocratic or democratic 
legitimacy).
Beck asks: can the citizens of Europe be 
convinced to fi nd a solution for the common 
crisis in cooperation? Th e author suggests that 
Europe can develop in two directions. In the 
fortunate case, the history overloaded with 
wars of nation states would be defeated and the 
crisis would be curbed through democratic co-
operation. In the second case, the technocratic 
reactions for the crisis would bring the dusk 
of democracy, as the threatening catastrophe 
would legitimize every allegedly necessary 
measure; annul every kind of opposition and 
in this sense lead to an absolutistic rule (p. 41.). 
All in all, the ‘German Europe’ that has come 
to life Beck fi nds inappropriate. Th e alleged ne-
cessity of German austerity policy has pushed 
the principle of equal participation in the 
background and it is more and more frequently 
substituted by forms of hierarchic dependency 
(p. 73.). Ulrich Beck concludes at the end of his 
essay volume that a social contract inspired by 
Rousseauian philosophy would be essential at 
the beginning of the 21st century which would 
exceed the nation state situation and off er more 
freedom, more democracy and greater social 
security for the citizens through its elevated 
Europeanism. And how can it be realised? Beck 
indicates: through the coalition of the indebted 
countries and Germany that gains profi t from 
the crisis. Th e Merkiavellistic governance has 
to be modifi ed; (full?) political-economic un-
ion should take the place of neoliberal reforms. 
Or it might be achieved by the protesting mass-
es of citizens who would fi ght from beneath 
for a union that is political and committed for 
social democratic principles, since only such a 
union would be able to vanquish the reasons 
of the misery (p. 90.). Is this really the recipe? 
Many argue against this statement, but its core 
concept, namely that the ‘German Europe’ has 
emerged, cannot be disputed.
Th e translation of Beck’s work edited by 
Csaba Jancsák and published by the Belvedere 
Meridionale is fl uent and easy to understand. 
First and last, the publisher did a fi ne job: not 
long aft er the publication of the original Ger-
man version, the Beck volume became avail-
able in Hungarian which is a praiseworthy 
accomplishment.
(Ulrich Beck: A német Európa: Új hatal-
mi térségek a válság jegyében3. Ed. by Csaba 
Jancsák, trans. by Ildikó G. Klement. Belvedere 
Meridionale, Szeged, 2013. 91 pp.)  ❋
 3 Th e original title: Das deutsche Europa: Neue Macht-
landschaft en im Zeichen der Krise published in Berlin 
in 2012.




ISSN 1419-0222 (print)  
ISSN 2064-5929 (online)
Cikkre való hivatkozás / How to cite this 
article: Jancsák, Csaba (2015): Ulrich Beck 
(1944–2015). Belvedere Meridionale vol. 27. no. 
1. 151–152. pp
Ulrich Beck who deceased on the 1st Janu-
ary 2015 at the age of 70 was one of the greatest 
sociologists of his generation. Th e questions 
of globalisation and social changes were at 
the centre of his work. In his view, we live in 
a new world whose boundaries and founda-
tions have become insecure and plastic. We 
cannot perceive and eff ectively form the new 
social reality, the second modernity, because 
our institutional systems and the history of 
their foundations have their roots in the era 
of the fi rst modernity. In an era whose leading 
ideas were characterised by full employment, 
the dominance of national state policy in con-
nection with national economy, functioning 
boundaries and clear-cut territorial identities. 
Beck thought that these ideas cannot answer 
the key questions of our age. His basic notion 
was that the institutions of national states are 
challenged by the global threats that do not 
respect any boundaries. In the chaotic world 
fear becomes a constant feeling and the long-
ing for the lost security increases. Another of 
his signifi cant conclusions was that (world)risk 
and risk-consciousness do not only dominate 
the great institutions of our society, but they 
penetrate into the everyday life of individuals 
transforming it to be more refl exive, as the ref-
erence frame of individuals is life-world itself. 
As a consequence, alienation from customs and 
traditions is a typical tendency of our age, the 
second modernity.
As a resolute supporter of transnational 
Europe, Beck believed that a European social 
contract is necessary that would guarantee 
more freedom, social security and democracy 
all over the continent, because Europe in its 
present form would not be able to resist the 
storms of risk world. Th e European Union 
must be something more than a ‘bitter mar-
riage’ kept together by the fear of collapse; 
it has to be based on something else: on the 
creation from beneath, in other words, on the 
vision of citizens’ Europe. Th ere is no better 
way to revitalize Europe than encouraging 
Europeans to act in their own rights and fi nd 
each other again.
In Hungary, Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity was published by 
Századvég in 2003. In 2001, we started to work 
on the Hungarian edition of Ulrick Beck’s Was 
ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus – 
Antworten auf Globalisierung (originally pub-
lished in 1997) at the suggestion of the youth 
researcher Kálmán Gábor. Th is volume was 
translated by Ildikó G. Klement and published 
with Kálmán Gábor’s epilogue in Szeged by 
the Belvedere Publisher in 2005 (under the 
title Mi a globalizáció? A globalizmus téve-
dései – válaszok a globalizációra). Since the 
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fi rst volume we have published one of Beck’s 
further works almost every year (all of them 
were translated by Ildikó G. Klement and the 
covers were designed by Andrea Majzik): A 
választás tétje in 2006, A kozmopolita Európa 
in 2007 (originally Cosmpolitan Europe which 
he wrote with Edgar Grande), Világkockázat-
társadalom. Az elveszett biztonság nyomában. 
In 2008 (World Risk Society), A munka szép új 
világa in 2009 (Th e Brave New Work of World) 
and A német Európa. Új hatalmi térségek a 
válság jegyében. in 2013 (Das deutsche Europa). 
Th e forewords/epilogues were written fi rst by 
Kálmán Gábor, and in the case of the last two 
volumes by Csaba Jancsák. Kálmán Gábor, the 
greatest populizer of Beck’s work in Hungary 
passed away in 2009, and now we lost Ulrich 
Beck.
 Ulrich Beck was born in Stolp, Po-
merania (today Słupsk, Poland). From the 
middle of the 1960s he studied sociology, phi-
losophy, physiology and political science at the 
University of München. He earned his doctoral 
degree in arts in 1927; seven years later he ha-
bilitated in sociology. He was a lecturer of the 
University of Münster between 1979 and 1981 
and of the University of Bamberg between 1981 
and 1992. Later, until his death he worked as a 
professor at the Ludwig Maximilian University 
in München and London School of Econom-
ics. During his very active research career 
he earned international acclaim and many 
prestigious awards. His research interests were 
modernisation/modernity, globality/globalisa-
tion, individualisation, cosmopolitanism and 
the issues of the European Union. He re-ex-
amined social and economic correlations with 
an innovative approach and enriched social 
sciences with the introduction of new terms, 
such as “risk society”, “second modernity” and 
“refl exive modernity”.
 On 17 November 2014, the Socio-
logical Workshop of Szeged organised a book 
debate as a part of the Festival of Hungarian 
Science (an event of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences) with the title From world risk society 
to German Europe where sociologists, philoso-
phers and ecologists participated. As the host 
of this event, I had to realise how Ulrich Beck’s 
work inspired generations, and how versatile, 
popular and infl uential his theories are.
Farewell, dear Professor!
Csaba Jancsák
The editor of the Hungarian editions of 
Ulrich Beck’s volumes
“Ulrich Beck was a dedicated and conscien-
tious scholar, with an encyclopaedic knowledge 
of the social sciences. For such a distinguished 
fi gure he was refreshingly down to earth and 
approachable, highly popular with his students 
everywhere. I used to tease him quite oft en, since 
he never mastered the British sense of humour, 
with its mixture of self-deprecation and smug 
superiority. More oft en than not though I was 
the one who ended up looking foolish. He had 
a good line in put-downs when he needed to.” 
(Anthony Giddens)
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Kiss Gábor Ferenc monográfi ája a magyar királyi Hon-
védség történetének egy izgalmas korszakába vezeti el 
az olvasót. A tudományos igénnyel megírt mű az akkor 
egyik legkorszerűbbnek számító fegyvernem, a gyor-
scsapatok (páncélosok, gépkocsizó lövészek, huszárok, 
kerékpárosok) megalakulását, fejlődését mutatja be 
annak gyakorlati alkalmazásán keresztül. A kötet 
lapjain nem csak egy modern fegyvernem története 
bontakozik ki, hanem az 1938–1941 közötti terület-
gyarapodásások hadtörténetének az utókor számára 
is tanúságos oldala. A tárgyalt korszak eseményeinek 
ismerete ugyanakkor segít megérteni a Honvédség 
második világháborús szereplésének hátterét is.
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